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Chapter 2 examines the harm associated with being a problem gambler. Problem 
gambling is conventionally determined by having a score in a questionnaire screen that exceeds 
some critical value. The UK is fortunate in having large representative sample surveys that 
embed such questions, and our estimate from the 2010 survey is that several hundred thousand 
people in the UK could be afflicted by PG. However, existing literature has not evaluated the 
size of the harm associated with being a problem gambler and this chapter uses this individual 
level survey data to evaluate the effect of problem gambling on self-reported well-being. 
Together with a corresponding effect of income on well-being a money-metric of the harm 
associated with being a problem gambler is derived. An important methodological challenge is 
that well-being and the harm experienced may be simultaneously determined. Nonetheless, 
instrumental variable estimates suggest that problem gambling imposes an even larger 
reduction in well-being than least squares would suggest.  The role of gambling expenditures 
in the transmission between problem gambling and well-being is considered, distinguishing 
between draw-based games, such as lotto, from scratchcards, and from other forms of 
gambling. 
Chapter 3 investigates the price elasticity of demand for the UK National Lottery – a 
state-licensed, draw-based lotto game. Little is known about the price elasticity of demand for 
gambling products because the “price” is typically hard to define. The exception is “lotto” 
where an economics literature has focused on the response of sales to variations in the prize 
distribution. Existing literature has used these responses make inferences about the price 
elasticity of demand, where price is defined as the cost of entry minus the expected winnings.  
In particular, the variation in the value of the jackpot prize pool, due to rollovers that are a 
feature of lotto, has been used as an instrument for price. This chapter argues that rollovers do 
not make valid instruments, because of their correlation with lagged sales, and propose an 
alternative identification strategy which exploits two arcane features of lotto. Finally, this 
chapter evaluates whether changes to the design of the UK National Lottery in 2013 and 2015 
had a positive effect on the sales figures. 
Chapter 4 investigates the extent to which the large, flat-rate tax imposed on the UK 
National Lottery is regressive. This chapter evaluates a Working-Leser demand model for lotto 
tickets using both Heckman’s selection model and Cragg’s double hurdle estimator using 
 v 
household-level data. A unique strategy is employed to identify these two-stage routines by 
exploiting exogenous differences in consumer preference arising from religious practice. The 
income elasticity of lottery tickets is found to be significantly lower than previous estimates, 
suggesting that lottery tickets are inferior goods and that the (high) flat-rate tax imposed on 
lotto tickets is more regressive than previously thought. 
Whilst the three chapters are stand-alone essays, they are linked by the use of modern 
statistical techniques and the use of the best possible data. Together, they address key issues 
on the economics of gambling and the results are new to their respective literatures and of 
interest to academics and policy makers alike.   
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The premise of any gamble is simple. It involves a minimum of two parties who are 
each willing and able to wager something which the other party values on different outcomes 
of some future, uncertain event. The event in question can be anything for which the outcome 
is not known – from the cards drawn from a shuffled deck to the outcome of a national election 
and the number of points scored by any given sports team to today’s closing value of the 
FTSE100. 
Written evidence of gambling activity in some form or another can be found as far back 
as the ancient Egyptians and Assyrians. In fact, it has likely existed for as long as mankind has 
been able to form opposing predictions on the outcome of some future event. Dice have been 
found dating back to 3000 BC in Mesopotamia, gambling was enjoyed by the Greek and 
Roman elite as after-dinner entertainment, lots were drawn by soldiers to lay claim to Jesus’ 
belongings, and Queen Elizabeth I used a lottery to fund defence against the Spanish Armada. 
Moreover, the relationship between gambling, morality, and the law enriches the history of one 
of mankind’s oldest pastimes – drawing interest from philosophers, psychologists, religious 
leaders, and, of course, economists alike.  
There are many aspects of gambling that make the activity of particular interest to 
economists. Its very nature provides an environment to examine how individuals behave under 
risk and uncertainty. With gambling opportunities almost never available at fair odds, 
participation in gambling poses the question of why those same individuals will pay to bear 
risk and pay premiums to avoid risk with insurance (Friedman and Savage, 1948). Viewing 
bets as simple financial contracts gives economists a setting to examine the implications of the 
efficient market hypothesis without the complexities of traditional financial markets (Vaughan-
Williams, 2005). As with any other good or service, economists naturally ask questions about 
supply, demand, surpluses and tax, and the use of gambling by governments – most often in 
the form of lotteries – to raise public finance makes gambling a particularly interesting topic. 
A final concern amongst economists with regards to gambling one of externalities. In addition 
to the association between gambling and crime, problem gambling is receiving increased 
attention from both policy makers and academics as a public health issue.  
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1.1.1 Gambling as a global industry 
Throughout history gambling activity has been subject to various degrees of regulation. 
Today, this regulation is determined at various levels of government and exists in some form 
in almost all countries around the world.  
In the US, gambling is regulated at the state level and the legality of gambling varies 
from state to state and from one form of gambling to another. Lotteries, for example, are 
permitted (and operated) in all but 6 states1, whereas only 4 states permit gambling online2. 
Australia and Canada both have legalised gambling nationwide, but specific regulations and 
licencing occurs at the province level. In the EU, gambling in-person is regulated and licensed 
by individual member states, though legal rules vary only slightly between nations. Recent 
developments in technology and the rapid rise of online gambling led to a cooperation 
agreement being signed in 2015 by EU members to allow gambling regulators to share their 
practices. In China, gambling is officially illegal, however citizens are able to participate in 
state-run lotteries and restricted gambling activity is permitted in Hong Kong and Macau as an 
added attraction for tourists.  
Partly due to increasingly liberal attitudes of governments around the world, and partly 
to technological developments allowing individuals to gamble remotely and online, the 
gambling sector expanded to become a significant global industry over the past 5 decades. 
Figure 1.1 shows the global annual “gross gambling yield” (GGY) – the industry term for 
wagers placed minus winnings paid – from 2001 to 2016. In this 15-year period alone, annual 
takings for gambling operators doubled from $220b to $450b. This rapid rise in global revenues 
can be seen in each country where legal gambling occurs. A report by the Canadian Gaming 
Association (2011) shows that from 1995 the legalised gambling industry tripled in size and 
has become the largest of the entertainment sector by revenue. The Canadian gambling market 
contributed $31b CAD to the economy, employing over 128,000 people in 2010. In Australia, 
a report by the Australian Productivity Commission (2010) showed the GGY in 2008-2009 
was $19b AUD, or 3.1% of household consumption. The American Gaming Association 
(2016) reports the GGY from casinos alone in the US was $38.4b USD in 2015 and the North 
                                               
1 The 6 states which prohibit lotteries are Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Delaware. 
American Samoa, an unincorporated territory of the United States also prohibits lotteries.  
2 The 4 states which permit gambling online are Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 
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American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries reports a GGY from lotteries of an 
additional $35b USD in 2016.  
Figure 1.1: Global gross gambling yield (GGY) in $USD (billions) 2001-2016 
 
1.1.2 Gambling in the UK 
In the UK, gambling is regulated by the Gambling Commission and gambling firms 
must possess a license to operate legally. Many forms of gambling are permitted under UK law 
both in person and remotely via the internet including lotteries, gambling at casinos, betting on 
sports and other events, and on virtual games but age restrictions are enforced3. 
1.1.2.1 Size of the UK gambling market 
In the year to September 2016, the GGY of the UK gambling market totalled £13.8b 
and employed 106,678 people (Gambling Commission, 2016). Figure 1.2 shows the increase 
in the size of the regulated UK gambling market by GGY from April 2008 to September 2010. 
Official figures show that the market has grown by almost £5.5b over this time period. A large 
portion of this reported increase is due to a legal change in October 2014 which expanded the 
scope of the UK regulator to include all remote bets placed by UK customers, regardless of the 
registered country of the betting company used. Prior to this, the regulator was limited to 
reporting figures from UK registered companies and, unfortunately, no GGY figures 
                                               
3 In the UK, an individual must be 18 or over to participate in any commercial gambling with the 








































comparable to those post-2014 are available. Nonetheless, comparing annual GGY figures 
before this date shows steady growth in the UK market from April 2009 to March 2014, 
increasing by around £1.8b over this time period. The market appears to have continued this 
growth post-2014, increasing by around £400m in GGY from 2015 to 2016.  
Gambling in the UK not only generates these significant revenues for the gambling 
companies themselves, but also makes substantial contributions to the UK tax budget. In 2016-
2017 the industry generated £2.7b in tax receipts and, as Figure 1.3 shows, these tax revenues 
have increased year-on-year since 2006-2007. Since 2001, winnings from gambling in the UK 
are not considered income or capital gains and are therefore received tax-free but betting and 
gaming taxes in the UK are instead imposed on gambling operators themselves. Gambling 
duties are charged as a proportion of profits or GGY of individual gambling firms and the rate 
applied varies depending on both the size of the company and the type of gambling activity. 
For instance, the current duty levied on earnings from remote gambling, in-person betting, and 
small in-person gaming is 15% of profits from these activities, whereas bingo and lotteries are 
taxed at lower rates of 10% and 12%, respectively4. 
Figure 1.2: UK GGY in £millions April 2008-September 2016 
 
                                               











































YearSource: Gambling Commission 
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Figure 1.3: UK betting and gaming tax receipts 1999-2017 (£m) 
 
Figure 1.4: UK market share of each gambling category by GGY 
 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the composition of the UK market by the GGY of each activity. The 
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remote)
Source: Gambling Commission (2016)
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GGY, more than double the profits compared to 2015 (£2.2b)5 and accounting for 33% of total 
gambling revenues. The second largest sector is “betting” which includes gambling in-person 
at a bookmaker (either placing bets on real-life events or spent on virtual gaming machines in-
store), bets placed on site at sporting events, and entries to the football pools. Third is the 
National Lottery which operates a range of numbers-based lotteries and scratchcard games and 
makes up almost a quarter of the market by GGY. The UK National Lottery is of particular 
interest as its primary function is to raise revenues for “good causes” – public goods which are 
otherwise not financed using regular tax money. The remainder of the UK market is made up 
of revenues from casinos, bingo, arcades, and other small charitable lotteries.  
1.1.2.2 The National Lottery 
The largest gambling provider by GGY in the UK is Camelot, who is licensed by the 
Gambling Commission to operate the National Lottery and the games it provides feature in all 
of the following chapters. It currently offers four numbers-based lottery games6, a range of in-
person instant win games known as scratchcards, and several online instant win games. As with 
many lotteries around the world, a large share of the proceeds from the UK National Lottery 
are used for financing public goods7. Unlike most lotteries, however, these funds are allocated 
to public goods – termed “good causes” – which are not covered by regular tax money in the 
UK. The UK National Lottery generates an average of £30 million per week in good causes 
funding – a total of £37 billion since its first game in 1994. Investment of these funds is decided 
by 12 organisations chosen by the UK government and distributed across four broad categories: 
health, education, environment and charitable causes (40%), sport (20%), arts (20%), and 
heritage (20%). According to the National Lottery website8, these funds have helped to finance 
over 500,000 projects in the UK and have previously been used to finance projects as varied 
as the London 2012 Summer Olympics and restoration work on Stonehenge and the Royal 
Opera House. 
                                               
5 Remote gambling here refers to any form of gambling not done in person at designated business 
premises. The vast majority of remote betting today is done via the internet, though it also includes 
gambling via telephone. 
6 Two of the four numbers games, Lotto and Euromillions, primarily offer “pari-mutuel” prizes – in 
which players aim to win shares of prize pools funded by entry fees – and the other two are fixed-prize 
games. 
7 Currently, 28% of lottery sales revenue is earmarked for spending on good causes. 12% of revenues 
are paid in lottery duty to HMRC, 50% is returned in prizes, with the remaining 10% of revenues 
covering operating costs (9%) and profit (1%). 
8 www.national-lottery.co.uk 
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Dwindling ticket sales for the National Lottery’s flagship game – Lotto – has recently 
prompted two overhauls of the game’s design. Changes in October 2013 saw the sticker price 
of tickets double from £1 to £2, the introduction of 50 raffle prizes of £20,000 to each draw, 
and changes made the share of revenues allocated to each prize pool. The final change to the 
game saw the fixed prize paid to players who matched 3 of the 6 winning numbers increase 
from £10 to £25. A second redesign occurred in October 2015 which introduced a further raffle 
prize of £1m each to each draw and expanded the set of numbers from which players choose 
(and which make up the winning combination) from 49 to 59, decreasing the probability of 
winning the jackpot prize from around 1/14m to 1/45m. This later reform to the game also saw 
the introduction of a free ticket to the next draw being awarded for matching 2 of the 6 winning 
numbers and lifted a cap on the number of times the game could “roll-over” before the jackpot 
prize money would be shared amongst winners of lower prize tiers.9 
1.1.3 Problem gambling 
Whilst for many individuals gambling is merely a source of harmless fun, there are a 
number for whom it can be a very real and serious problem. This problem gambling has 
received growing attention in recent years from the media, academics, and politicians. 
However, the literature in economics, medicine, and psychology on problem gambling is still 
in its relative infancy, with the American Psychiatric Association only classifying the condition 
as an addictive disorder as recently as 2010. 
Problem gambling is typically diagnosed by an individual exceeding some critical value 
on a screen of scored questions. Use of such screens in representative sample surveys has 
allowed researchers to estimate the prevalence of problem gambling for entire populations. 
Estimates of this prevalence rate varies across the UK from 0.5% according to the Health 
Survey England in 2012, to 1.1% from the Welsh Problem Gambling Survey in 2015. Calado 
and Griffiths (2016) present a review of the literature surrounding prevalence rates around the 
world. Their data suggests that the UK’s problem gambling prevalence rate is comparable with 
that of Australia (0.4-0.6%), and relatively low compared those of Canada (2-3.5%) and the 
US (3.5-4.6%), where the same diagnostic screens have been used. Whilst problem gambling 
only affects a small proportion of the population, the number of people afflicted with the 
                                               
9 Prior to the 2015 game changes, the jackpot would be shared amongst winners of the next highest 
prize tier if it was not won for 4 consecutive draws. After the changes, the game was free to roll-over 
until the jackpot reached £50m; after which, if it had still not been won, would be shared amongst 
winners of the next highest prize tier. This cap was reduced in 2016 to £22m.  
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condition is still large. In the UK, the estimated prevalence rate of 0.5% indicates over 300,000 
people are affected, and in the US a prevalence rate of 4.6% implies there are almost 15 million 
problem gamblers.  
1.2 Aims and structure 
The aim of this thesis is to make three novel contributions to the current understanding 
of issues surrounding the economics of gambling. The following chapters can be read as stand-
alone essays on three different aspects of the economics of gambling but are also connected by 
the application of modern statistical techniques to the best data available. Collectively, these 
chapters contribute to our understanding of the level of harm experienced by those afflicted 
with problem gambling, of how to model lotto demand, and the regressivity of taxes imposed 
on the UK lotto.  
1.2.1 Overview of Chapter 2 
Whilst the prevalence of problem gambling is well documented in the literature, and 
there is some evidence on the externalities caused by gambling, there is little known about the 
level of harm experienced by afflicted individuals. Chapter 2 aims to fill this gap in the 
literature using a well-being methodology in which self-reported happiness is the dependent 
variable and problem gambling and income are the independent variables of interest. Dividing 
the coefficients on the two independent variables gives a money-metric of the loss in well-
being associated with being a problem gambler and acts as a catch-all measure of the harm 
experienced by those affected. By aggregating this money-metric of the harm associated with 
well-being using prevalence rates, average income, and the UK population figure, the implied 
loss in happiness associated with problem gambling is equivalent to increasing national 
incomes by approximately £30b. To obtain causal estimates, an instrumental variables strategy 
is employed using parental problem gambling and aggregate estimates from this are even 
larger. The results are found to be robust to both measurement error in the independent 
variables and ordinality assumptions about well-being. The transmission mechanism of lost 
well-being from problem gambling via gambling expenditure is also considered. Although 
measurement error in the expenditure renders much of this analysis ineffective, there is 
tentative evidence that expenditure on scratchcards plays a mediating role. 
1.2.2 Overview of Chapter 3 
This chapter uses aggregate-level data for each draw of UK lotto to investigate the price 
elasticity of demand for the game and the importance of prices as a determinant of demand. 
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Accurately modelling demand for the UK lotto is important because of its function as a means 
to raise finance for public good provision and the large tax revenues collected from its 
operation. Moreover, such a model is a necessity in determining whether these revenues are 
being maximised. Existing models of lotto demand use a unique feature of the game – rollovers 
– as an instrumental variable to overcome the simultaneity bias inherent to such analysis. 
Chapter 3 argues that rollovers make poor instruments as they are also correlated with sales 
and instead proposes exploiting behavioural biases in players to identify the model. The role 
of prize size is also investigated as a key determinant of demand for lotto games. Findings from 
these models and testing against models of demand that use price alone suggest that existing 
models of lotto demand are also deficient insofar as prizes also affect the demand for tickets 
beyond their influence on price. Finally, using data beyond the main sample period, this chapter 
evaluates whether the game redesigns of 2013 and 2015 increased revenue relative to what 
would have been received had the operator left the game unchanged. The evidence suggests 
that sales did indeed increase beyond what they would have been had the game design remained 
the same. 
1.2.3 Overview of Chapter 4 
Lotteries notoriously offer participants one of the worst returns of any form of gambling 
and the UK lotto is no exception. With just 50% of revenues being returned in prizes, the 
combined good causes contribution and lottery duty of the UK game is in effect taxed at 40% 
with the remainder covering operating costs and profit. Moreover, with the game being 
operated under license from the government, the question of the regressivity of these taxes is 
even more important. Due to the flat rate of tax imposed on the UK lotto, an analysis of this 
question trivialises to determining whether the income elasticity of demand is less than 1. 
Chapter 4 improves upon existing literature by estimating a Working-Leser demand function 
and finds income elasticity estimates significantly lower than previous estimates. Estimating 
this specification using micro-level data requires modern statistical techniques to overcome 
bias induced by the presence of zeroes in expenditure data. Both Heckman’s selection model 
and double hurdle models are considered. The identification of both these two-stage procedures 
is done using exogenous differences in consumer preference arising from religious belief. 
Whilst there is little qualitative difference implied by the estimates of income elasticity, 
choosing between estimates from these two models has importance to the implied magnitude 
of the regressivity of lotto taxes. A Suits’ index estimate is also calculated and suggests that 
the regressivity of taxation on UK lotto tickets is in the ballpark of alcohol and tobacco taxation.   
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2 How much of a problem is problem gambling? 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with evaluating the reduction in well-being caused by being 
a “problem gambler”. Problem gambling (PG) is usually defined by aggregating responses 
across questions which are embedded within a screen designed by psychologists to capture 
such behaviour. When administered to large samples of individuals this facilitates an estimate 
of the prevalence of problem gambling.  An individual is defined as a problem gambler (PG=1) 
if that individual’s score on the screen exceeds some critical value. There are several such 
screens used in this literature and they each contain questions that are designed to detect 
behaviour associated with pathological gambling and gambling harms. Our estimate for Great 
Britain (i.e. UK minus Northern Ireland, who are a very small proportion of the UK population 
and were not surveyed in our data) is that there are approximately ⅓ million (about 0.7% of 
approximately 45m) adults who are assessed to be problem gamblers, and this is typical of the 
literature. A recent review of PG by Williams et al (2012) provided estimates for the USA that 
suggested the PG prevalence rate was 2.2% of approximately 240m US adults, or around 5m. 
However, none of the extensive literature that attempts to quantify the prevalence of 
problem gambling has attempted to also quantify the costs that problem gambling imposes on 
the individuals afflicted by it, and this is the main contribution of this paper. Here, a well-being 
methodology is used which scales the effect of PG on self-reported well-being with the effect 
of income on well-being to produce a money metric (see, for example, the recent application 
to valuing the availability of health insurance using the Oregon experiment by Finklestein et 
al, 2012). The baseline estimate of the aggregate loss in well-being associated with PG is 
approximately £70 thousand ($90k at current exchange rates) per problem gambler, or over 
£25 billion per annum across the GB population as a whole – a figure that is the same order of 
magnitude as that often associated with alcohol abuse, exceeds the tax take on gambling 
products, and even exceeds overall gambling expenditures10. The US estimates of the 
                                               
10 HMRC reports gambling tax revenue of £2.1 billion for 2014/15, and the Gambling Commission 
reports further good causes revenue from the National Lottery portfolio of games of £3.8 billion. 
Alcohol expenditure in 2010 was approximately £16b and the Institute of Alcohol Studies (IAS) 
estimates of the harms associated with alcohol abuse in the UK is in the order of £21b pa. This estimate 
is not comparable with our well-being based measure, but rather aggregates effects associated with 
crime, absenteeism, and health. The IAS reports results that also include wider harms that aggregate to 
over £50b pa. Tax revenue from alcohol is approximately £10b p.a. Note that the measure here is not 
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prevalence of PG would suggest an overall loss in well-being that would be equivalent to $450 
billion pa if the presented estimates were applicable to the US. 
Gambling is an important part of many economies. UK expenditure net of winnings 
(sometimes referred to as Gross Gambling Yield, GGY) in 2014/5 was approximately £3 
billion, or about 0.2% of GNP; and overall expenditure is close to £12b or more than 0.7% of 
GNP. The Economist (2017) cites a report by H2 Gambling Capital Consulting that estimates 
that US gambling losses amount to $116 billion in 2016, despite the much stricter regulatory 
controls on off-course/internet betting in the US than in most other countries.  
Consumers in the UK do not directly pay tax on gambling - with the exception of the 
products sold by the National Lottery, sales of which are taxed at 12% plus a levy for “good 
causes” of approximately 28%. Suppliers of other products pay 15% on “profits”, defined as 
revenue minus winnings and in the case of FOBTs (Fixed odds betting terminals) that are 
thought to be particularly likely to be associated with PG, the tax is 25%. Relative to other 
“sins”, gambling in the UK is not highly taxed; and taxes have been driven downward as 
regulators and tax authorities have struggled with the increasingly footloose nature of the 
industry that is becoming more highly dominated by online, and often offshore, provision.  
The motivation for sin taxes is driven by the notion that consumption causes 
“internalities” as well as externalities. The former are harms that are self-inflicted, sometimes 
uncertain, and often long-term, but which are not fully internalised by the consumer.11  In which 
case, penal levels of tax can be motivated not just by Pigovian considerations but also by wider 
considerations associated with the behavioural deficiencies in individual preferences. Indeed, 
whether to legalise and tax the consumption of some commodities, as opposed to criminalise, 
has been analysed by Becker et al (2006) who show that the demand and supply elasticities as 
well as the nature of harms, play an important role in the optimal design of policy. Thus, the 
contribution here speaks to one of the critical parameters relevant to the design of public policy 
relevant to potentially harmful products.  
                                               
one of social costs in the traditional sense (see Walker and Barnett (1999) for issues around the 
measurement of social costs in the context of gambling).  
11 See Gruber and Koszegi (2004) for an analysis of cigarette taxation in the context of a model with 
time-inconsistent behaviour. Also see Leicester and Levell (2016) for an analysis of the effects of a 
smoking policy on well-being which is consistent with a behavioural interpretation of addiction. 
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This analysis exploits the availability of data on well-being in a large household sample 
survey. We construct a financial measure of PG harm by estimating the relationship between 
subjective well-being, PG, and income. The methodology draws on the seminal work on 
“happiness” and a particularly good early exemplar is Clark and Oswald (2002). The 
methodology estimates well-being effects for a variety of life outcomes using large random 
samples of individuals, and the relative coefficients of income and of the life event in question 
are used to provide a financial compensating amount for that event. The method has been used 
to evaluate the effects of marital status, unemployment, health, and many other phenomena.12 
The present application also adopts this idea of scaling the effect of PG on well-being by the 
effect of income on well-being to monetize the estimate of the well-being effect of PG. This 
well-being approach is a catch-all one – it looks, not at the mediating mechanisms, but directly 
at the effect on the well-being of individuals, irrespective of how that comes about.  The results 
are dramatic: the baseline estimate is that the harm associated with PG is over £70,000 pppa 
which, for ⅓ of a million PGs, amounts to an aggregate loss in well-being for the UK of over 
£25b pa. The size of consumer surplus enjoyed by responsible gamblers, and the revenue 
generated for the HMRC, is likely to be small in comparison to such huge welfare losses. 
However, there are a number of threats to the legitimacy of the well-being methodology 
that are typically not addressed in the existing literature. In particular, measurement error and 
other sources of endogeneity are usually ignored by the simple regression method that is used 
to obtain the statistical estimates.  Existing measures of PG are based on self-reports and are 
very likely to be measured with error in the data. Thus, OLS estimates will inevitably understate 
the effect of PG on well-being.13 On the other hand, PG might be symptom of low well-being 
rather than the other way around. This reverse causality is likely to bias the estimate of PG on 
well-being upward. Since these two sources of bias counteract each other, it is unclear what 
the net effect would be – the true effect might be larger or smaller than baseline results obtained 
by OLS. 
                                               
12 Powdthavee and van den Berg (2011) use the well-being method to evaluate the effect of a variety of 
medical conditions on several measures of well-being. However, they do not consider the issues raised 
above which are likely to bias the results in different ways for different well-being measures. An 
excellent review of the issues around the use of subjective well-being measures can be found in Nikilova 
(2016), albeit in the context of development. 
13 To make things more complicated, measurement error in income is likely to understate the effect of 
income on well-being – and since it is used to scale the effect of PG on well-being this will tend to 
overstate the financial effect of the loss in well-being associated with PG. 
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This chapter attempts to tackle these endogeneity issues head-on using an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach. The reported coefficients suggest even larger losses in aggregate well-
being than the simple headline results – nearly double what the OLS estimates suggest. 
However, a substantially larger dataset would be needed to come to any firm conclusions and, 
for the moment, the OLS estimates can be treated as a plausible lower bound. 
A complementary approach to this investigation of well-being data would consider the 
effect of PG on a list of all relevant mediators – for example, in the case of PG, researchers 
may look at the effect on mental health, employment, wages (a measure of productivity in the 
labour market) conditional on employment, tax receipts, and welfare payments etc. The 
predicted effects would then need to be “valued” and aggregated14. A recent UK example is 
Thorley et al (2016) which focuses on those outcomes that affect some of the range of other 
people and agencies, apart from the PG. That study, from the Institute for Public Policy 
Research, focuses on only certain aspects of health, housing, crime, and welfare and 
employment, and provides estimates of a cost of just £1.2b pa. This alternative methodology 
is likely to miss many elements of the transmission mechanism for which data is not available. 
Moreover, this method is also more likely to miss true externalities – the effects of one person’s 
PG on other people is not measured in the IPPR study, for example. The well-being method is 
less likely to be affected by this – since it will capture the effects of own PG on other people 
to the extent that the former feels altruistic towards the latter.15 In any event, the well-being 
method seems likely to yield bigger estimates than the alternative to the extent that the latter 
embraces only a subset of possible mediators.  
Nonetheless, the analysis in this chapter is deficient in that it has no policy implications 
over and above highlighting the magnitude of the PG problem, important though that might be. 
To address how to ameliorate the PG problem would require structurally modelling PG. While 
the former requires an understanding on the nature of the behavioural deficiencies underlying 
individual behaviour, the latter would require information on gambling expenditure that our 
data does contain; together with a sense of the behavioural deficiencies that inhibit restraint in 
                                               
14 An exhaustive report on the Australian gambling market by Delfabbro (2010) for the Australian 
Productivity Commission (APC) reviews the literature on a wide variety of harms associated with PG 
(ch 3) and comments on the APC’s own attempt (Australian Productivity Commission, 2010) to 
aggregate harms and compare with consumer surplus benefits (ch 6). 
15 Attempts to estimate the effects of PG on the well-being of spouses yielded small and imprecise 
estimates. Of course, partner separation might be partly driven by PG and the sample of intact 
partnerships is probably not representative – these are surviving partnerships. 
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the longer term that would likely require panel data.  At present, there are only two panel studies 
in the world, none for the UK, and, in any event, the two that do exist are far too small to 
support fixed effect estimation. And even if they were not, differencing self-reported gambling 
expenditure, income, and PG in panel data is inevitably likely to exacerbate the measurement 
error problems considerably, even if it were to eliminate simultaneity bias.  
However, this chapter may be able to investigate the way in which PG affects W, 
conditional on PG status. The most obvious contenders as mediating variables are gambling 
expenditure and gambling losses and Section 2.5.4 attempts to quantify their role, once the 
magnitude of the PG problem has been established. However, gambling expenditure in the data 
is heavily underreported, with the exception of scratchcards and lotto. The finding of no effect 
of overall gambling spend on the impact that PG has on well-being is likely to be a 
manifestation of the measurement error in the data. However, since expenditures on National 
Lottery products (lotto and scratchcards) are comparatively well measured in the data, one 
might be prepared to place at least some faith in the estimates that scratchcard spending does 
have a sizeable and statistically significant mediating role, while spending on lotto does not.  
2.2 Related literature 
There is a considerable literature on problem gambling. All of the quantitative work 
uses one or more of a number of screens that consist of a set of questions that are thought to be 
indicative of PG. An overview of the problem gambling literature is provided by Orford et al 
(2003), which exploits the British Gambling Prevalence Surveys (BGPS) that pre-date the 2010 
GPS used in our analysis. Griffiths provides an updated review of the British literature in 
Griffiths (2014), which includes analysis of the 2010 GPS data used here, as well as providing 
wider international comparisons. The BGPS is one of a small number of random sample 
surveys of populations that have been conducted in the world for this purpose – many samples 
elsewhere are drawn from specific subsets of the population. Indeed, Britain has had three such 
surveys - although the changes across years have been small and the samples are not large 
enough to have the power to reject stability of the prevalence of problem gambling across time. 
For the 2010 dataset used here, Griffiths argues that “…problem gambling in Great Britain is 
a minority problem that effects less than 1% of the British population…”, and that “Problem 
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gambling also appears to be less of a problem than many other potentially addictive 
behaviours”16.  
Related research does consider the public health consequences of gambling which looks 
at specific outcomes in a piecemeal fashion. An excellent early overview is by Shaffer and 
Korn (2002) which candidly confesses that the causal effect of gambling on adverse outcomes 
such as mental health, crime, domestic violence, etc. cannot be inferred from their correlations, 
even though some of these correlations are large. Establishing that an effect of gambling on 
any of these outcomes is causal is likely to be problematic. Establishing the causal effect on all 
possible outcomes is likely to be considerably harder. The well-being approach offers a 
practical and way of condensing the problem into a univariate outcome. 
However, none of the extensive PG literature that focusses on measuring the prevalence 
of PG makes any attempt to uncover the size of the problem that PG generates for those people 
who are so afflicted. So, this literature is seriously incomplete, and this work attempts to fill 
that gap as its primary contribution. Only Forrest (2016) and Farrell (2017), who also use the 
2010 BGPS draws any attention to this issue. While Forrest (2016) does not report the effect 
of problem gambling on well-being he does report that non-problematic gambling increases 
well-being by 0.2 points, on the 0 to 10 scale, perhaps reflecting the consumer surplus from 
being able to gamble. Attempts to replicate this finding here were, however, unsuccessful using 
the well-being specification and the same data. Farrell (2017) controls for income in her 
estimation of the relationship between well-being and PG but her interest is in improving the 
fit of the relationship between well-being and PG, not providing causal estimates, and she 
makes no attempt to derive welfare inferences from her analysis. 
The precise question asked in the BGPS data was “Taking all things together, on a scale 
of 1 to 10, how happy would you say you are these days?” Deaton and Stone (2013) refer to 
measures of well-being such as that in the BGPS as “evaluative” and they report that there is a 
stable relationship in the literature between such evaluative measures of well-being and log 
                                               
16 Here, Griffiths is referring to Sussman et al (2011) who surveyed the prevalence of other addictions 
and found that addictions to alcohol, cigarette smoking, illicit drugs, work, and shopping appear to have 
a prevalence rate of around 5% to 15% of the population.  
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income, with a coefficient that is typically around ½ - implying that a 100% increase in income 
would raise well-being by ½.17  
Forrest (2016) reports a large difference in mean well-being for PG vs non-PG 
individuals in the BGPS data18. He goes on to investigate the other correlates of well-being in 
the 2010 GPS data, including income intervals and many other control variables. He reports 
estimates that suggest that the effect of PG is strongly and significantly negative. While he 
does not report the implied effect of income because of the binned nature the data, he does 
demonstrate that the effect of PG on W is comparable with the effect of divorce and 
widowhood, relative to married. However, it seems likely that several of the control variables 
that Forrest includes represent “bad controls”: variables that are themselves endogenous and 
whose presence results in biased coefficients of the PG variable and/or those on income 
intervals19. For example, education, employment, self-reported health, and marital status are 
all arguably endogenous; and they are likely correlated with PG as well as with income and 
well-being. It is unclear what the direction of bias would be on the PG or income coefficients 
associated with including such bad controls.  
In addition to the bad controls problem, which is addressed here, there are strong 
grounds for thinking that PG itself is measured with error. It is, after all, self-reported and 
individuals may wish to conceal their problem from the interviewer if not from themselves, 
even though the interview is constructed in a such a way that interviewer is not able to see the 
subjects’ responses to the PG screens. Moreover, PG itself, even if it is not subject to 
measurement error, is likely to be endogenous because both PG and well-being may be 
correlated with some unobservable factors that are not explicitly included in the modelling - 
for example, with non-cognitive traits such as self-control. Or, PG might cause low well-being 
at the same time as low well-being causes PG.  Resolving this endogeneity issue is crucial for 
being able to put a causal interpretation to the estimated relationship between PG and well-
being in observational data. A causal estimate of the effect of PG is needed, rather than a simple 
                                               
17 Interpreting the coefficient on log-income in the relationship between well-being and log income as 
the coefficient of a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) expected utility function then this 
coefficient of ½ would be within the ballpark of estimates from other methodologies. For example, 
Hartley et al (2013) estimate the CRRA coefficient using a sample of gameshow players in an 
environment where players might win a wide range of amounts. Their well-determined estimate of risk 
aversion would be consistent with a coefficient on log income of 1. 
18 Since 2010 the DSM and PGSI screens used in the BGPS surveys have instead been incorporated in the 
Health Survey of England (HSE) in 2012, and the Scottish Health Survey (SHS) every year since 2012. 
19 The bad controls problem is discussed in section 3.2.3 of Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
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correlation, since the objective is to obtain estimates that will help policymakers understand 
the consequences of a policy-induced change in PG. 
Moreover, a common weakness of the existing literature is that income is typically 
measured with error and this will tend to attenuate the coefficient on income in a well-being 
equation. Since the money metric associated with the event in question will vary inversely with 
the estimate of the effect of income on well-being this attenuation in the latter will inflate the 
money metric. Powdthavee (2010) appears to be the only paper to suggest how important this 
problem is. He corrects for the measurement error in income, in the relationship between 
income and well-being in the British Household Panel Study data, using information on 
whether the interviewer saw the payslip of household members. Using this as an instrumental 
variable for log income did indeed result in a large and statistically significant increase in the 
estimated effect of log income.  
A further concern relates to the idea of “Rational Addiction” pioneered by Becker and 
Murphy (1988). They proposed a forward-looking model of addiction where agents respond to 
expected changes in future prices/costs as well as to current ones, and where current 
consumption affects the marginal utility of future consumption. If this model were a true 
description of behaviour, and the well-being measure was an accurate metric of lifecycle well-
being, then one would expect to observe no well-being effect of PG. PG status would be 
optimally chosen so that although instantaneous ex post well-being of problem gamblers is low 
relative to non-problem gamblers, PG would not experience ex ante regret relative to non-
problem gamblers at the onset of their path to addiction.  
The RA theory has been widely criticised for not being able to explain the empirical 
observation of widespread ex-ante expression of regret by addicts. In fact, this is not a valid 
criticism of the theory – it is quite possible that addicts, once addicted feel currently worse off 
than they would have been had they not decided originally that the discounted lifetime benefits 
exceed the lifetime discounted costs. Moreover, extensions of the original theory, by 
Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Gruber and Koszegi (2001), allows for the possibility that 
individuals experience either imperfect or subjectively biased perception of their odds, or time 
inconsistency over their potential to become addicted. Individuals, in these extensions to the 
theory, still optimally make forward looking decisions but are nonetheless allowed to 
ultimately regret those decisions because they may have overestimated their ability to win, or 
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underestimated either the ease with which they become addicted, or the present value costs of 
that addiction. 
Finally, the strong effect of PG on well-being begs the question of what mediating 
factors are involved in the underlying transmission mechanism. Most evaluation work focusses 
on the “total” effect of some “treatment”, rather than on the underlying “channels” that drive 
the effect. Evaluation work does not usually investigate the possibility that the total effect may 
be driven by specific channels that relate to “mediating” variables that affect the final outcome. 
Here, the role of gambling expenditures/losses is, albeit tentatively, explored, distinguishing 
between expenditure on draw-based lotto games and scratchcard–style games, from other 
forms of gambling. It is not surprising, in the light of the lacuna around the magnitude of the 
harm that PG implies, that the literature is again silent on the potential role that mediating 
factors might play in determining this unknown magnitude. However, if it is possible to 
establish some mediation effects then one would at least be able to say something about the 
likely size of the taxes that might be required to ameliorate the extent of self-harm since there 
is a (very small) literature on gambling price elasticities.20 Moreover, since the marketplace for 
gambling products is highly regulated and far from being competitive it is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that the relatively concentrated nature of supply, and the low marginal cost of the 
products supplied, would yield price elasticities that are probably close to -1. Given this, there 
may be grounds for thinking that changes in the structure of gambling taxation might be used 
to change behaviour so as to reduce harms. Section 2.6 speculates what might be required. 
2.3 Data 
The primary dataset is the British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS) 2010. An excellent 
overview of the content and construction of the BGPS is provided by Wardle et al (2011). The 
data surveys over seven thousand households and so is relatively large for its type but it is 
nonetheless underpowered for its primary purpose of measuring and comparing problem 
gambling since PG prevalence turns out to be relatively low. Moreover, the response rate is 
only 65% and clearly non-random since young single men, in particular, are under-represented 
and it is precisely this demographic that are most likely to be problem gamblers. Sample 
weights are available but no statistically significant differences are found from using the 
unweighted data, relative to the weighted data. 
                                               
20 See Frontier Economics (2014) for a recent survey. 
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BGPS contains two PG screens: DSM (the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders) IV and PGSI (the Problem Gambling Severity Index)21. The DSM IV is an 
application of the DSM framework – a guide for medical practitioners outlining diagnosis tools 
to be used in clinical settings for a wide range of mental disorders. Application of the DSM IV 
screen results in a dichotomous diagnosis for problem gambling, with no consideration for the 
fact that PG may present with varying degrees of severity22. The PGSI screen is a condensed 
version of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index – a 31-item screen specifically designed for 
use in population level surveys to elicit a broader measure of gambling problems (Ferris and 
Wynne, 2001). This is captured in the PGSI’s low, medium and high categorisations for 
problem gambling23.  
Orford et al (2010) provides a comparison of the DSM and PGSI screens, basing their 
discussion of the merits and weaknesses of each screen on their respective psychometric 
properties. Their study finds that, whilst all PGSI and DSM IV items received higher 
endorsement from males than females, four of the nine PGSI items suffer from particularly 
high proportions of male endorsements24, possibly understating the already small prevalence 
of problem gambling amongst females. Moreover, their study singles out item 5 – “do you feel 
you have a gambling problem?” – as a bad question to include. They explain that item 5’s 
relative poor performance is likely because individuals are more reluctant to acknowledge that 
they have a problem than they are to admit known associated behaviours. Nonetheless, Orford 
et al (2010) find the PGSI outperforms the DSM IV in terms of internal consistency – how well 
individual items are correlated – and uni-dimensionality – how well the individual items are at 
measuring the same problem – suggesting the PGSI may be better suited to population surveys 
like the BGPS 2010 used here.  
 
                                               
21 This chapter assumes, throughout, that all non-gamblers are not problem gamblers so non-gamblers 
in the data are re-coded from missing to PG=0. This assumption makes no difference to the subsequent 
econometric results or the welfare inferences made, although the Forrest (2014) specification does find 
a small positive effect of non-problem gambling on well-being. 
22 DSM V, developed after the GPS 2010 survey was conducted, now also distinguishes between 
problem (scoring 3-4) and pathological (5+) gambling behaviour. Since well-being seems to be almost 
constant for scores above 2 this distinction in DSM V seems likely to be relatively unimportant. 
23 PGSI scores of 1-2 are classified as a low risk/level of problems with gambling, 3-7 is classified a 
being at moderate risk/ level of problem gambling and 8+ denotes high risk/level of problem gambling.  
24 These are items 5, 6, 7, and 8 which can be found in Appendix 2.8.1.  
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Panel (a): DSM 
PGSI                  No  problem Problem gambler Total 
No problem 6474 6 6480 
Low risk 330 3 333 
Moderate risk 78 13 91 
Problem gambler 10 28 38 
Total 6892 50 6942 
 








Core variables:     
Well-being Score, 1-10 7.868 7.949 6.240 7.916 
 (1.9915) (1.8491) (2.6462) (1.8982) 
Personal Income, £ pa 14,904.64 15,842.07 17,547.08 15,616.66 
 (9,332.521) (9,065.814) (10,522.33) (9,153.726) 
Household Income, £ pa 28,781.91 29,842.58 28,020.13 29,560.56 
 (16,868.25) (15,862.56) (15,037.04) (16,121.37) 
Gambling Spend, £ pm 0 21.979 308.07 18.467 
  (76.0745) (598.6111) (86.6464) 
Female=1 0.579 0.531 0.200 0.541 
 (0.4939) (0.4991) (0.4041) (0.4983) 
Age, years 51.606 49.508 37.600 49.953 
 (18.3987) (16.9282) (14.2628) (17.3456) 
Ethnicity:     
White 0.852 0.953 0.820 0.927 
 (0.3545) (0.2107) (0.3881) (0.2604) 
Mixed Ethnicity 0.014 0.006 . 0.008 
 (0.1184) (0.0799)  (0.0910) 
Asian/Asian British 0.082 0.019 0.120 0.036 
 (0.2742) (0.1382) (0.3283) (0.1863) 
Black/Black British 0.043 0.017 0.060 0.024 
 (0.2034) (0.1276) (0.2399) (0.1523) 
Chinese/Other 0.008 0.004 . 0.005 
 (0.0889) (0.0638)  (0.0708) 
Marital Status:     
Married 0.654 0.670 0.520 0.665 
 (0.4759) (0.4701) (0.5047) (0.4720) 
Separated/Divorced 0.095 0.098 0.120 0.097 
 (0.2932) (0.2968) (0.3283) (0.2961) 
Single 0.173 0.163 0.360 0.167 
 (0.3782) (0.3690) (0.4849) (0.3726) 
Widowed 0.079 0.070 . 0.071 
 (0.2690) (0.2544)  (0.2574) 
Observations 1,760 5,132 50 6,941 
Notes: Std dev in parentheses. No observations is recorded as “.” Personal and household income is reported as 




The decision to use the DSM screen as the focus in this chapter is based largely on the 
fact that it has makes a very clear distinction between PG and non-PG – while the PGSI screen 
distinguishes between degrees of problem gambling. However, all analysis in Section 2.5 has 
been repeated using PGSI as diagnosis tool (instrumented with DSM score where appropriate) 
and these results can be found in the chapter appendix. Despite the differences in the 
performance of the two screens as highlighted in Orford et al (2010), there is no substantive 
difference in the results when using PGSI as the PG measure, with reported CVs being of a 
similar magnitude.  
Panel (a) of Table 2.1 describes the sample sizes for the two screens. It is clear that PG 
afflicts a small minority of the population: just 0.55% according to PGSI and 0.72% according 
to DSM. The British adult population (16+ for lotto gambling purposes) is approximately 45 
million so these percentages correspond to approximately ¼ and ⅓ million people respectively. 
The two PG screens overlap but contain different numbers of questions and they are scored 
differently: PG=1 is defined as a score on DSM>2, or as a score on PGSI>7. More detail on 
the screens is provided in the appendix, Section 2.8.1.  Panel (b) of Table 2.1 gives a breakdown 
of the data: gamblers who are PG, gamblers who are not PG, and non-gamblers. It is clear that 
problem gamblers are much more likely to be male, young, single (never married), and Asian 
or Black (although cell sizes are tiny here). While problem gamblers have 10% higher personal 
income, they live in households that are 12% poorer – because they are much more likely to be 
single. Moreover, they spend over fourteen times as much as the gambling non-PG group and 
they experience a level of well-being that is approximately a whole standard deviation lower. 
Figure 2.1 very clearly shows the highly left skewed distributions of scores for both 
screens, and Figure 2.2 shows a scatterplot of the two (where, for clarity, we omit the 93% of 
individuals who score zero on both screens). Only 28 individuals are classified as PG=1 for 
both screens, and only 60 individuals are classified as PG=1 for at least one screen. Precision 
is always an empirical issue, but such is the low proportion of PG in the data that even the 
BGPS sample is unlikely to be sufficiently large to provide the power to reliably estimate the 
effects of PG on well-being in the population if they are small. Of course, if the effects were 
small then there would be no need to worry about them. 
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A near-unique feature of the 2010 BGPS survey is it contains information, at the 
individual level, on well-being. This information is not available in almost all of the similar 
surveys conducted elsewhere in the world. As reported above, well-being is recorded on a 0 to 
10 integer scale and the distribution is shown in Figure 2.3 for those who are designated as 
problem gamblers (PG=1) by the DSM screen, and those not (PG=0). There is more than twice 
the proportion of PG=1 individuals who have well-being below 7 as there are PG=0 
individuals. 
The relationship between well-being and the DSM score for defining problem gambling 
is presented in  
Figure 2.4. This is drawn with “jitter” to show more clearly how the data is distributed 
across these two integer-valued variables – more observations at intercises are indicated by 
denser clouds. The solid line shows a local polynomial regression and the grey area is the 95% 
confidence interval around this. It is clear that a score above 2 in DSM is indeed indicative of 
lower well-being, but there is no step-change at a score of 3, and the well-being gradient above 
3 is not significantly different from zero.  However, even scores of 1 or 2 also have a 
pronounced effect on well-being.25 The graph suggests that a score of 3 compared to 0 reduces 
well-being by close to 2 units – approximately a whole standard deviation. 
Income in BGPS is recorded at both the individual level, and at the household level, as 
net annual income and is coded into £5k bins. Since a continuous measure of income is required 
to be able to implement the well-being method, this chapter eschews the alternative of using a 
set of dummy variables to indicate which bin each individual belongs to. Moreover, because 
the income data is likely to be the object of measurement error, estimation of the relationship 
between (log) net household annual income and a number of explanatory variables is done 
using an interval regression.26 This estimation methodology respects the grouped nature of the 
dependent variable and relies on the assumed log Normality of the income residuals to form a 
continuous relationship with the explanatory variables.   
                                               
25 Dummy variables for DSM=3, 4 ….10 in the well-being equations are jointly insignificantly different 
from that for DSM=2. 
26 Another alternative is to use the midpoints of the income bins as the measure of income. Doing so 
makes no substantive difference to the findings – the money metric of lost well-being from problem 
gambling remains large and significant. However, since measurement error is not accounted for using 
this approach, the coefficient on household income simply becomes smaller, making estimates of the 
cost of PG, even larger. 
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Figure 2.2: Scatterplot of scores using DSM and PGSI screens 
 
Note: PG defined by DSM score >2 or PGSI>7. Bubble size shows proportion of sample. 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of well-being in BGPS 2010 
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The selection of explanatory variables, and the use of log household income as the 
measure of income, is deliberately parsimonious and is inspired by the theory of human capital 
due to Becker (1964) and its empirical implementation in Mincer (1974), and in many hundreds 
of subsequent analyses of earnings27. Thus, the log of the recorded grouped net income is 
replaced by its prediction from this interval regression. Appendix Table A2.8 presents the 
empirical estimates of this interval regression. The estimates are very conventional with a large 
negative effect of female, a strong quadratic effect of age, and a strong positive effect of better 
educational qualifications and better health. The great virtue of this interval regression is that 
it simultaneously provides a continuous measure of net income, and it resolves the 
measurement error problem in self-reported income. Figure 2.5 shows the scatterplot (with 
“jitter” applied to allow us to see how many individuals are at each integer value in the graph 
from the density of the clouds) of predicted log net household income against well-being and 
superimposes a local polynomial of the relationship between these two variables. This 
relationship is relatively flat but does show a significant monotonically increasing relationship 
that is concave over most of its range.  
Thinking of this well-being vs income relationship as an (expected) utility function then 
the concave nature would be consistent with diminishing marginal utility of income. While 
there has been considerable controversy over inferring the marginal utility of income, a cardinal 
concept, from observed decisions made under uncertainty there is ample evidence in the 
literature that one can. For example, Hartley et al (2013) estimate a model of decision-making 
behaviour under uncertainty in a gameshow setting, which features a range of stakes from low 
to very high during the course of play. They find that behaviour is consistent with a utility of 
income relationship that is log linear. In their analysis, using a very different methodology from 
that used below, the coefficient on log income is found to be, very precisely, 1. Here, Figure 
2.5 suggests that doubling income from, say, a log income level of 9.5 to 10.5 would indicate 
a rise in well-being of around ½ - which is close to what we estimate in the next section using 
conventional statistical analysis. 
 
                                               
27 The interval regression exploits the detailed information on education included in BGPS, as well as age, age-
squared, gender, self-assessed ethnicity, marital status, and an indicator of self-assessed health. Since the purpose 
in modelling income is to obtain a consistent prediction of the true level of income from the observed interval 
data there is little concern about the exogeneity of the variables in this auxiliary equation. Variations in the precise 
specification of this interval regression make very little difference to the subsequent analysis. 
 26 
Figure 2.4: Relationship between well-being and DSM screen score 
 
Figure 2.5: Well-being and (predicted) net annual household income 
 
Finally, the gambling expenditure data referred to in Table 2.1 is aggregated up from 
information about expenditures on each type of gambling. Figure 2.6 compares the mean spend 
by type of gambling for gamblers who are PG with those who have positive spend on overall 
gambling but are not PG. It is clear that PGs spend more on all products than non-PGs and this 
is especially the case for most forms with the exception of the National Lottery draw games 
and bingo. This is explored in more detail in the mediation analysis in Section 2.5.4. 
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Figure 2.6: Monthly expenditure (£) on gambling products by gamblers 
 
Note: The raw data is reported in bands and here aggregates imputed expenditure using the mid-points of 
the reported bins. The red bars are for the PG=1 group and the blue bars are for the PG=0 individuals who 
report positive levels of overall gambling expenditure. 
2.4 Estimating the determinants of well-being 
There is a well-established well-being methodology for estimating the consequences of 
life events and an outline of the method and a seminal application of it can be found in Clark 
and Oswald (2002). In its simplest incarnation, it starts from the presumption that there is some 
parametric relationship between individual well-being (Wi), where the i subscript indicates 
individual i, income (Yi), the (discrete) event in question, which in this case is PGi, and a vector 
of control variables (Xi). This relationship may be summarized by Wi = W(Xi, Yi PGi). When 
taken to the data, this is often specified as Wi being linear in Xi and PGi, but often log linear in 
Yi, and this is typically estimated by OLS. Thus, a typical model is  𝑊( = 𝑿𝒊+𝜷 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑌( + 𝛿𝑃𝐺( + 𝑢(	 (2.1) 
where ui is the residual that captures variation in Wi that is not captured by the included 
variables. Thus, the difference in well-being associated with PGi = 1 rather than 0 is simply ∆𝑊( = 𝛿. Since γ is the effect of a unit change in lnYi on well-being it follows that the same 
difference in W could be achieved by changing lnYi by an amount equal to δ/γ. This implies 


















that δ/γ is the (percentage) change in Yi required to hold well-being at the level associated with 
not being a problem gambler for i. This proportionate difference in Yi is commonly referred to 
as a measure of compensating variation (CV) – the percentage change in Yi required to 
“compensate” i for being PGi=1.28  
 The decision to model PG as a dummy variable for scoring above some prescribed 
threshold in a given screen raises questions about the behavioural assumptions underlying the 
model presented in (2.1). In particular, it is tempting to view the coefficient 𝛿 as a measure of 
changing state from non-PG to PG. This view implies that changing states occurs 
instantaneously and without the individual anticipating the change which is unsupported at best 
and patently unrealistic at worst. This interpretation would certainly be valid if it were applied 
to panel data and especially so if we were measuring changes from PG=0 to PG=1 for 
individuals between waves. However, in the cross-sectional context of the BGPS, modelling 
PG in this merely compares the average difference in well-being of those who are PG=1 to 
PG=0 at a single point in time. It is somewhat irrelevant to the model in this context of whether 
or not potential PGs anticipate the affliction or how fast shifting from PG=0 to PG=1 occurs. 
It is indeed likely that becoming PG occurs gradually and can be anticipated, potentially quite 
far in advance, by the individual. Assuming that this anticipation has a negative impact on well-
being implies that the obtained coefficient 𝛿 would be biased towards zero, since there are 
PG=0 respondents in the survey whose well-being is lower in anticipation of becoming PG=1 
at a later date. Similarly, any PG=1 respondents who are optimistic about becoming non-PGs 
in the future would have the same effect of biasing 𝛿 towards zero. This adds further weight to 
this chapter’s conclusion that the OLS estimates presented are a lower bound of the cost of PG 
in the UK. 
The proposed methodology is not without its critics. The first criticism stems from the 
fact that it is not at all clear that the scale of Wi from 1 to 10 can be given a cardinal 
interpretation. That is, the restriction that moving from Wi=1 to 2 is as good (bad) as a move 
from 4 to 5 is a strong one, impossible to verify, and hence difficult to rely on in such data. It 
is just as plausible that the move from 1 to 2, thereby doubling Wi, can only be achieved for 
                                               
28 Estimating separate equations for PG=0 and PG=1 would be considerably more flexible but, in the 
present case, sample size for the PG=1 group precludes this. Interacting PG with lnY would allow the 
marginal utility of income to differ between the two groups – something that might be expected since 
this marginal utility of income is related to the degree of risk aversion. However, this interaction proved 
to be statistically insignificant from zero. 
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someone who has a Wi of 4 by moving to, say, 8. It seems plausible that a Wi measure could 
well be monotonically increasing, but non-linear, transformation of some true underlying 
metric of well-being, so that only the ordinality of measured Wi can be relied upon.  To 
investigate the robustness of the conclusions on the impact of PG, in addition to estimating the 
conventional model where W is estimated by linear regression, Section 2.5.1 also provides 
estimates under the assumption that lnWi is linear in the explanatory variables, and further uses 
Box-Cox estimation. The latter procedure transforms the dependent variable in a way that nests 
both linear and log linear and enables testing of these special cases. In particular, the following 
is also estimated 
;<=>?@ = 𝑿𝒊+𝜷 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑌( + 𝛿𝑃𝐺( + 𝑢(. (2.2)
Here λ=1 corresponds to the linear special case and λ=0 to the log case. Estimates in Section 
2.5.1 show that these alternative specifications make little difference to the PG money metric 
estimate.  
A critical contribution to the well-being methodology by Bond and Lang (2010) raises 
this ordinality issue. They note that since the W data is categorical, where the categories 
represent intervals along some continuous distribution, the implied CDFs of these distributions 
are likely to cross when estimated using large samples. Therefore, some monotonic 
transformation of the utility function, F(Wi)¸ can always reverse the ranking of overall well-
being: for example, between the PG=1 group and the PG =0 group. Of course, more categories 
will help resolve this problem – the issue would not even arise if W were continuous – but there 
is nothing to say that 10 categories is enough to ensure the reliability of the method.  A popular 
solution to this problem is to adopt a specification that only relies on the ordinal nature of such 
well-being data. The simplest case is where one is prepared to assume that the unobserved 
component of well-being is normally distributed so that we can easily fix the cut-points 
between values of Wi of 1, 2, 3 etc. in which case one can estimate the means and variances of 
each group using ordered Probit estimation. In particular, the method estimates the 
determinants of the latent variable Wi*, 𝑊(∗ 	= 𝑿𝒊+𝜷 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑌( + 𝛿𝑃𝐺( + 𝑢(	 (2.3)
here Wi = j if  µj-1 < Wi* < µj, for j = 1, 2, 3,... 10, ui is assumed to be Normal, and µj are the 
unknown cut-points that are estimated by exploiting the assumed Normality of ui. In order to 
compute the compensating variation in this ordered Probit case requires a transformation of the 
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coefficients into marginal effects, to make them comparable to the OLS coefficients, and then 
cumulate the predicted probabilities across each of the levels of W, using the proportions 
reporting each level of W as weights. 
The second criticism of the method is a practical one – that, in practice, PG, is measured 
with error. This will be true, not least, because PG is defined using self-reported responses to 
the questions in the screen that is employed; it is noticeable in the data that the different screens 
produce different results (although insubstantially so). OLS estimates of δ, when PG is subject 
to measurement error (ME), will be attenuated – i.e. biased towards zero. The solution to a ME 
problem is to instrument with another measure (even one that is also measured with error). 
When the ME is classical, IV then produces consistent estimates of δ. In practice, GMM 
estimation may be used to ensure consistency even if ME is non-classical (see Kane et al, 1999, 
and Light and Flores-Lagunes, 2006).  
Fortunately, the BGPS data provides not just one screen for PG but two. Thus, it is 
possible to instrument the PG variable, computed from one screen according to whether the 
score exceeds the critical value, with the score on the other screen. Indeed, the scores for each 
question within the alterative screen might be used to form many instruments; although for the 
moment a parsimonious approach using the overall score from the alternate screen is adopted.  
A third criticism of the methodology is that of assuming well-being is linear in the log 
of income. The relationship between well-being and log household income in Figure 2.5 is, 
after all, non-linear in places and more or less flat over large sections of the income distribution. 
Given the role of 𝛾 in the denominator of the CV calculation, a small coefficient here, as might 
be expected from the relationship depicted in Figure 2.5, will inevitably lead to large CV 
estimates. Nonetheless, experiments with the specification of income in the well-being formula 
– including linear, quadratic, and cubic expansions of both level and log household income – 
had no material effect on the resultant CV estimates. Therefore, this chapter proceeds with the 
above specification in which well-being is linear in the log of household income29.  
An alternative method for modelling the relationship between income and well-being 
is to suggest that it is relative, rather than absolute, income which matters. For example, Clark 
                                               
29 Estimates using log personal, rather than household, income were also considered and, whilst smaller, 
these made little material impact to the CV estimates presented in this chapter. Estimates using 
polynomial expansions of log household income can be found in the appendix Error! Reference source n
ot found.. 
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et al (2007) argue that a strong correlation between relative income and happiness can be used 
to explain the coexistence of the ‘Easterlin Paradox’ – the common observation that GDP per 
capita does not correlate with self-reported happiness across countries – and the body of 
evidence showing that income is a (positive) predictor of subjective well-being in micro-level 
studies. However, to use relative income requires knowledge of exactly who individuals may 
be comparing themselves to, information on which is unsurprisingly absent in the data used 
here. If the whole population is assumed, this would involve subtracting average income in the 
sample from individual income – but this would have no effect on the income coefficient. One 
might be tempted to approximate relative income as deviations from the average income for 
individuals with the same socio-economic characteristics. However, it is impossible to know 
which of these characteristics form the relevant groups which individuals in the sample 
compare themselves to. As such, any assumptions made here would be entirely arbitrary and 
this approach is eschewed in favour of the absolute income approach of equation (2.1). 
There remains one further criticism of this well-being methodology: one that is 
generally ignored in the well-being literature, but was, nonetheless, a question that was raised 
by Forrest (2104, 2016) in the present context of problem gambling. This criticism is that PGi 
is itself endogenous - that is, it is correlated with both ui and Wi perhaps because there are 
missing variables that confound the relationship. For example, in this context, individuals with 
low Wi, for reasons that are not observed and controlled for, may be more likely to have PGi=1. 
OLS estimation of δ will then be biased – upwards (downwards) if cov(PGi,ui) > 0 (<0) since 
δ will capture both the effect of PGi, and the effect of the unobservables that are correlated 
with both PGi and Wi . One might expect that low well-being types of people to be more likely 
to develop problem gambling (i.e. cov(PGi,ui) < 0) so OLS estimates of the PG coefficient 
would be biased upwards. The solution to this problem is again found through instrumental 
variables. That is, we need to find some variable, call it Zi, that affects PGi but only affects Wi 
through its effect on PGi – so there is no direct effect of Zi on Wi.  
Forrest chooses not to pursue this on the grounds that the fact that PG and W are strongly 
correlated is sufficient to make even the OLS estimates of policy interest. This is a legitimate 
view – the strong correlation suggests that people who are PG=1 and have low W are worthy 
of the attention of policymakers. This is the ‘where there’s smoke there’s fire’ view that is 
often adopted in the epidemiology literature and is enshrined in the commonly referenced Hill’s 
Criteria (see Hill, 1965). However, if the policy objective is to raise W, at least for those with 
 32 
low W, there are likely to be much better ways of profiling for this than using PG– not least 
because PG=1 is so scarce that it is likely to miss the overwhelming majority of low W cases. 
Thus, the case for relying on OLS results without further investigation is weak30. However, 
since PG is itself scare it is difficult to find some Z that is strongly correlated with it. The 
candidate for Z used here is parental PG - sample members are asked whether one or both 
parents gambled regularly and, if so, whether they now regard their parent’s gambling when 
they were young as problematic. While this might well be highly correlated with own PG, it is 
more difficult assess whether one can be confident that parental PG has no direct effect on W 
- that is, can we be sure that the effect of parental PG on W is mediated only through its effect 
on own current PG? There may, for example, be a case for thinking that individuals with 
parent(s) who were thought to have been PG might positively affect the PG status of the child 
through some heritable transmission mechanism.31  
The definition of PG pays no regard to the financial transactions that underlie PG: that 
large amounts of money are, on average, lost through heavy gambling expenditure that Table 
2.1 showed was many times higher for PG cases than for non-PG cases. While this chapter 
addresses the effect of PG on well-being, it is silent on how this effect happens. The 
methodology is not well-adapted to generate policy implications if it cannot tell us what the 
transmission mechanism through which PG impacts W. Therefore, Section 2.5.4 augments this 
standard well-being method with “mediation analysis”. This facilitates the decomposition of 
the effect of PG on well-being into a direct effect, and an effect that is mediated through the 
indirect channel of associated gambling expenditures. The mediation approach is to estimate a 
pair of linear equations – one for the mediator, that depends on the treatment (and covariates) 
and one for the outcome which depends on the mediator and the treatment (and covariates). 
Then the “direct effect” is computed as the partial effect of treatment on the outcome (holding 
the mediator fixed), while the “indirect effect” is the product of the partial effect of treatment 
on the mediator, and the partial effect of the mediator on the outcome. Assuming a linear 
specification for both equations, (and no interaction between treatment and mediator) then a 
numerically equivalent strategy is to add the mediator to the model in (2.1) and measure the 
extent to which the treatment effect decreases relative to the estimate when the mediator is 
                                               
30 Hill’s Criteria was appealed to in recent submissions to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport. See Hofler (2005) for many of the reasons why this is inappropriate.  
31 Studies of twins are commonly used to examine heritability where a within twin pair PG correlation 
for MZ twins that exceeds that for DZ twins may be indicative of a genetic (or epi-genetic) mechanism 
at work. Slutske et al (2010) uses a large sample of Australian twins and does find such evidence. 
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excluded (the “difference in coefficients” method).32  It was clear from Figure 2.6 that non-
problem gamblers spend very little on gambling products apart from lotto and other lottery 
draw games, and scratchcards, and bingo. Thus, if denoting potential mediators as the vector 
of gambling expenditures, G, then the essence of mediation analysis is to estimate   𝑊( = 𝑿𝒊+𝜷 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑌( + 𝛿𝑃𝐺( + 𝑮𝒊+𝜽 + 𝑢(. (2.4)
Here, the direct effect is the estimate of δ from (2.4) and the indirect effect is found by 
subtracting this direct effect coefficient from the estimate of the same in (2.1).  
2.5 Results 
The empirical estimation deliberately adopts a parsimonious specification of the well-
being equation for fear that including bad controls may bias the estimates of the coefficients 
on the variables of interest – problem gambling and log income. Only those variables that one 
can be reasonably confident are themselves exogenous are included: age, age2, gender, and 
indicators for marital status, and ethnicity.33  
2.5.1 Correlation analysis 
Headline estimates of the parameters of interest, using OLS, are presented in Table 2.2, 
which sets out to investigate the issue raised by Bond and Lang concerning how the ordinal 
nature of the data might be cardinalised. Table 2.2 compares a conventional specification, 
where the Wi ranking is used as linear cardinalisation (so that Wi=4 is assumed to mean twice 
as good as Wi=2, which is twice as good as Wi=1) with a log-linear model, where Wi is replaced 
by Wiʹ=lnWi (so that Wiʹ=2 is assumed to mean twice as good as Wiʹ=1, but a value of 3 is twice 
as good as a value of 2). The second column corresponds to such a log-linear cardinalisation.  
The final column is known as the Box-Cox specification that nests the earlier two as 
specials cases. Note that the specifications differ only in the transformation of the dependent 
variable and so the ratio of any pair of coefficients will have the same interpretation across 
specifications. Thus, the interpretation of the estimated parameter, δ/γ, remains legitimate 
across the specifications – and the fact that they are very similar, and certainly not statistically 
different from each other, suggests that the overall welfare consequences are captured 
                                               
32 See the simple exposition in Huber (2016) and references therein. 
33 Experiments that also included or excluded marital status, ethnicity, region, and even education made 
no substantive difference to the estimates of δ/γ so these are not considered “bad controls”. However, 
the results are sensitive to the inclusion of self-assessed health and is omitted to avoid a bad controls 
problem.  
 34 
reasonably well by the simplest specification.34 It is not very surprising that the ratio of 
coefficients on two explanatory variables is not greatly affected when the dependent variable 
alone is subjected to a monotonic transformation. The headline welfare loss calculation 
multiplies the estimated δ/γ (of -2.5) by average annual household income, of almost £24k, to 
yield an annual loss for a household of average income of approximately £60k. Since the 
interpretation of this is the average effect, the aggregate welfare loss can be found by 
multiplying by the number of people with PG (approximately ⅓m) to yield a figure that is close 
to £25b.35 
Table 2.2: OLS estimated parameters of interest across cardinalisations 
Dependent variable W Ln(W) 
𝑊(@ − 1𝜆  
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.534*** 0.103*** 5.275*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0120) (0.6553) 
PG (𝛿) -1.382*** -0.289*** -13.444*** 
 (0.3719) (0.0890) (3.6509) 𝛿/𝛾 -2.589*** -2.811*** -2.549*** 
 (0.7605) (0.9338) (0.7707) 
CV (£b, pa) 25.4 27.5 25.0 
Notes: Estimated robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically 
significant at 1%/5%/10%. Female, age, age2, marital status, ethnicity, and government office 
region are included as control variables. Full results can be seen in Appendix Table A2.9. 
Corresponding results where PG is defined using the PGSI score are provided in Appendix Table 
A2.13. Table A2.14 replicates this table using the weighted data, but the results are largely 
unchanged. 
 
The PG losses estimated above rely on an income coefficient that itself relies on the 
predictions from the interval regression from the binned income data. This should, in principle, 
resolve any bias from measurement error in the raw data. An alternative way to sidestep this 
issue is to impose an extraneous estimate of the parameter of interest from the existing 
literature.  Thus, Table 2.2 was re-estimated imposing the coefficient on log income to be either 
unity, as suggested by the Hartley et al (2014) gameshow study, or ½, as suggested by the 
Deaton and Stone review. The PG coefficient changed little under these constraints and the 
estimated implied financial losses from PG are slightly smaller in the case of ½ and less so in 
the case of assuming 1. Appendix Table A2.10 provides estimates using equivalised income 
                                               
34 The estimated value of λ is 2.27 with a standard error of 0.040 – which rejects both extremes in 
columns 1 and 2. 
35 When dropping non-gambler observations, the results remain almost identical to those in Table 2.2. 
When including a dummy variable for non-gamblers in Table 2.2, the coefficient is found to be 
statistically insignificant and the remaining coefficients do not change.   
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which adjust for household size, n, whereby income is deflated by (1+n)0.7 and shows that the 
income coefficient fell by around 20% but the PG coefficient remained almost unchanged 
implying larger CV estimates. Appendix Table A2.11 uses mid-points of the income bins rather 
than the interval regression predictions from the estimates in Table A2.8. Table A2.12 uses 
personal income rather than household income. None of these changes make any substantive 
difference to the conclusion from Table 2.2 – that the CV is very large. 
2.5.2 Causal analysis 
However, these results are contingent on the exogeneity of PGi which is relaxed in 
Table 2.3. The first column corrects for measurement error in PGi by exploiting the correlation 
between the DSM definition of PGi and the score from the alternative screen. The Staiger and 
Stock (1997) rule of thumb that the first stage F-statistic should exceed 10 is easily satisfied 
for the results in the first column of Table 2.3, suggesting that the PGSI score is a very strong 
instrument. The second column also includes parental PG in the instrument set in an attempt to 
deal with the second potential source of endogeneity.  The F-statistic still satisfies the rule of 
thumb.  In each case presented in Table 2.3, the PGi coefficient is substantially larger than that 
in Table 2.2.  The crucial welfare effect, δ/γ, remains the same irrespective of whether Parental 
PG is added to the instrument set. However, column 3 which, uses ParentalPGi alone as an IV, 
does not produce as large an F-statistic in the first stage as the other cases. Not surprisingly, 
because it is common for the IV estimate to be even more biased than the OLS estimate in such 
cases, the estimate of δ becomes much larger because of this relatively weak instrument.  
Forrest (2016) is rightly suspicious of the ability of this data to yield a valid instrument 
for PG. Wardle et al (2011) note (in their Table 6.3) that individuals with parents who were 
problem gamblers were themselves five times more likely to be problem gamblers (as defined 
by DSM) than those who were not PG. But it is not sufficient that the instrument be correlated 
with the endogenous variable. It must also be the case that the only transmission route by which 
ParentalPGi affects Wi is through its effect on PG.  In the just identified case, whether or not 
the instrument has a direct effect on the dependent variable of interest rather than just via the 
endogenous variable, is not something that can be readily inferred, so the validity of the 
instrument(s) remains an article of faith. One might argue that ParentalPGi in the past has an 
effect on current own well-being apart than through its effect through own PGi which, if true, 
would undermine its use as an instrument. This is clearly a very credible criticism.  However, 
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the difference in W for those with ParentalPG = 1 compared to 0 is statistically insignificant 
in the raw data.  
Table 2.3: IV estimated parameters of interest 
Dependent variable: 𝑊(     
Instruments: PGSI score 
Parental PG and 
PGSI score Parental PG 
Ln Y (𝜸) 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.458*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0567) (0.0873) 
PG (𝜹) -2.482*** -2.498*** -18.072* 
 (0.6079) (0.5972) (9.5863) 𝜹/𝜸 -4.695*** -4.724*** -39.462* 
 (1.2869) (1.2512) (25.0554) 
CV (£b, pa) 46.0 46.3 386 
First stage F-statistic 4890.97*** 2488.75*** 28.41*** 
Notes: Estimated standard errors, obtained from bootstrapping, are in parentheses. ***/**/* 
indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. F-statistic is the Stock-Yogo definition – using 
the Windemeijer definition for multiple instruments in column 2 produces very similar results.  
Female, age, age2, marital status, and ethnicity are included as control variables and full results 
are presented in Appendix Table A2.15. The first stage estimates for this specification, and for 
the alternative PGSI definition of PG, are presented in Appendix Table A2.16. Corresponding 
results where PG is defined using the PGSI score and instrumented using the DSM score are 




It has been argued that in the over-identified case, where there already exists one or 
more valid instruments, it is possible to test validity of a second instrument, conditional on the 
validity of a first instrument, using the Sargan–Hansen test (see Sargan, 1958, and Hansen, 
1982). It seems likely that the PGSI score is a valid IV for PG, as defined by the DSM screen, 
since both screens have been designed with the objective of assigning PG status and inspection 
of the questions in the appendix below suggest a lot of overlap across the two screens. Indeed, 
the overlap is so great that the conclusions of this chapter do not depend greatly on which 
screen is used (see Appendix Table A2.17 for PGSI results). Moreover, even though parental 
PG is found to be a statistically valid IV, and so yields a consistent estimate of the effect of 
own PG on W, there is still the question of how one interprets the resulting estimate. In a model 
with heterogeneous effects, while OLS estimation yields a biased estimate of the average effect 
of PG on W, this is not the case with IV. However, while an IV estimate is unbiased, IV does 
not necessarily yield an estimate of an average effect in the same way as OLS does. In 
particular, IV estimates are best interpreted as the causal effect of the treatment (in this case, 
PG) on individuals who are treated by virtue of the instrument. This is referred to as a Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) in the literature. In the present PG case, exogenous variation 
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in PG occurs only for the group of individuals who are PG by virtue of parental PG – the 
complier group.  
Some applied econometricians have argued that, while the IV analysis here does not 
necessarily obtain an estimate of the average effect of the treatment in question on a readily 
identifiable population, it nonetheless estimates something that is still relevant for policy. In 
contrast, others argue that a LATE estimate is not useful and must be augmented with 
something else to produce economically meaningful parameters (e.g. a structural econometric 
model). Unlike the case of a schooling reform instrument used in Harmon and Walker (1995) 
in the context of the causal effect of education on wages, it is difficult to argue that the adults 
were so affected by their parents’ PG that they became PG themselves, especially because this 
group is so small. In particular, it is quite conceivable that Parental PG makes some people 
more likely to be PG (compliers) through some common environment or even genes, while 
others are defiers – people who observe their parents were PG and were determined not to 
become like that. Formally, IV LATE estimates are the weighted average of the defier and 
complier estimates.  
In the specification using both PGSI score and parental problem gambling as 
instruments tests of the validity of the instruments using Hansen’s J-test for over-identification 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the use of parental PG as a first-stage instrument is valid, 
conditional on the validity of PGSI. However, the Hansen test (and earlier Sargan test) are not 
generally applicable in the context of a model where there are heterogeneous effects. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to rely on this test because Table 2.3 suggests that nothing much 
hangs on the case for using Parental PG as an IV –the same results are obtained when Parental 
PG is omitted and the alternative PGSI score is the only instrument. The welfare relevant 
parameter, δ/γ, is virtually the same in both columns. The suggestion is that it is the 
measurement error in PG that accounts for much of the bias in the OLS estimate in column 1 
of Table 2.2. This is fortunate since it implies that we can extrapolate from the IV estimates. 
Thus, if taking δ/γ to be -4.7 then this implies an average welfare effect of around £110k pppa, 
which aggregates to approximately £37b pa.36 
A possible alternative to the instrumental variables procedure for causal identification 
as described above can be found in Lewbel (2012) who builds upon earlier work by Klein and 
                                               
36 Dropping non-gamblers, or including a dummy for them, makes no difference to the results in Table 2.3. 
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Vella (2006). This method uses a subset of the regressors from the model which are 
uncorrelated with the covariance of heteroscedastic errors to construct instruments in a two-
stage routine to identify coefficients on the endogenous variable(s). Exploiting the fact that 
these constructed instruments are, by construction, uncorrelated with the error terms, this 
approach also facilitates the use of the Sargan-Hansen test discussed above when there are not 
enough instrument candidates to achieve over-identification. As such, a secondary benefit of 
this approach is to provide evidence in support of otherwise suspect instruments.  
However, when the endogenous variable is binary, as in the present case, the utility of 
using heteroscedasticity per Lewbel (2012) to achieve identification has come under scrutiny 
(see, for example, Emran, Robano and Smith, 2012). Lewbel (2016) demonstrates that 
exploiting heteroscedasticity to identify the model is possible when the endogenous regressor 
is binary but notes that it requires a very strong distribution restriction on the error term. 
Moreover, the required assumption is not testable and is as much an article of faith as regular 
IV techniques. As such, even as a means to conduct the aforementioned Sargan-Hansen test of 
instrument validity will likely yield misleading estimates. Nonetheless, the null hypothesis of 
this test is again not rejected. The resultant CV estimates, though smaller than those obtained 
using PGSI and parental PG as instruments alone, are still greater than those obtained via OLS. 
This provides further evidence towards the conclusion of this chapter that the OLS estimates 
provide a lower bound on the cost of PG. The results from using Lewbel’s identification 
methodology therefore makes only a marginal contribution to the evidence already presented 
and estimates can be found in Appendix Table A2.18.  
2.5.3 Robustness 
Table 2.3 was also re-estimated including exactly the same set of exogenous variables 
in both first and second stages. The second stage results of the relevant parameters were almost 
identical to the ones provided above. The sensitivity of the results in column 1 of Table 2.2, to 
how income is defined was also explored. There are two choices in the BGPS data – individual 
net income, or household net income. The tables here use (predicted log) household level 
income. Replacing this by (predicted log) individual level income (again from an interval 
regression) produces a slightly smaller income effect. However, household income is 
approximately double the level of individual income and so the corresponding welfare loss 
measures, using the household definition, are somewhat larger than those found with individual 
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income.37 For example, using predicted log individual income the aggregate CV for the basic 
OLS specification is £21b rather than £31b. Using the (log of) the midpoint of the bin which 
each individual reports (whether at individual or at household level) yields much smaller 
estimates than when use the predicted log from the interval regression. This is to be expected 
and the large difference is indicative of considerable measurement error in the raw binned data, 
as well as the inappropriateness of using the midpoint when the raw income data is highly left 
skewed. So the estimates reported in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 of this section are strongly 
preferred, and the results referred to above are confined to Table A2.11 and Table A2.12 in the 
appendix.38 
Finally, Table 2.4 presents Ordered Probit results using both un-instrumented PG 
(defined by the DSM screen) in the first column and PG instrumented with PGSI score and 
Parental PG in the second column. Ordered Probit treats the dependent variable as ordinal so 
the transformation of W is no longer relevant to the estimates, apart from the cut-points.  
However, interpretation is more difficult in the context of Ordered Probit since the marginal 
effects of LnY and PG rely on the parameters in Table 2.4, and on the cut point estimates which 
are not reported. For any cardinalisation of W, one would expect PG to lower the probability 
of high W and increase the probability of low W. Using Ordered Probit estimates to infer the 
annual CV is slightly more involved.39 The marginal effects reported in the bottom half of 
Table 2.4 describe the effects of PG on the probability that W=1, 2…..,10. There are positive 
significant effects of PG=1 (as opposed to 0) on the probability of having low W, and negative 
effects on the probability that W is high. Figure 2.7 plots the probability of W = 1, 2, 3…,10, 
                                               
37 A minor problem with household income is that there is a coding mistake in the raw data that cannot 
now be fixed – two different income bins shared the same code on the income show-card. One solution 
to this problem is to recode the observations that chose either of these two codes as missing. Two 
alternatives would be to check by adding up the (midpoint of the binned) individual level data and 
replace accordingly; or, similarly, use STATAs missing values routine to construct a replacement 
exploiting the relationship between household and individual incomes in the data. None of these 
methods made any effective difference to the estimates. 
38 The pursuit of a matching methodology would be ideal to support the IV estimates. However, since 
the PG group is so very small it is not likely that one would ever be able to get good matches. Similarly, 
one might like to pursue the bounding idea in Altonji, Elder and Taber (2006) and its extensions in 
Oster (2016). However, the fact that the treatment group is so small will inevitably imply that the bounds 
would be large. 
39 Similar to the OLS and IV cases, CV is calculated by taking the ratio of estimated marginal effects 
of ln(Y) and PG on W and multiply by the proportion of afflicted individuals, using their respective 
mean incomes. These must be calculated using the marginal effects and mean income for each value of 
W to correctly estimate the aggregate cost. The cost estimates provided in  
Figure 2.4, of £65b, are the summation of this calculation for W=1,…,10, weighted by the proportion 
of our sample who report each well-being level. 
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at the averages of the other explanatory variables, for the PG = 1 and 0 groups, using the 
estimates from the bottom half of column 2 of Table 2.4. The figure also shows the confidence 
intervals around these predicted probabilities of being at each level of W by PG. The PG = 0 
group is much larger so the confidence intervals are much tighter. Nonetheless, the estimates 
separate the groups very well.  






PGSI and Parental PG 
Ln Y (𝜸) 0.236*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0313) 
PG (𝜹) -1.221*** -1.219*** 
 (0.2939) (0.2930) 𝜹/𝜸 -5.171*** -5.165*** 
 (1.4538) (1.4501) 
Marginal Effects, 𝜟𝐏𝐫(𝑾 = 𝟏,… , 𝟏𝟎) /𝜟𝑷𝑮 
W=1 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) 
2 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) 
3 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0060) 
4 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0069) 
5 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0275) 
6 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0148) 
7 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0290) 
8 0.044*** 0.043*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0114) 
9 -0.100*** -0.099*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0241) 
10 -0.355*** -0.354*** 
 (0.0854) (0.0851) 
CV (£b, pa) 50.64 50.59 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 
significance at 1%/5%/10%. Female, age, age2, and ethnicity are included as 
control variables and their coefficients are reported in Appendix Table A2.19. 
The first stage results from Table A2.16 are re-used here. Corresponding 
estimates where PG is defined using the PGSI screen, and then instrumented by 





Figure 2.7: Predicted probabilities of W=1,2,3,...,10 for PG=0 and PG=1 at means 
 
There are statistically significantly larger probabilities of PG = 1 individuals having values of 
W below 7 compared to PG = 0 individuals; and significantly larger probabilities of PG = 0 
individuals having values of W above 7 compared to PG=1 individuals40. 
A further issue is the appropriateness of the definition of PG itself. The DSM (and 
PGSI) score comes from simply adding up the responses to each question, thus attributing them 
with equal weight in terms of their effect on well-being. A simple alternative would be to allow 
the data to decide by including controls for each of the 10 (9) questions. Doing this (see 
Appendix Table A2.21 for DSM and Appendix Table A2.22 for PGSI) suggests that only one 
of the 10 DSM questions has a statistically significant effect on well-being: Q5 which, not 
surprisingly, asks “Have you gambled to escape from problems or when you are feeling 
depressed, anxious or bad about yourself?” and a test of the joint insignificance of the 
remaining questions fails to reject. Q5 of PGSI asks a related but different question: “have you 
felt that you might have a problem with gambling?” and this question is insignificant when 
using controls for all PGSI questions. Dropping controls for all the other questions in the screen 
(i.e. separate models defining PG using Q5 of either the PGSI or DSM screen) yields a δ 
                                               
40 Extending the IV analysis to the ordered Probit case is not straightforward. Chesher and Smolinski 
(2012) show that control function methods in this case impose unrealistic restrictions, and are set, rather 
than point, identified. However, they show that this problem becomes less severe the less discrete the 
dependent variable is. 
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coefficient of -2.01*** in the DSM Q5 case and, -0.82 in the PGSI Q5 case when using OLS. 
Instrumenting PG when defined by these questions using the cross score (without also 
including Parental PG) gives a δ coefficient of -4.04*** in the DSM Q5 case and, -5.827*** in 
the PGSI case. It seems these Q5s are quite different. In the DSM case the implication is that 
PG is very clearly endogenous – PG is caused by other problems. In the PGSI case it seems 
less clear that Q5 is endogenous. 
2.5.4 Mediation analysis 
Finally, this section returns to the baseline OLS specification from column 1 of Table 
2.2 to consider mediation. The results of this are presented in Table 2.5 where the baseline 
column is taken from Table 2.2. In specification 1, the aggregate of all gambling expenditure 
forms the mediator; while specifications 2 and 3 consider expenditure on two of the most 
popular gambling products – Lotto and scratchcards – individually as mediators. In each case, 
expenditures are measured in £/month. Only in specification 3 do the results tentatively suggest 
that expenditure on scratchcards plays a mediating role in the loss in well-being associated with 
problem gambling. The direct effect of PG on W is £27.8b in aggregate. The indirect effect is 
only significant at the 10% level, but the magnitude of the effect, -0.172, represents almost 
13% of the total effect (𝛿 in column 1). Thus, there is a potential in these results to support 
policy that decreases scratchcard sales, perhaps through regulatory actions that raise the price 
of such games relative to others that seem benign, such as lotto. However, we know almost 
nothing is known about the cross-price demand elasticities between scratchcards and other 
gambling products. It is therefore unclear whether a reduction in the demand for scratchcards 
would increase the demand for other gambling, which may not be as benign as the estimates 
suggest because the coefficients are likely to be heavily attenuated towards zero because of 
measurement error in expenditure data.  
The reservations about the causal interpretation of the PG effect on W applies to this 
mediation analysis too. In particular, gambling spending and its composition might be a result 
of low well-being. Given the difficulty in resolving the problem of reverse causation in the 
earlier work, it is likely to be impossible to resolve this additional concern with the existing 
data. Moreover, while the BGPS data on monthly lottery expenditure, and on monthly 
scratchcard expenditure compares closely to the sales reported by the private sector company 
that is licensed to sell such products, the same is not true for the other components of gambling 
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overall expenditure. It seems that there is considerable under-reporting on other forms of 
gambling in BGPS relative to what is known from industry sources. 
The implication of this is that the coefficient on other gambling in Table 2.5 is likely 
to be considerably biased towards zero. The true value of this coefficient may be substantially 
larger. But since the scratchcard and lottery spending data appears to be reasonably accurate, 
at least in aggregate, there is a case for thinking that the statistical significance of scratchcard 
spending suggests that this product may play a role in the transmission mechanism, while Lotto 
spending does not. 
Table 2.5: Mediation analysis 
 Baseline Mediation 1 Mediation 2 Mediation 3 
Ln Y (𝜸) 0.534*** 0.535*** 0.527*** 0.525*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0524) 
PG (𝜹) -1.382*** -1.415*** -1.254*** -1.210*** 
 (0.3719) (0.2726) (0.2780) (0.2689) 𝜹/𝜸 -2.589*** -3.247*** -2.927*** -2.838*** 
 (0.7605) (0.9613) (0.9715) (0.9410) 
All gambling expenditure - 1.15× 10UV - - 
  (0.0003)   
Other gambling expenditure - - 0.0002 - 
   (0.0003)  
Lotto expenditure - - 0.001 - 
   (0.0018)  
Scratchcard expenditure - - -0.016*** -0.015** 
   (0.0054) (0.0067) 








CV (£b, pa) 25.4 25.9 23.3 22.6 
 
2.6 Comparison with HSE and SHS data 
A major concern with the BGPS 2010 data used in the analysis above is the response 
rate of 65%. Perhaps even more troubling is that single, young males – the most likely 
demographic to be problem gamblers – appear to be under-represented in the sample according 
to the summary statistics in Table 2.1. This raises concerns about non-response bias in the 
preceding estimates and is certainly a weakness of the data as a whole. With the particular 
dataset used here, one may be suspicious, for instance, about the ability of a survey conducted 
with the express purpose to evaluate the prevalence of gambling (and problem gambling) to 
elicit responses from problem gamblers who are concealing their affliction from others or in 
 44 
denial about it with themselves. Moreover, the external validity of the findings above is suspect 
even if the proportion of problem gamblers is the same for respondents and non-respondents 
since the distribution of other characteristics – most notably well-being and income – may 
differ between responding and non-responding problem gamblers. 
The fact that using sample weights makes only a negligible difference the preceding 
estimates only partially relieves concerns about non-response bias since weights only adjust 
for the distribution of well-known population characteristics – such as age, sex, employment 
status and income – but not for the unknown distributions of characteristics like problem 
gambling or well-being. An alternative approach to examining the extent to which non-
response bias may be an issue is to find and use other data which is less likely to suffer from 
the same non-response issues. Fortunately, the Health Survey England 2012 (HSE) and 
Scottish Health Survey 2012-2015 (SHS) – both of which are large, individual-level, 
representative sample surveys administered in the UK – contain the DSM and PGSI problem 
gambling screens used here as well as information on well-being, income and demographic 
characteristics41. Importantly, PG questions feature only very briefly in these surveys and 
identifying the prevalence of problem gambling is only a minor concern of both the SHS and 
HSE which are designed to make observations on public health more generally. Thus, non-
participants in the HSE and SHS surveys, particularly those who are problem gamblers, are 
less likely to do so because of the same reasons as those who refuse the BGPS 2010 
questionnaire. 
The response rates of the HSE and SHS surveys are similar to that of the BGPS, at 65% 
for the former in 2012 and 59% (2015) to 66% (2012) for the latter. Table 2.6 compares 
descriptive statistics from the BGPS 2010 data and the pooled HSE 2012 and SHS 2012-2015 
datasets. There is little difference in the average age and the proportion of males between the 
datasets, but the proportion of single (never married) individuals are slightly better represented. 
The number of problem gamblers in the HSE and SHS data is almost double that of the BGPS 
data, though the sample size is around three times as large42. The proportion of single PGs is 
3.4 percentage points higher in the HSE/SHS dataset than in the BGPS and the proportion of  
                                               
41 Unfortunately, the HSE and SHS data do not contain information on gambling expenditure or parental 
gambling behavior. Thus, the BGPS 2010 data is the only dataset available to conduct the entire main 
analysis of this chapter. 
42 Despite the much larger pool of problem gamblers in the HSE and SHS combined data, the number 
was still too small for matching methodologies to be properly determined.  
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Table 2.6: Comparison of BGPS and HSE/SHS descriptive statistics 
 BGPS 2010 HSE and SHS 
 Non-PG PG 
 
All Non-PG PG All 
       
Well-being Score, 1-10 7.928 6.240 7.916 . . . 
 (1.8865) (2.6462) (1.8982)    
Well-being Score, 0-10* . . . 7.791 6.920 7.758 
    (1.7994) (2.3810) (1.8324) 
WEMWBS+ . . . 50.596 41.650 50.568 
    (8.6832) (10.3619) (8.7349) 
GHQ¨ . . . 1.434 3.463 1.439 
    (2.6899) (3.9189) (2.6987) 
Household Income, £ pa 29571.74 28,020.13 29,560.56 37,686.30 29,171.44 36,852.86 
 (16,129.46) (15,037.04) (16,121.37) (16,102.89) (16,151.75) (16,269.38) 
Female=1 0.544 0.200 0.541 0.559 0.172 0.557 
 (0.4981) (0.4041) (0.4983) (0.4965) (0.3791) (0.4968) 
Age, years 50.043 37.600 49.953 50.302 41.273 50.991 
 (17.3347) (14.2628) (17.3456) (18.2139) (16.6647) (18.5327) 
Ethnicity:       
White 0.928 0.820 0.927 0.954 0.848 0.947 
 (0.2592) (0.3881) (0.2604) (0.2093) (0.3604) (0.2247) 
Mixed Ethnicity 0.008 . 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.004 
 (0.0914)  (0.0910) (0.0651) (0.1005) (0.0661) 
Asian/Asian British 0.035 0.120 0.036 0.025 0.081 0.029 
 (0.1848) (0.3283) (0.1863) (0.1556) (0.2739) (0.1674) 
Black/Black British 0.024 0.060 0.024 0.008 0.040 0.009 
 (0.1515) (0.2399) (0.1523) (0.0896) (0.1979) (0.0942) 
Chinese/Other 0.005 . 0.005 0.008 0.020 0.009 
 (0.0711)  (0.0708) (0.0886) (0.1414) (0.0929) 
Marital Status:       
Married 0.666 0.520 0.665 0.622 0.464 0.618 
 (0.4716) (0.5047) (0.4720) (0.4848) (0.5013) (0.4858) 
Separated/Divorced 0.097 0.120 0.097 0.104 0.111 0.102 
 (0.2959) (0.3283) (0.2961) (0.3047) (0.3159) (0.3029) 
Single 0.165 0.360 0.167 0.194 0.394 0.192 
 (0.3713) (0.4849) (0.3726) (0.3951) (0.4911) (0.3939) 
Widowed 0.072 . 0.071 0.080 0.030 0.087 
 (0.2582)  (0.2574) (0.2717) (0.1723) (0.2823) 
Observations 6,891 50 6,941 23,250 99 23,349 
Notes: Std dev in parentheses. No observations recorded as “.” Personal and household income is 
reported as fitted values from interval regressions. Gambling spend is the mid-points of the binned data. 
*Only 16,522 (75 PG) respondents were asked the 0-10 well-being question in the SHS dataset. +Only 
20,451 (80 PG) respondents completed the WEMWBS screen. ¨Only 22,878 (95 PG) respondents 
completed the GHQ screen. 
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males is 3.8 percentage points higher, though the average age of PGs in the HSE/SHS data is 
almost 4 years older. Average income is also notably higher in HSE/SHS compared to the 
BGPS and can be at least partially explained by the time difference between the surveys43. 
Both the HSE and SHS surveys contain two measures of well-being; the Warwick and 
Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS) and the General Health Questionnaire 12-
item screen (GHQ). WEMWBS is a mental well-being screen comprised of 14 positively 
framed questions about mental health and well-being, each of which receive a scaled score 
from 1-5 and responses are aggregated to achieve some mental well-being score – where higher 
scores indicate better well-being. The GHQ is a 12 question, negatively worded screen often 
used to detect depression. Affirmative answers to each question score 1 point and the 
summation of these scores indicate mental health – where higher scores indicate worse well-
being. The SHS also contains an extra well-being question; “How satisfied are you with life as 
a whole nowadays?” with responses ranging from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely 
satisfied) and is the closest question to the one asked in BGPS. 
In all three surveys, well-being questions are asked at the end of the questionnaire. This 
raises potential problems for comparing across the surveys since responses may be influenced 
by the preceding questions when well-being items are asked. That is, there is scope for the 
different preceding questions to have a material impact on individuals’ evaluation of their well-
being at that point in time – even if “these days” is included in the question and meant to be 
evaluative in nature. However, though not identical, the average score from the 0-10 well-being 
question in SHS is very similar to that from the BGPS for the whole sample, suggesting any 
difference the preceding questions may have had on well-being is not present. There is, though, 
a difference in the average well-being score between non-PG and PG individuals across the 
surveys. It is less than 1 in the SHS data, compared to over 1.5 from the BGPS, which may be 
explained by the preceding questions causing a non-monotonic change in well-being for 
respondents, but there is no evidence to support or refute such a conclusion. The coefficient on 
problem gambling is therefore likely to be correspondingly smaller in a well-being equation 
when using the SHS and HSE data compared to the estimates above. Moreover, this would 
yield a smaller estimate of compensating variation associated with being PG, ceteris paribus. 
                                               
43 Income in HSE and SHS is again recorded in bins, thus interval regression is employed as with the 
BGPS data to obtain a continuous measure. The resultant estimates of this interval regression are also 
in line with the literature. 
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Whether this follows for the WEMWBS and GHQ measures of well-being is, however, unclear 
from the raw data. 
Figure 2.8: Well-being and net annual household income in the SHS 
 
The remaining component of the compensating variation calculation, the relationship 
between well-being and income, is illustrated in Figure 2.8 which plots a local polynomial fit 
of the SHS well-being question (0-10) against fitted log household income and is directly 
comparable with Figure 2.5. There appears to be a much more pronounced relationship 
between income and well-being compared to the BGPS, with a unit increase in log income 
from 9.5 to 10.5 associated with an increase in well-being of around 1 – double what is 
indicated by Figure 2.5. This implies that one should expect a higher coefficient on log income 
in well-being regressions using the HSE/SHS data, further reducing the resultant CV estimate. 
Using the WEMWBS measure of well-being yields a similar picture and the GHQ measure is 
equally pronounced but with a negative gradient. 
Table 2.7 compares estimates of the well-being methodology across the BGPS and the 
three measures of well-being in the pooled HSE and SHS data. Having established in Section 
2.5.1 that monotonic transformations to the well-being measure makes no practical difference 
to the resultant CV estimates, the well-being measures are normalised by subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the standard deviation to allow direct comparisons to be made between 
regressions using the four measures. Note that for all variables, the sign on the coefficients in 
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the GHQ regression are reversed, which is expected since higher GHQ scores correspond to a 
lower mental well-being.  
Table 2.7: OLS well-being regression comparison between BGPS and HSE/SHS data 
  BGPS SHS/HSE 
Dependent Variable: Well-being 1-10 Well-being 0-10 WEMWBS GHQ 12 
      
Ln(Y) (𝛿) 0.233*** 0.722*** 0.772*** -0.640*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0273) (0.0229) (0.0242) 
DSM PG (𝛾) -0.742*** -0.187 -0.797*** 0.651*** 
 (0.1928) (0.1746) (0.1767) (0.1729) 
Constant -2.072*** -6.725*** -7.649*** 6.432*** 
 (0.3127) (0.2904) (0.2454) (0.2546) 
     𝛿/𝛾 -3.186*** -0.260 -1.033*** -1.017*** 
 (0.9285) (0.2423) (0.2320) (0.2746) 
Observations 6,942 13,335 17,312 19,711 
R-squared 0.065 0.122 0.106 0.076 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Well-being measures all normalised by subtracting mean 
and dividing by standard deviation. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level. Full estimates including demographic controls are presented in Appendix Table A2.23. 
 
The coefficient on log income is significantly larger in magnitude for all well-being 
measures in the HSE and SHS data compared to estimates from the BGPS. It is this difference 
which primarily drives the much smaller 𝛿/𝛾 metric, indicating a lower CV estimate than those 
presented so far, though the reason for why income correlates with well-being so much better 
in the SHS and HSE data is unclear. The coefficient on problem gambling when using the 0-
10 scale from the SHS is significantly smaller than that from the BGPS. However, using 
WEMWBS as the relevant measure of well-being in the HSE and SHS data yields a coefficient 
very similar to that in the BGPS. As a result, the CV estimates from HSE and SHS data are 
significantly smaller than from BGPS; though, the implied aggregate compensating variation 
from WEMWBS and GHQ estimates are still large – around £10b per annum. The estimates 
from the SHS 0-10 measure are smaller still, and are in fact insignificantly different from zero, 
driven largely by a statistically insignificant coefficient on PG. The poorly determined 
coefficient on PG in this regression is likely due to the smaller sample of PGs which were 
asked this question, relative to the other well-being measures in the SHS and HSE data. 
The significant difference in estimates between the BGPS used in the main analysis of 
this chapter and the HSE/SHS data may well be indicative of a non-response bias in the BGPS 
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data which the use of sample weights is unable to correct. For all well-being measures in the 
HSE/SHS data the resultant compensating variation is significantly smaller, around one third 
of the estimate from BGPS. This is driven by non-PGs reporting, on average, a larger difference 
in well-being to their PG counterparts in the BGPS than in the HSE/SHS and by income having 
a greater influence on reported well-being in the latter dataset. However, the response rate of 
the HSE and SHS is not dissimilar to that of the BGPS and may well face non-response biases 
of their own. The difference in the objectives of the SHS and HSE surveys compared to the 
BGPS make it likely that single, young and male PGs are better represented as is evidenced in 
the summary statistics – and it is these characteristics that the BGPS appears to under-represent 
the most. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Problem gambling is thought to affect a small proportion of the adult population but 
the contribution of this chapter is to quantify how much of a problem PG is for those who are 
afflicted. Baseline OLS estimates are in excess of £31 billion pa – around 1.7% of GNP. Further 
estimates, allowing for measurement error and the endogeneity of PG, suggest this cost to be 
more than twice as large as the baseline case. Various robustness checks failed to indicate that 
the overall harm would be less than the headline estimate. Using a nonlinear Ordered Probit 
model generates even (slightly) higher estimates - although any of these estimates would imply 
that the PG problem swamps the tax revenues from gambling, by an order of magnitude. The 
baseline estimates appear to be the lower bound of the likely range of self-harm costs, and even 
this lower bound suggests that PG would be an enormous social problem. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to provide any direct comparisons with the previous literature or with alternative 
methodologies.44 
The estimated size of these internality costs suggest that PG may be susceptible to 
policy that addresses its behavioural origins (see Chetty (2015)), which might be uncovered by 
testing PG subjects in the laboratory compared to matched non-PG cases. Moreover, given the 
potential size of this problem it would be important to design the policy response to it by 
exploring the transmission mechanism by which low well-being develops. Only if the 
transmission of PG to well-being was mediated via gambling expenditure may it then make 
                                               
44 However, Forrest (2016), while not addressing the range of econometric issues that are of concern here, supports 
this conclusion that the PG problem is a very serious one by showing that his estimates of PG on well-being for 
men was of a similar order of magnitude as that of being a widower, relative to being married. Indeed, for women, 
he found that, the effect of PG on W was even larger than that of being a widow on W. 
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sense to use gambling tax policy to reduce the extent of transmission. Even if this were the case 
this would not necessarily imply that gambling should be made illegal, or even taxed more 
heavily.  
There is the additional consideration of the consumer surplus enjoyed by players. 
Although the results here suggest that there are significant self-harms associated with DSM 
scores of 1 or 2 and these people constitute a much larger proportion of the population that the 
traditional PG (DSM>2) group, the overwhelming majority of the adult gambling population 
appear to experience little or no problem with this activity. Interpreting the estimates of the 
loss in well-being associated with PG in the spirit of Orphanides and Zervos (1995), then the 
average estimate already incorporates the positive well-being enjoyed by those who are lucky 
enough to gamble without regret.  
If one were not prepared to accept this interpretation, then the cross-section work in 
Farrell and Walker (2000) and the time series work reported Chapter 0 provide estimates of the 
price elasticity of demand for lotto that would imply that the consumer surplus enjoyed by lotto 
players is in the order of £1 billion pa. Extrapolating from this to the rest of gambling spending, 
the aggregate consumer surplus across all forms of gambling would still be very small in 
comparison with the welfare losses reported here.45 
Nonetheless, taxing gambling more heavily would only be part of the solution to the 
PG problem if gambling expenditure was an important mediator for PG and there was an 
elasticity to exploit by taxation. The lottery draw and scratchcard spending in the BGPS data 
does suggest a correlation with PG. The data – even with the aforementioned measurement 
error issues – suggests that PG=1 individuals spend almost two and a half times as much on 
lottery draw games as do PG=0, and almost fourteen times as much on lottery scratchcards46.  
                                               
45 However, the take-out for non-lottery forms of gambling are subject to take out rates that would 
typically be less than 10% so this might be underestimating the consumer surplus enjoyed through these 
other sources of gambling. 
46 GPS contains data on monthly spending, reported in intervals, for every type of gambling for those 
that say they engage in each type. The lottery draw spending grosses up, using the bin mid-points, to 
£3.20b, almost exactly matching the official annual sales (of £3.16b), but scratchcard spending 
underestimates official sales (of £1.34b) by approximately 14%. Respondents are allowed to say that 
they would prefer not to say how much they spend and this is not an insubstantial proportion of those 
that report buying scratchcards in the last year. It is likely that these refuseniks are larger than average 
spenders and this is not captured in the calculations here which are therefore best thought of as a lower 
bound.  There are clear differences in the gambling spending of PG=1 and PG=0 individuals. PG=1 
spend £308 per month and lotto is about 5% of this. While PG=0 spend an average of £16 per month 
and lotto accounts for around 35% of this. Investigating the extent to which expenditure, and its 
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However, as Forrest (2014) points out, one would need to be able to argue that the elasticity of 
gambling demand was high, especially for those with PG.47 The absence of evidence that 
taxation would reduce expenditure and that expenditure matters causally for PG is an important 
priority for future work. In any event, given the highly skewed nature of PG, there may be a 
case for trying to profile problem gamblers and apply treatments that do not rely on financial 
incentives solely to those that have a high probability of PG, rather than imposing some policy 
intervention onto the population as a whole, especially when doing so would harm the 
overwhelming majority of non-PG cases. Sadly, the reduced-form work shows that the few 
variables that are significantly indicative of PG (age and gender) might not be very helpful in 
profiling PG since there are many single, young men who are not problem gamblers.  
The exploratory mediation results suggest that scratchcards may play a mediating role 
in the impact of PG on well-being, while other products do not, which suggests a role for policy 
that generates substitution effects towards more benign products. Regrettably, even less is 
known about the cross-price elasticities than about own price elasticities.   
                                               
composition, is an important part of the transmission mechanism that determines PG is a topic for future 
research if, an only if, data that included PG, Y and W and gambling expenditures exists.  
47 Intuitively, one would expect addicted consumers to exhibit less price elastic demand. Taxation, 
therefore, might have little effect on the behaviour of addicts but nonetheless cause a large deadweight 
loss on those who are not addicted. While estimates of the average elasticity for various types of 
gambling do exist (see the report by Frontier Economics, 2014), there appear to none that allow for 
heterogeneity across the distribution of gambling. See Hollingsworth et al (2016) for the case of alcohol 
demand.  
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2.8 Appendix  
2.8.1 DSM and PGSI screens  
In DSM-IV respondents are asked the following 10 questions to determine whether or 
not they show signs of problem gambling. Respondents are asked how often they exhibit the 
behavior in each question (with options for never, some of the time, most times, every time). 
Answers ‘never’ and ‘some of the time’ score 0, whilst ‘most times’ and ‘every time’ are scored 
as 1. A cumulative score of 3 or more from the following questions indicate a problem gambler. 
In the past 12 months:  
1. How often do you go back another day to win back money you lost? 
2. How often have you found yourself thinking about gambling? 
3. Have you needed to gamble with more and more money to get the excitement you are looking 
for? 
4. Have you felt restless or irritable when trying to cut down on gambling? 
5. Have you gambled to escape from problems or when you are feeling depressed, anxious or 
bad about yourself? 
6. Have you lied to family, or others, to hide the extent of your gambling? 
7. Have you made unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back or stop gambling? 
8. Have you committed a crime in order to finance gambling or to pay gambling debts? 
9. Have you risked or lost an important relationship, job, educational or work opportunity 
because of gambling? 
10. Have you asked others to provide money to help with a desperate financial situation caused 
by gambling?  
In PGSI respondents answer: never, sometimes, most of the time, or almost always 
(scoring as 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively) to the following 9 questions. In the past 12 months, how 
often:  
1. Have you bet more than you could really afford? 
2. Have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of money to get the same excitement? 
3. Have you gone back to try to win back the money you’d lost? 
4. Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble? 
5. Have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling? 
6. Have you felt that gambling has caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety? 
7. Have people criticized your betting, or told you that you have a gambling problem, whether 
or not you thought it is true? 
8. Have you felt your gambling has caused financial problems for you or your household? 
9. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble? 
The PGSI screen differs from DSM in that it attempts to assess the severity of the individual’s 
problem gambling. A score of 0 indicates non-problem gambling, 1-2 is assessed as a low-level 
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risk of problem gambling, 3-7 would indicate a moderate risk of becoming a problem gambler, 
and a score of 8+ is typically used to define problem gambling. 
2.8.2 Auxiliary estimates 





Dependent variable Ln(Household Income) Ln(Personal Income) 
Age 0.0210*** (0.00422) 0.035*** (0.0038) 
Age2 -2.01e-04*** (4.40e-05) -3.02e-04*** (3.92e-05) 
Female -0.302*** (0.0974) -2.837*** (0.0956) 
Education Qualifications: NQF 1 0.474*** (0.0339) 0.396*** (0.0307) 
NQF 2  0.309*** (0.0387) 0.237*** (0.0351) 
NQF 3 0.690*** (0.0379) 0.606*** (0.0339) 
NQF 5 0.472*** (0.0433) 0.472*** (0.0390) 
NQF 6 0.650*** (0.0553) 0.649*** (0.0505) 
NQF 7 0.734*** (0.0665) 0.819*** (0.0604) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.394*** (0.122) -0.142 (0.1095) 
Asian/Asian British -0.386*** (0.0589) -0.214*** (0.0535) 
Black/Black British -0.595*** (0.0773) -0.163** (0.0688) 
Chinese/Other -0.174 (0.137) -0.394*** (0.1290) 
Unemployed -0.957*** (0.0618) -1.353*** (0.0576) 
Long-term Disability -0.932*** (0.0634) -0.895*** (0.0587) 
Family Carer -0.490*** (0.0405) -0.999*** (0.0368) 
Retired -0.475*** (0.0425) -0.587*** (0.0381) 
Good Health -0.129*** (0.0254) -0.067*** (0.0228) 
Fair Health -0.246*** (0.0338) -0.165*** (0.0228) 
Bad Health -0.246***(0.0589) -0.197*** (0.0301) 
Very Bad Health -0.209* (0.112) -0.105 (0.1031) 
Separated/Divorced -0.395*** (0.0599) 0.293*** (0.0406) 
Single -0.276*** (0.0441) 0.232*** (0.0676) 
Widowed -0.287*** (0.0872) 0.321*** (0.0910) 
Constant 9.979*** (0.153) 8.818*** (0.1385) 
Observations 4,540 5,667 
Notes: Omitted categories: Male, education level 0 (NQF0=1), white, paid work, very good health, 
married. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Government office region and 
marital*gender interaction omitted from reporting. 
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Table A2.9: Full OLS estimated coefficients (PG defined by DSM>2) 
Dependent Variable W Ln(W) 
𝑾𝒊𝝀 − 𝟏𝝀  
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.534*** 0.103*** 5.275*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0120) (0.6553) 
PG (𝛿) -1.382*** -0.289*** -13.444*** 
 (0.3719) (0.0890) (3.6509) 
Age -0.040*** -0.006*** -0.507*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0017) (0.0993) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
Female 0.230*** 0.038*** 2.697*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0088) (0.5352) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.611** -0.105* -7.622*** 
 (0.2630) (0.0620) (2.7549) 
Asian/Asian British -0.099 -0.019 -0.839 
 (0.1379) (0.0271) (1.6039) 
Black/Black British 0.227 0.038 2.476 
 (0.1718) (0.0361) (1.9657) 
Chinese/Other -0.020 0.021 -1.303 
 (0.2760) (0.0409) (3.4672) 
Married 0.358*** 0.044*** 5.208*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0157) (0.8956) 
Separated/Divorced -0.022 -0.000 -0.671 
 (0.1023) (0.0207) (1.1498) 
Widowed -0.547*** -0.085*** -7.016*** 
 (0.1294) (0.0265) (1.4647) 
Constant 2.755*** 1.016*** 1.261 
 (0.5894) (0.1208) (6.6333) 𝜹/𝜸 -2.589*** -2.811*** -2.549*** 
 (0.7605) (0.9338) (0.7707) 
CV (£b, pa) 25.4 27.5 25.0 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.071 0.054 0.073 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 
1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single, North East. Government office region omitted 
from reporting. CV is computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.0072*46m*𝑌X: where 𝑌X =£29,560; 0.0072 is the proportion with PG=1, 46m is the adult population, and CV is recorded in 






Table A2.10: OLS estimated coefficients using log equivalised income 
Dependent Variable W Ln(W) Box-Cox 
     
Ln (Equivalised Income) 0.445*** 0.084*** 4.510*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0105) (0.5911) 
DSM PG -1.413*** -0.295*** -13.849*** 
 (0.3738) (0.0897) (3.6871) 
Age -0.041*** -0.006*** -0.520*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0017) (0.1004) 
Age Squared 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
Female 0.225*** 0.037*** 2.685*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0088) (0.5401) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.644** -0.112* -7.972*** 
 (0.2640) (0.0620) (2.7904) 
Asian/Asian British -0.112 -0.022 -0.926 
 (0.1382) (0.0273) (1.6155) 
Black/Black British 0.176 0.028 2.050 
 (0.1706) (0.0358) (1.9681) 
Chinese/Other -0.005 0.024 -1.165 
 (0.2764) (0.0409) (3.4980) 
Married 0.527*** 0.077*** 6.905*** 
 (0.0739) (0.0148) (0.8390) 
Separated/Divorced -0.034 -0.003 -0.779 
 (0.1027) (0.0208) (1.1626) 
Widowed -0.533*** -0.082*** -6.936*** 
 (0.1297) (0.0266) (1.4792) 
Constant 4.033*** 1.272*** 13.255** 
 (0.4888) (0.0989) (5.5736) 
    
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.069 0.051 0.072 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 
statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single, 
North East. Government office region omitted from reporting. Equivalised 
income calculated as the fitted household income obtained from Table A2.8 





Table A2.11: OLS regressions using midpoints of household and personal income 
Income measure: Household Income Personal Income 
    
Ln(Midpoint Y) 0.311*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0275) 
DSM PG -1.618*** -1.463*** 
 (0.4438) (0.3972) 
Age -0.041*** -0.037*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0093) 
Age^2 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.223*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0514) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.809*** -0.766*** 
 (0.3122) (0.2846) 
Asian/Asian British -0.299* -0.359** 
 (0.1615) (0.1494) 
Black/Black British 0.113 -0.075 
 (0.2136) (0.1792) 
Chinese/Other 0.165 -0.022 
 (0.2938) (0.2869) 
Married 0.536*** 0.644*** 
 (0.0877) (0.0757) 
Separated/Divorced -0.041 -0.101 
 (0.1262) (0.1096) 
Widowed -0.596*** -0.666*** 
 (0.1732) (0.1441) 
Constant 4.914*** 6.692*** 
 (0.5019) (0.3373) 
   
CV (£b, pa) 51.0 59.5 
Observations 4,540 5,957 
R-squared 0.073 0.062 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 
statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, 
single, North East. Government office region omitted from reporting. CV is 
computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.0072*46m*𝑌X: where 𝑌X ≈£29,560 for household income and 𝑌X ≈ £15,500 for personal income; 0.0072 
is the proportion with PG=1; 46m is the adult population: and CV is recorded 




Table A2.12: OLS estimated coefficients using personal income and PG defined as 
DSM>2 
Dependent Variable W Ln(W) Box-Cox 
     
Ln(Personal Income) 0.356*** 0.072*** 3.306*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0099) (0.5474) 
DSM PG -1.380*** -0.288*** -13.573*** 
 (0.3693) (0.0887) (3.6577) 
Age -0.042*** -0.007*** -0.519*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0017) (0.1016) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
Female 0.375*** 0.068*** 4.021*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0108) (0.6314) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.780*** -0.137** -9.432*** 
 (0.2654) (0.0628) (2.7899) 
Asian/Asian British -0.232* -0.043 -2.244 
 (0.1373) (0.0269) (1.6109) 
Black/Black British -0.033 -0.011 -0.175 
 (0.1690) (0.0357) (1.9499) 
Chinese/Other 0.038 0.033 -0.783 
 (0.2803) (0.0417) (3.5399) 
Married 0.605*** 0.090*** 7.764*** 
 (0.0725) (0.0145) (0.8256) 
Separated/Divorced -0.176* -0.031 -2.146* 
 (0.1042) (0.0212) (1.1775) 
Widowed -0.667*** -0.109*** -8.188*** 
 (0.1310) (0.0269) (1.4950) 
Constant 4.705*** 1.362*** 22.741*** 
 (0.4746) (0.0977) (5.3821) 𝛿/𝛾 -3.876*** -4.002*** -4.106*** 
 (1.1842) (1.3666) (1.3271) 
    
CV (£b, pa) 20.1 20.7 21.2 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.066 0.049 0.069 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 
statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, 
single, North East. Government office region omitted from reporting. CV is 
computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.0072*46m*𝑌X: where 𝑌X ≈£15,500; 0.0072 is the proportion with PG=1; 46m is the adult population: and 
CV is recorded in £ billion pa. The estimated value of λ in the final column is 





Table A2.13: OLS estimated coefficients (PG defined by PGSI>7) 
Dependent variable W Ln(W) 
𝑊(@ − 1𝜆  
     
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.533*** 0.102*** 5.281*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0120) (0.6574) 
PG (𝛿) -1.305*** -0.293*** -12.417*** 
 (0.4342) (0.1090) (4.1227) 
Age -0.039*** -0.006*** -0.500*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0017) (0.0997) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
Female 0.235*** 0.039*** 2.758*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0088) (0.5364) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.609** -0.105* -7.623*** 
 (0.2632) (0.0621) (2.7655) 
Asian/Asian British -0.106 -0.020 -0.913 
 (0.1384) (0.0271) (1.6146) 
Black/Black British 0.229 0.039 2.498 
 (0.1717) (0.0361) (1.9708) 
Chinese/Other -0.015 0.022 -1.253 
 (0.2759) (0.0408) (3.4774) 
Married 0.356*** 0.043*** 5.208*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0157) (0.8994) 
Separated/Divorced -0.031 -0.002 -0.755 
 (0.1024) (0.0208) (1.1553) 
Widowed -0.549*** -0.085*** -7.056*** 
 (0.1294) (0.0265) (1.4702) 
Constant 2.747*** 1.016*** 1.154 
 (0.5877) (0.1201) (6.6493) 𝛿/𝛾 -2.450*** -2.860** -2.351*** 
 (0.8625) (1.1151) (0.8403) 
CV (£b, pa) 18.2 21.3 17.5 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.070 0.053 0.073 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 
1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single, North East. Government office region omitted 
from reporting. CV is computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.0055*46m*𝑌X: where 𝑌X ≈£29,560; 0.0055 is the proportion with PG=1; 46m is the adult population: and CV is recorded in 






Table A2.14: Level and log well-being regression using sample weights and PG defined 
as DSM>2 
Dependent Variable W Ln(W) 
    
Ln(Household Income) 0.529*** 0.100*** 
 (0.0597) (0.0121) 
DSM PG -1.438*** -0.296*** 
 (0.3704) (0.0886) 
Age -0.037*** -0.005*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0017) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Female 0.232*** 0.038*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0090) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.470* -0.073 
 (0.2483) (0.0522) 
Asian/British Asian -0.061 -0.015 
 (0.1410) (0.0284) 
Black/Black British 0.130 0.025 
 (0.1822) (0.0350) 
Chinese/Other -0.314 -0.023 
 (0.3592) (0.0543) 
Married 0.322*** 0.036** 
 (0.0810) (0.0159) 
Separated/Divorced -0.043 -0.007 
 (0.1039) (0.0207) 
Widowed -0.546*** -0.086*** 
 (0.1325) (0.0262) 
Constant 2.789*** 1.042*** 
 (0.5994) (0.1212) 
   
CV (£b, pa) 26.6 29.1 
Observations 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.067 0.050 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* 
indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted 
categories: Male, white, single, North East. Government office 
region omitted from reporting. CV is computed by multiplying 
the estimated δ/γ by 0.0055*46m*𝑌X: where 𝑌X ≈ £29,560; 
0.0055 is the proportion with PG=1; 46m is the adult population: 




Table A2.15: Full IV estimated coefficients (PG defined by DSM>2) 
Instrument: PGSI Score 




Dependent variable W W W 
     
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.458*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0567) (0.0873) 
PG (𝛿) -2.482*** -2.498*** -18.072* 
 (0.6079) (0.5972) (9.5863) 
Age -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.051*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0124) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.054 
 (0.0453) (0.0460) (0.1159) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.624** -0.624** -0.798*** 
 (0.2642) (0.2701) (0.2801) 
Asian/Asian British -0.088 -0.088 0.068 
 (0.1403) (0.1395) (0.2070) 
Black/Black British 0.231 0.231 0.284 
 (0.1694) (0.1595) (0.2573) 
Chinese/Other -0.034 -0.034 -0.224 
 (0.2678) (0.2795) (0.3006) 
Married 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.329*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0758) (0.1042) 
Separated/Divorced -0.022 -0.022 -0.010 
 (0.0939) (0.1025) (0.1363) 
Widowed -0.551*** -0.551*** -0.611*** 
 (0.1349) (0.1263) (0.1401) 
Constant 2.841*** 2.842*** 4.022*** 
 (0.6127) (0.5623) (1.0491) 𝛿/𝛾 -4.695*** -4.724*** -39.462* 
 (1.2869) (1.2512) (25.0554) 
CV (£b, pa) 46.0 46.3 386 
1st stage F 4890.97*** 2488.75*** 28.41*** 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.066 
Notes: Estimated standard errors, obtained from bootsrapping, are in parentheses.. 
***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. CV is computed by 
multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.072 * 46m * 𝑌X, where 𝑌X = £29,560, 0.072 is the 
proportion with PG=1, 46m is the adult population, and CV is recorded in £ billion pa. 






Table A2.16: First-stage coefficient estimates of PG (opposite score and parental 
gambling) 
Dependent Variable DSM>2 DSM>2 DSM>2 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 
PGSI Score 0.048***  0.048***    
 (0.0039)  (0.0041)    
DSM Score    0.092***  0.092*** 
    (0.0107)  (0.0105) 
Parents did not   -0.001 0.001  -0.002 0.001 
gamble  (0.0022) (0.0019)  (0.0020) (0.0018) 
Parents were PG  0.031** 0.014*  0.024** 0.007 
  (0.0127) (0.0078)  (0.0108) (0.0066) 
Age -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female 0.000 -0.009*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 
 (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.011 -0.010*** -0.011 -0.006 -0.008*** -0.006 
 (0.0071) (0.0032) (0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0043) 
Asian/British Asian 0.005 0.011 0.004 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0077) (0.0047) 
Black/British Black -0.001 0.006 -0.000 0.003 0.008 0.003 
 (0.0066) (0.0111) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0108) (0.0069) 
Chinese/Other -0.010** -0.013*** -0.010** -0.006 -0.008*** -0.006 
 (0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0047) 
Married 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.005* -0.005 -0.005* 
 (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0028) 
Separated/Divorced 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0034) 
Widowed -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006** -0.005 -0.006** 
 (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0028) 
NQF1 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.004* 
 (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0023) 
NQF2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0026) 
NQF3 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0024) 
NQF5 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0027) 
NQF6 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0038) 
NQF7 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.0055) (0.0071) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0038) 
Unemployed 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.008 0.021* 0.008 
 (0.0078) (0.0119) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0123) (0.0086) 
Long-term disability 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.008** -0.007 -0.008* 
 (0.0050) (0.0072) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0041) 
      Contd. 
 62 
Table A2.14 Contd.: First-stage coefficient estimates of PG (opposite score and parental gambling)  
Dependent Variable DSM>2 DSM>2 DSM>2 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 
Caring for family 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0019) 
Retired 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
Good health 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.001 0.004** 0.001 
 (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
Fair health -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005** 0.007** 0.005** 
 (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
Bad health -0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.013*** 0.016** 0.012*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0045) 
Very bad health -0.010 -0.003 -0.011* 0.018 0.016 0.018 
 (0.0067) (0.0040) (0.0064) (0.0128) (0.0138) (0.0126) 
Constant -0.007 0.028*** -0.009 -0.014* 0.013 -0.015* 
 (0.0091) (0.0107) (0.0089) (0.0079) (0.0097) (0.0080) 
       
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.423 0.019 0.424 0.410 0.018 0.411 
Notes: Estimated standard errors, obtained by bootstrapping, are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 
1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Parents gambled but were not PG, male, white, single, NQF level 0, employed, very good 




Table A2.17: IV estimated coefficients (PG defined by PGSI>7) 
Instruments DSM Score 




     
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.362*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0628) (0.1127) 
PG (𝛿) -3.544*** -3.552*** -36.896*** 
 (0.8455) (0.8990) (12.1641) 
Age -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.041*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0142) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.219*** 0.219*** -0.018 
 (0.0476) (0.0475) (0.1037) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.630** -0.630** -0.954*** 
 (0.2739) (0.2661) (0.2892) 
Asian/Asian British -0.094 -0.093 0.092 
 (0.1419) (0.1412) (0.2344) 
Black/Black British 0.242 0.242 0.424 
 (0.1780) (0.1840) (0.3977) 
Chinese/Other -0.035 -0.035 -0.328 
 (0.2811) (0.2842) (0.3050) 
Married 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.216 
 (0.0821) (0.0845) (0.1572) 
Separated/Divorced -0.043 -0.044 -0.232 
 (0.1032) (0.1064) (0.1817) 
Widowed -0.561*** -0.561*** -0.744*** 
 (0.1303) (0.1334) (0.1763) 
Constant 2.882*** 2.883*** 5.066*** 
 (0.6083) (0.6423) (1.3024) 𝛿/𝛾 -6.775*** -6.791*** -101.863* 
 (1.8102) (1.9335) (55.8167) 
CV (£b, pa) 50.4 50.6 758 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.085 
Notes: In the first column PG is instrumented using the DSM score, while in the 
second column it is instrumented with DSM score and parental problem gambling 
using GMM estimation. In the final column PG is instrumented with parental problem 
gambling only. Female, age, age2, marital status, ethnicity, and government office 
region are included as control variables. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 
***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. CV is computed by 
multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.0055*46m*𝑌X, where 𝑌X = £29,560, 0.0055 is the 













Dependent variable W W W 
    
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.529*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0583) (0.0583) 
PG (𝛿) -2.498*** -1.541*** -1.577*** 
 (0.5972) (0.3790) (0.3814) 
Age -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.218*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0454) (0.0454) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.624** -0.613** -0.613** 
 (0.2701) (0.2625) (0.2625) 
Asian/Asian British -0.088 -0.098 -0.097 
 (0.1395) (0.1377) (0.1377) 
Black/Black British 0.231 0.228 0.228 
 (0.1595) (0.1717) (0.1718) 
Chinese/Other -0.034 -0.022 -0.023 
 (0.2795) (0.2756) (0.2756) 
Married 0.357*** 0.358*** 0.358*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0789) (0.0789) 
Separated/Divorced -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.1025) (0.1022) (0.1022) 
Widowed -0.551*** -0.547*** -0.547*** 
 (0.1263) (0.1292) (0.1292) 
Constant 2.842*** 2.766*** 2.768*** 
 (0.5623) (0.5888) (0.5889) 
CV (£b, pa) 46.3 28.3 29.0 
1st stage F 2488.75*** 1418.10*** 1306.521*** 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.066 0.071 0.071 
Notes: Estimated standard errors, obtained from bootsrapping, are in parentheses.. ***/**/* 
indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. CV is computed by multiplying the 
estimated δ/γ by 0.072 * 46m * 𝑌X, where 𝑌X = £29,560, 0.072 is the proportion with PG=1, 
46m is the adult population, and CV is recorded in £ billion pa. Omitted categories: Male, 









    
Ln Y 0.236*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0313) 
DSM PG -1.221*** -1.219*** 
 (0.2939) (0.2930) 
Age -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Age Squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0260) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.367*** -0.367*** 
 (0.1291) (0.1291) 
Asian/Asian British -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.0755) (0.0755) 
Black/Black British 0.115 0.115 
 (0.0920) (0.0919) 
Chinese/Other -0.059 -0.059 
 (0.1585) (0.1586) 
Married 0.247*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0418) 
Separated/Divorced -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.0531) (0.0531) 
Widowed -0.345*** -0.345*** 
 (0.0693) (0.0693) 
   
Observations 6,942 6,942 
Notes: In the first column PG is instrumented using the PGSI 
score, while in the second column it is instrumented with 
PGSI score and parental problem gambling. Female, age, 
age2, marital status, ethnicity, and government office region 
are included as control variables. Omitted categories are 
male, single, white, and North East. Government office 
region and cut-points are omitted from reporting Estimated 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 




Table A2.20: Ordered probit estimated parameters of interest (PG defined by PGSI>7) 
Dependent Variable W W 
    
Ln Y (𝛾) 0.234*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0313) 
PG (𝛿) -1.614*** -1.613*** 
 (0.3171) (0.3170) 𝛿/𝛾 -6.887*** -6.883*** 
 (1.6587) (1.6585) 
Marginal Effects, 𝛥 Pr(𝑊 = 1,… ,10) /𝛥𝑃𝐺)	 
   
W=1 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) 
2 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) 
3 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0068) 
4 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0077) 
5 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0299) 
6 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0162) 
7 0.159*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0314) 
8 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0127) 
9 -0.131*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) 
10 -0.469*** -0.469*** 
 (0.0920) (0.0920) 
CV (£b, pa) 51.3 51.2 
Notes: In the first column PG is instrumented with DSM 
score. PG in the second column is instrumented with parental 
problem gambling as well as DSM score. Female, age, age2, 
ethnicity, and government office region are included as 
control variables and their coefficients are not reported here. 
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* 




Table A2.21: Well-being OLS regressions using responses to individual DSM questions 
Dependent Variable W W W 
     
Ln(Household Income) 0.535*** 0.536*** 0.534*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0581) (0.05814) 
DSM1=1 -0.382   
 (0.2341)   
DSM2=1 -0.245   
 (0.2101)   
DSM3=1 0.403   
 (0.3879)   
DSM4=1 0.023   
 (0.4811)   
DSM5=1 -1.461*** -2.012***  
 (0.5317) (0.4259)  DSM	5 = 	1e    -4.039*** 
   (1.05927) 
DSM6=1 -0.730   
 (0.6599)   
DSM7=1 -0.396   
 (0.4999)   
DSM8=1 -0.967   
 (0.9192)   
DSM9=1 0.245   
 (0.5955)   
DSM10=1 0.375   
 (0.4932)   
Constant 2.791*** 2.719*** 2.776*** 
 (0.5853) (0.5868) (0.58765) 
    𝛿/𝛾 -5.865*** -3.751*** -7.569*** 
 (1.7207) (0.8941) (2.1609) 
CV (£b, pa) 53.7 27.2 54.9 
Observations 6,936 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.075 0.073 0.067 
Notes: Robust standard errors are parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically 
significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single, North 
East. Controls omitted from reporting. DSM Q5 is instrumented with PGSI 
score in column 3. CV calculated as the sum of individual question 
coefficients divided by the log income coefficient, weighted by the proportion 
of affirmative answers, and multiplied by the adult population and mean 
household income. 𝛿/𝛾 is computed as the sum of individual question 





Table A2.22: Well-being OLS regressions using responses to individual PGSI questions 
Dependent Variable W W W 
        
Ln Y 0.539*** 0.538*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0584) (0.05935) 
PGSI 1=1 -0.612   
 (0.6732)   
PGSI 2=1 -1.552   
 (1.2505)   
PGSI 3=1 0.421   
 (0.5332)   
PGSI 4=1 2.745***   
 (1.0582)   
PGSI 5=1 1.303 -0.817  
 (1.2001) (0.6541)  PGSI	5 = 	1e    -5.827*** 
   (2.07485) 
 PGSI 6=1 -1.877   
 (1.2107)   
PGSI 7=1 0.289   
 (0.7368)   
PGSI 8=1 -1.418   
 (1.6303)   
PGSI 9=1 -1.244   
 (0.7883)   
Constant 2.702*** 2.675*** 2.756*** 
 (0.5872) (0.5898) (0.60277) 
    𝛿/𝛾 -3.608 -1.518 -10.939*** 
 (2.4530) (1.2289) (4.0522) 
CV (£b, pa) 16.4 5.1 36.4 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.072 0.067 0.050 
Notes: Robust standard errors are parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 
statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, 
white, single. Controls omitted from reporting. PGSI Q5 is 
instrumented with DSM score in column 3. CV calculated as the sum 
of individual question coefficients divided by the log income 
coefficient, weighted by the proportion of affirmative answers, and 
multiplied by the adult population and mean household income.	𝛿/𝛾 is 
computed as the sum of individual question coefficients divided by the 




Table A2.23: OLS well-being regression comparison between BGPS and HSE/SHS 
  BGPS SHS/HSE 
Dependent Variable: Well-being 1-10 Well-being 0-10 WEMWBS GHQ 12 
      
Ln(Y) (𝛿) 0.233*** 0.722*** 0.772*** -0.640*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0273) (0.0229) (0.0242) 
DSM PG (𝛾) -0.742*** -0.187 -0.797*** 0.651*** 
 (0.1928) (0.1746) (0.1767) (0.1729) 
Age -0.020*** -0.042*** -0.026*** 0.018*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
Age2 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female 0.115*** 0.046*** 0.035** 0.090*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0162) (0.0146) (0.0138) 
Separated/Divorced -0.233*** -0.023 0.181*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0374) (0.0305) (0.0314) 
Single -0.220*** 0.022 0.136*** -0.197*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0299) (0.0264) (0.0261) 
Widowed -0.499*** -0.009 0.134*** -0.182*** 
 (0.0614) (0.0385) (0.0335) (0.0302) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.402*** 0.296** 0.166 -0.114 
 (0.1372) (0.1455) (0.1318) (0.0890) 
Asian/Asian British -0.134* 0.137** 0.410*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0721) (0.0698) (0.0585) (0.0450) 
Black/Black British -0.026 -0.122 0.386*** -0.034 
 (0.0846) (0.2445) (0.1011) (0.0814) 
Chinese/Other -0.089 0.117 0.288*** -0.094 
 (0.1450) (0.0889) (0.0829) (0.0767) 
Constant -2.072*** -6.725*** -7.649*** 6.432*** 
 (0.3127) (0.2904) (0.2454) (0.2546) 
     𝛿/𝛾 -3.186*** -0.260 -1.033*** -1.017*** 
 (0.9285) (0.2423) (0.2320) (0.2746) 
Observations 6,942 13,335 17,312 19,711 
R-squared 0.065 0.122 0.106 0.076 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Well-being measures all normalised by subtracting mean 




Table A2.24: OLS estimates using polynomial expansions of log household income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Y) Polynomial Expansion: Linear Quadratic Cubic 
    
Ln(Y) 0.534*** 4.365*** -7.924 
 (0.0583) (1.1373) (22.4224) 
Ln(Y)^2  -0.193*** 1.054 
  (0.0567) (2.2587) 
Ln(Y)^3   -0.042 
   (0.0757) 
DSM PG (𝛿) -1.382*** -1.378*** -1.378*** 
 (0.3719) (0.3710) (0.3710) 
Age -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
Age^2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.230*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0454) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.611** -0.627** -0.631** 
 (0.2630) (0.2612) (0.2616) 
Asian/Asian Briish -0.099 -0.134 -0.138 
 (0.1379) (0.1383) (0.1382) 
Black/Black British 0.227 0.229 0.218 
 (0.1718) (0.1720) (0.1728) 
Chinese/Other -0.020 -0.062 -0.066 
 (0.2760) (0.2744) (0.2748) 
Married 0.358*** 0.384*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0796) (0.0796) 
Separated/Divorced -0.022 0.013 0.012 
 (0.1023) (0.1028) (0.1028) 
Widowed -0.547*** -0.452*** -0.449*** 
 (0.1294) (0.1343) (0.1342) 
Constant 2.755*** -16.224*** 24.027 
 (0.5894) (5.6972) (74.0037) 
    
Log Income Marginal Effect at means (𝛾) 0.534*** 0.466*** 0.447*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0586) (0.0654) 𝛿/𝛾 -2.589*** -2.957*** -3.083*** 
 (0.7605) (0.8886) (0.9552) 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.071 0.073 0.073 
Notes: Robust standard errors are parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 
1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single. Controls omitted from reporting. 𝛿/𝛾 is 




3 The Economics of Lotto Design 
3.1 Introduction 
Lotto is the most popular form of lottery game and typically used by governments and 
charitable organisations to raise funds for goods and services which may not be easy to fund 
through other means, such as raising taxes or voluntary contributions. One of the main 
objectives for lottery operators is to maximise net revenues from the games they offer by 
appropriate design of the game. As is often the case when estimating demand models, price is 
endogenous to sales and care must be taken in statistical modelling to infer the causal 
relationship. This is a particularly tricky issue in the case of lotto draws since prizes, and thus 
their expected value and the ‘effective price’ of a ticket, are funded using sales revenue for that 
draw.  Early literature (see Clotfelter and Cook, 1993, and Walker, 1998) pointed out that lotto 
features “peculiar economies of scale” which imply that price is endogenous in a way unique 
to lotto, and that modelling demand needed to recognise how sales respond to short term 
variation in the distribution of prizes. However, the empirical models of sales revenue in more 
recent research has not been based on a sound approach to identification. To resolve the issue 
instrumental variable methods are typically applied, and almost all of the existing literature 
relies on rollovers to fulfil the role of the instrument. However, rollovers themselves depend 
on sales in the previous draw and current sales are correlated with sales in the previous draw, 
so rollovers do not satisfy the requirements of a valid instrument. This paper aims to correct 
this shortcoming though a novel identification strategy and the application of semi-parametric 
analysis. 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the lotto literature. Section 3.3 argues that rollovers 
make unsuitable instruments for price since they themselves are also inherently endogenous 
due to way in which lotto is designed. Section 3.4 proposes that a novel yet powerful alternative 
instrument candidate is available by exploiting systematic non-random number selection by 
lotto players – a phenomenon known as ‘conscious selection’. Section 3.5 describes the data 
used in Section 3.6 to provide empirical evidence by estimating demand models for lotto using 
OLS and instrumental variables techniques using this conscious selection phenomenon. 
More recent literature suggests that the expected price is not a sufficient statistic for 
determining sales of lotto tickets. In particular, prizes may affect sales apart than via the 
expected price. Walker and Young (2001) allow for higher order moments of the prize 
distribution so that variance and skewness play a role in determining sales. In contrast, Forrest 
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et al (2002) uses the jackpot size itself as the relevant explanatory variable. Therefore, Section 
3.7 presents estimates of a reduced form of lottery demand, where the jackpot prize included 
in the model directly and is identified using the same strategy as for the price model. Both 
Walker and Young (2001) and Forrest et al (2002) impose specific but arbitrary functional 
form restrictions which we have no more reason to believe than the functional form imposed 
by the price. So, an additional contribution in Section 3.7 is to extend their work by adopting 
a totally flexible approach in a semi-parametric estimation and test this against a parameterised 
polynomial expansion of prizes. 
Re-designs to the UK National Lottery’s flagship product occurred in 2013 and later in 
2015 with a view to rejuvenate dwindling sales and, by extension, good causes funding. The 
final contribution of this chapter, in Section 3.8 uses data beyond the main sample to examine 
whether these changes were successful in this objective.  
3.2 Background 
Commercial gambling products are rarely available at favourable odds and the 
widespread prevalence of gambling at unfair odds has long been a puzzle for economists. One 
argument that has been used to rationalise gambling with Expected Utility (EU) Theory is 
based on the idea that stakes are usually small, so that any downside losses are also small, 
relative to wealth, and the likely gains are either small or at such long odds that they can be 
neglected. This argument suggests that agents will act in a way that, at least locally, is risk 
neutral. But this explanation also demands that the expected loss is small relative to the non-
pecuniary gains associated with participating. In the case of lotto, ‘take-out’ rates – the 
proportion of sales revenue not returned in prizes – are typically large, often in excess of 50%, 
so the potential for non-pecuniary gains has to be large enough to outweigh this. Lotto operators 
emphasise the, albeit remote, possibility of life changing gains and, while the expected value 
of such unlikely prizes is small, the fact that participation might offer the ability to dream about 
such prospects might be real and important.  
Friedman and Savage (1948) embed this possibility in a utility of wealth function that 
they use to rationalise the coexistence of insurance and gambling, although Markowitz (1952) 
and Hartley and Farrell (2002) marshal convincing arguments against this idea as a plausible 
explanation. In addition, in the case of lotto, the rationale for the large take-out rate is that the 
revenue is used to fund public goods and most operators dedicate a large proportion of the take-
out to “good causes”. Morgan (2000) showed that, within an EU framework, games with fixed 
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prizes, such as a raffle, can in theory come closer to efficient public good provision than 
reliance on voluntary contributions. At the very least, lotteries with a fixed prize component 
will yield levels of contributions above those obtained from reliance only on voluntary 
contribution, and large – albeit, fixed – prizes could raise sufficient revenue to provide public 
goods close to, but not exceeding, an optimum level. Morgan and Sefton (2000) provide 
empirical support. Thus, the expectation of losing might be offset by the warm glow that one 
is losing to a good cause.  
If risk aversion is locally close to neutral, and there is sufficient warm glow, then the 
relevant determinant of lottery demand will be the expected value of the gamble since the mean 
of the prize distribution (including the loss of the stake as a negative prize) is then a sufficient 
statistic for demand. This motivates the specification that appears most commonly in the 
literature and which is followed below.  
The 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey estimated that 72% of the adult 
population – approximately 34 million individuals – had engaged in some form of gambling 
activity in the previous 12 months (Wardle et al, 2011). Of all the gambling products available, 
lotteries have proven to be the most popular with the UK National Lottery, the sole licensed 
distributor of the UK lotto game, achieving sales of £4.6 billion in the year to March 2015 
(Gambling Commission, 2015). This accounts for approximately 0.7% of household 
expenditure (Office for National Statistics, 2014). In the US, lotteries are available in 43 states, 
each providing state-level tax dollars, and they collectively accumulated $70.1 billion worth of 
ticket sales in 2014. Since their implementation in New Jersey in 1971, state-run lotteries in 
the US have raised a total of $300 billion in revenue for state spending.  
Lotto is a pari-mutuel, low-cost game which offers large prizes with small win 
probabilities. Prior to reforms in October 2013 and October 2015, the UK lotto cost £1 to enter 
and regularly offered top prizes (jackpots) in excess of £8 million48. The game involved players 
paying the entry fee and choosing six numbers from 1-49 and participants were free to choose 
their own numbers or, from 1996 onwards, have the vending terminal randomly make the 
selection for them. Tickets are valid only for specific draws, which typically occur on 
Wednesday and Saturday, in which a mechanised device chooses six numbers from 1-49. 
Players were rewarded with cash prizes if their chosen numbers matched between three and six 
                                               
48 Game redesigns in the UK and US have driven large spikes in sales and prize money with recent 
record jackpots of £66 million in the UK and $1.5 billion in the US Powerball.  
 74 
of the randomly drawn numbers. A fixed prize of £10 was awarded to those who matched three 
numbers, and players won equal shares of prize pools for matching 4-6 numbers, with the 
jackpot being shared between those who matched all six. The ‘6 from 49’ design means that 
the probability of any given ticket winning this prize is extremely unlikely at approximately 
1/14 million. For this reason, it is not unusual for there to be no winners of the jackpot, in which 
case the prize money originally allocated to this prize is added to the jackpot prize pool in the 
following draw in an event known as a ‘rollover’. 
Historically, lotteries have been used to finance public good provision especially when 
alternative funding is hard to raise. For example, the US confederate states made extensive use 
of lottery funding in the US civil war, the English used them to finance the defence of the realm 
against the Spanish Armada, and US elite universities (Yale, Harvard, and Princeton) used 
them to fund infrastructure long before they had wealthy alumni to draw upon. Because of their 
success in raising public finance, lotteries today are often operated either directly by 
governments or a private sector licensee under strict regulation (Morgan, 2000). The UK lottery 
was introduced partly with a view to funding the renovation of the Royal Opera House at a 
time when it would have been politically impossible to use regular tax dollars for this purpose. 
Lotteries are also often used in federated countries with constitutional constraints on their 
powers of taxation. For this reason, one of the main objectives of lotto design is to maximise 
tax revenues for public good provision (Clotfelter and Cook, 1990). In the economics literature, 
attention has been focused on modelling consumer demand for lotto tickets and eliciting a price 
elasticity of demand to evaluate whether the objective of revenue maximisation is being 
achieved.  
Clotfelter and Cook (1990) note that the definition of price in the case of lottery tickets 
requires some clarification since consumers face two prices when making their purchase 
decision: the ‘sticker’ price and the ‘effective’ price – which is simply the sticker price minus 
the expected value of winnings. The former is fixed whereas the latter varies from draw to draw 
due to changes in the size of prize pools which are dependent on sales for that particular draw. 
For this reason, it is the effective price which is favoured in the literature to estimate the price 
elasticity (Walker, 1998; Farrell and Walker, 1990; Forrest et al 2000). 
3.3 An analytical model of lotto supply 
Early models of lotto sales choose strong parametric restrictions (for example in Farrell 
et al, 1999; and Forrest et al, 2002) which involve modelling current sales, 𝑆i, as a function of 
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past sales, 𝑆iUj, and the effective price, 𝑃i, along with controls for time trends and exogenous 
demand shocks.  
The simplest lotto games are designed so that players choose 𝑛 integers from a possible 𝑁 with pari-mutuel prizes available for matching 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 of the numbers drawn randomly by a 
mechanical device. More complex designs involve multiple devices and allow for fine 
gradation in the prize pools. Typically, fixed proportions of sales revenue are allocated to the 
pari-mutuel prize ‘pools’ of which successful players win equal shares. The operator retains a 
proportion of sales, 𝜏 ∈ 	 [0,1), for paying tax, funding public goods and to cover operating 
costs and this proportion is known in the industry as the ‘take-out rate’. The shares of sales 
assigned to specific pools are chosen by the operator and, in practice, their sum is typically 
regulated to ensure that a fixed proportion, 1 − 𝜏, is returned in prizes.  
Let 𝜌r ∈ [0,1] be the proportion of total prize money, (1 − 𝜏)𝑆i, allocated to the prize 
pool associated with matching 𝑘 numbers. Because the prize pools are pari-mutuel and funded 
using proportions of sales, the expected prize paid to any winning individual of that prize tier 
is constant when weighted by the likelihood of winning. Normalising the price of an entry to 
1, if all prize pools were won by at least one player then the effective price of a ticket would 
trivially be 𝜏. Real lotto games are often designed so that there is a non-trivial probability of 
there being no winner of the prize pool associated with k=n, known as the “jackpot” pool, in 
which case the money in that pool is added to the same prize pool in the following draw49. This 
chapter refers to a draw following the draw where there are no winners of this prize as a 
‘rollover draw’. If the prize for a particular draw is not won, it reduces the value of prizes 
shared amongst players for that draw and increases the price. Since the jackpot is transferred 
to the next draw it then also raises the expected value of prizes for that draw, thus decreasing 
the price for that draw. Walker and Young (2001) show that the possibility of rollovers has a 
significant impact on the expected value of prizes, and hence also on the effective price. 
Scoggins (1995) emphasises that the probability of a rollover occurring is a function of 
both the level of sales and the statistical difficulty of the game. Let 𝜋u be the probability of 
winning a share of the jackpot prize, awarded for matching all winning numbers. In addition 
                                               
49 Whilst any prize pool could theoretically fail to have at least one winner, in practice sales are 
sufficiently large that only the jackpot prize pool is sufficiently difficult to win to induce a rollover, 
hence only rollovers of this prize are considered in the subsequent analysis for determining the effective 
price. 
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to setting the shares of sales allocated to each prize pool, the operator is also able to determine 
the statistical difficulty of the game by appropriate choice of 𝑛 and 𝑁 to influence 𝜋u as 
follows50: 
𝜋u = 𝑛! (𝑁 − 𝑛)!𝑁! (3.1) 
From this it is possible to determine the likelihood of a rollover occurring, 𝑝x,i. If there 
is only one ticket sold, the likelihood that the prize pool will roll over is simply 1 − 𝜋u, if two 
tickets are sold the probability is (1 − 𝜋u)y. Hence, if 𝑆i tickets are sold the probability of a 
rollover occurring is: 𝑝x,i = (1 − 𝜋u)z{. (3.2) 
The simplest possible model of lotto is a game with only one prize pool (𝜌u = 1), which 
is shared among all players who match all 𝑛 winning numbers. If the previous draw had at least 
one winner, this draw is a non-rollover draw and the prize pool is only determined by 𝜏 and the 
number of tickets sold, 𝑆i. The effective price of a ticket in this draw is also influenced by the 
probability of there being no winners as follows: 
𝑃i = |1 − 𝑝x,i}𝜏 + 𝑝x,i. (3.3) 
That is, the effective price is the probability weighted average of the ticket price if the jackpot 
is won and the ticket price if there are no winners. For rollover draws where the previous 
jackpot was not won, the expected value of prize shares if the jackpot is won is increased by 𝑅i 𝑊i⁄ , where 𝑅i is the amount of money added to the draw (the jackpot in 𝑡 − 1) and 𝑊u,i is 
the number of winners of the jackpot prize in draw 𝑡. Since 𝑊u,i is simply 𝜋u𝑆i in expectation, 
the effective price for a rollover draw can be expressed as 
𝑃i = |1 − 𝑝x,i} 𝜏 − 𝑅i𝑆i + 𝑝x,i. (3.4) 
This can be thought of as the inverse supply function of lotto tickets, where 𝑅i = 0 
corresponds to the non-rollover case. Several features of lotto game designs are clear from the 
definition of price. Trivially, increasing the proportion of sales retained by the operator 
                                               
50 This is a special case of the hypergeometric function which can be used to determine the probability 
of matching any 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 numbers and can be written as 𝜋r = |ur}|UuuUr} |u} , where parentheses denote 
binomial choice functions. 
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increases the price, 𝛿𝑃i/𝛿𝜏 > 0, which makes the game less attractive to players. As in Cook 
and Clotfelter (1993), price has a clear inverse relationship with rollover size, 𝛿𝑃i/𝛿𝑅i < 0, 
since rollovers increase the expected value of prizes available. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the 
inverse supply function asymptotes towards τ from above as more tickets are sold when there 
is no rollover present due to the increasing likelihood that the prize pool will be won. Cook and 
Clotfelter (1993) termed this the ‘peculiar economies of scale of lotto’. 
 In the event of a rollover draw, however, the effective price of a ticket increases as 
sales increase because higher sales increases the likelihood that the fixed rollover component 
of the jackpot prize will be shared amongst more winners, who then each receive a smaller 
share. This causes price to asymptote towards 𝜏 from below when the jackpot prize in enhanced 
by a rollover.  
Figure 3.1: Inverse supply function for a 6/49 lottery with 𝜏 = 0.5	and rollovers of £0, 
£4m, and £8m. 
 
 
The possibility of a rollover in lotto has two important implications. Firstly, for any 
expected level of sales, the operator is able to alter 𝜋u (by choosing n and N) to influence price 
through adjusting the likelihood of a rollover occurring. Secondly, players will form 
expectations about the likelihood of a rollover occurring, and thus their expectation of price, 
by estimating the level of sales and adjust their consumption decision accordingly. In 
particular, potential players may decide to defer the purchase of a ticket if they expect low 
sales, and a high probability of a rollover, in favour of likely higher prizes in the following 









draw. The problem for the operator is to balance the gain in sales when rollovers occur with 
the suppression of sales because of the probability of one occurring. 
Prior to October 2015 the UK lotto was characterised by 𝑛 = 6 and 𝑁 = 49 – a design 
that has proved very popular in the industry. This translates to a rollover probability of 
approximately 1 in 14 million. There were also pari-mutuel prizes available for correctly 
predicting four and five numbers, and five plus a bonus number (b) drawn from the same set 
of 49 after the six main numbers were drawn. The prizes for matching 4, 5, 5+b and 6 of the 
winning set were funded using fixed proportions of the total prize money available after the 
additional fixed prizes of £10 were paid to those who matched 3 numbers. Thus, the prize pool 
in draw t for matching 𝑘 = 4, 5, 5 + 𝑏, 6 numbers, 𝐽ri, can be determined using51: 𝐽ri = 𝜌r(1 − 𝜏)𝑆i − 10𝑊,i. (3.5) 
A final feature of the UK lotto is the twice-weekly drawing. In the sample period 
analysed below, UK lotto draws occurred on Wednesdays and Saturdays of the same week52. 
The two draws are intrinsically linked by rollovers in the sense that money from jackpots not 
won on Wednesday is added to the corresponding prize pool for the following Saturday and 
vice versa. Despite the link between draws and being identical by design, in the following 
analysis demand for Wednesday and Saturday are estimated draws separately. Doing so does 
not then restrict slope coefficients to be identical for both games and allows for the possibility 
that players on Wednesday and Saturday may have different risk preferences and responses to 
price variation. 
This assumption is apparently justified simply by examining the descriptive statistics 
in Section 3.5 with sales for Wednesday draws being approximately half that of Saturday 
draws. Consequently, the average likelihood of a given draw being enhanced by a rollover is 
much larger for Saturday games than for Wednesday. The difference in price for non-rollover 
draws on Saturdays is subsequently much smaller than it is for Wednesdays - as would be 
expected from Figure 3.1.  
The important empirical lesson to be taken from the simple structure of the game is that 
the expected value, and hence price, in any draw depends on the size of the rollover jackpot, 
                                               
51 For the UK lotto, the share of the pari-mutuel prize fund allocated to each prize tier is parameterised 
as follows; 𝜌 = 0.52, 𝜌 = 0.16, 𝜌 = 0.10, and 𝜌V = 0.22. 
52 Between November 1994, the introduction of the game, and February 1997 draws only occurred 
every Saturday. 
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which depends linearly on the level of sales in the previous draw, and on the (expected) level 
of sales in the current draw. Thus, the price is endogenous because of its dependence on 𝑆i. 
This is obvious from Figure 3.1 and will be empirically important if sales are centred around a 
relatively steep part of the inverse supply curve. In practice, games typically are designed so 
that they operate at such levels that engenders a high probability of rollovers occurring – events 
which tend to increase sales in the next draw (and, to a lesser extent, in subsequent draws).  
3.4 Identifying the demand for lotto 
Using effective price as a determinant of lotto sales is a useful model specification since 
it allows for a price elasticity to be easily obtained. Walker (1998) suggests that lotteries will 
maximise sales, and therefore be “efficient”, when marginal revenue from additional sales is 
zero (since the marginal cost of production is close to zero), implying an optimal price elasticity 
of demand of -1. Allowing for a lagged dependent variable, the long-run price elasticity of 
demand was estimated to be -1.07 for the UK National Lottery and Walker concluded that the 
game was indeed appropriately designed. This estimate for the UK game is supported by 
Forrest et al (2000) who estimated a value for the price elasticity of demand of -1.03, and 
Farrell et al (2000) with a value of -1.06.  
However, models using effective price suffer from the endogeneity issue highlighted 
above. Consider the following myopic model as estimated in Scoggins (1995), Farrell et al 
(1999), Forrest et al (2000), and Forrest et al (2002), amongst others, with sales at 𝑡 dependent 
on lagged sales, 𝑆iU(, current price, 𝑃i, and controls for seasonality and structural events, 𝑋i, 
to be estimated via OLS: 
𝑆i = 𝛼 +β𝑆iU( + 𝜂𝑃i + 𝛾𝑋i + 𝜀i.( (3.6) 
Since the game is drawn twice-weekly and Wednesday and Saturday are treated as 
different games here, sales in 𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 3… are ‘cross’ lags of sales and 𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 4	… are 
‘own’ lags of sales. It is possible to retrieve a long run price elasticity of demand, 𝜖x , evaluated 
at mean sales, from this model using the following formula: 
𝜖x = 𝜕𝑆i𝜕𝑃i 𝑃𝑆̅|1 − ∑ 𝛽((y,V,… } (3.7) 
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Recalling the definition of price in equation (3.4), it is clear that it is unrealistic to 
assume that 𝐸[𝜀i|𝑃i] = 0, therefore OLS estimation will be biased and an instrumental variable 
approach is necessary. This issue is raised in Walker and Young (2000) who, along with 
subsequent work by Forrest et al (2000) and Forrest et al (2002), use rollover size as their 
exclusion restriction in the first stage of their modelling and find estimates of price elasticity 
which are not statistically different from -1, concluding that the game is taxed efficiently.  
Recall, however, that in the simple game outlined above 𝑅i = 𝜏𝑆iU which, if sales are 
serially correlated as suggested in equation (3.6), would imply that the size of the rollover is 
itself not orthogonal to sales since it is also correlated with previous sales which then 
mechanically determine the rollover size. This casts doubt on the validity of relying on rollover 
size as an instrument.  
The proposed solution to the endogeneity issue here involves extending the work of 
Farrell et al (2000) who appealed to ‘conscious selection’ as an explanation of why rollovers 
occurred far more frequently than the theoretical rollover probability predicts. This term is used 
within the industry to refer to systematic non-random number choice by players. For the 
average level of sales reported in Section 3.5 and the design parameters of the UK game, the 
supply theory above suggests that only 5.7% of Saturday draws should roll-over, whereas the 
actual proportion of Saturday draws with no jackpot winners is 13.4%. Farrell et al (2000) 
attribute this discrepancy between theoretical and realised rollover proportions to the fact that 
players, who are able to choose their own numbers, tend to select some numbers more 
frequently than others. By comparing the actual distribution of prize winners of each prize pool 
with the hypothetical distributions under the assumption of random selection by players, it is 
possible to estimate the likelihood of each of the 49 available numbers being chosen by a 
randomly selected ticket purchased for the game. Moreover, so long as each number has 
appeared at least once, it is possible to exploit the variation in the number of prize winners, 
conditional on the number of tickets sold, to estimate the proportion of tickets containing a 
specific number. Farrell et al (2000) construct a likelihood function, with 48 independent 
parameters, and estimate the probability of each number between 1-49 appearing on a randomly 
selected ticket and find this varies from as low as 1.2% (number 46) to 2.9% (number 7) 
compared to a probability of 2.4% that would have been expected if numbers were chosen 
randomly. Overall, they find that numbers 1-12 prove to be most popular and 32-49 being the 
least popular.  
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     Conscious selection has two relevant impacts on the effective price of a ticket. 
Firstly, there will be an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of a rollover if unpopular (popular) 
numbers are drawn among the winning numbers. Secondly, if a rollover does occur when 
unpopular (popular) numbers are drawn then the rollover size will be unusually large (small) 
relative to the number of tickets sold as there will be fewer (more) winners of the three-ball 
prize which reduce the pari-mutuel prize fund53.  
The definition of price derived in Section 3.3 implicitly assumes that players choose 
numbers randomly. The implication that the likelihood of a rollover occurring is inversely 
related to the number of tickets sold is certainly plausible, but equation (3.2) only accurately 
models this probability if each of the tickets sold are unique (and only approximates the true 
probability if numbers are randomly selected by players). Rather, the true probability is 
dependent on the number of unique selections bought by players which should increase with 
sales but not necessarily in a linear fashion. As more tickets are sold, and with systematic non-
random number selection by players, it becomes increasingly likely that the same combination 
of numbers appears on more than one ticket. To capture this, the rollover probability can be 
better described as: 
𝑝x,i = (1 − 𝜋u)£|z{,¤¥,{} (3.8) 
where 𝛿j,i is some indicator of the popularity of each of the 𝑗 = 1,… 49 available numbers in 
draw 𝑡. 𝑓 denotes some function relating the level of sales and the popularity of each of the 49 
numbers to the number of unique combinations sold. Including this refined definition of 
rollover probability implies re-writing effective price as: 
𝑃i = 1 − (1 − 𝜋u)£|z{,¤<,{} 𝜏 − 𝑅i𝑆i  + (1 − 𝜋u)£|z{,¤<,{}. (3.9) 
The identification strategy used here approximates the popularity of numbers by using 
variables indicating the number of small (1-12), medium (13-31) and large (32-49) numbers 
which appear in the winning configuration. The more popular small and medium numbers are 
therefore expected to be negatively related to the probability of a rollover occurring and large 
numbers to positively related. The set of numbers to be represented by the ‘small’, ‘medium’ 
and ‘large’ instruments used here reflects their occurrence in calendars. This deliberately 
                                               
53 Recall that the jackpot in draw t is defined by 𝐽ri = 𝜌r(1 − 𝜏)𝑆i − 10𝑊,i. 
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exploits just one heuristic employed by players to choose birthdays or other memorable as a 
‘strategy’ to choose numbers which is discussed, for example, in Forrest et al (2002). 
Specifically, the set of numbers in ‘small’ appear as both days and months, ‘medium’ numbers 
can only be used to represent days of the month, and is adjusted to account for the variable 
number of days in each month (and leap years), and ‘large’ numbers do not appear as a day or 
month in the calendar. Specifically, these instruments are constructed according to: 
Δª«¬­­,i =𝛿(,iy( 	Δ«®¯(°«,i =𝛿(,i + 4548 𝛿y±,i + 1112 𝛿\,i + 712𝛿,iy²( (3.10)	Δ­¬³´®,i =  𝛿(,iV±(y  
Where 𝛿(,i = µ1, 𝑖𝑓	𝑖	𝑖𝑠	𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤	𝑡,0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒																																																																							 (3.11) 
This approach is preferable to the more obvious solution of using 49 number dummies 
for two reasons. Firstly, it overcomes the problem that, individually, so many dummies would 
make weak instruments of rollovers because of the limited frequency each number appears in 
the winning configuration. Secondly, though this approach is less precise, the quantity of small, 
medium, and large numbers, as defined in equation (3.10), in the winning configuration must 
still be exogenous to sales since this winning combination is unknown ex ante by players, and 
Figure 3.3 shows that they sufficiently capture the effects of conscious selection on the 
probability of a rollover occurring. That is, these variables are both exogenous to the level of 
sales and sufficiently correlated with price, making them useful as instruments.  
Figure 3.2 shows the theoretical and actual proportion of draws with 1-6 numbers 
greater than 31 among the winning combination. This figure highlights how the quantity of 
‘large’ winning numbers for any given draw is indeed random by comparing the actual 
distribution of how many large numbers make up the winning set with the theoretical. This 
randomness is important to illustrate since it adds weight to the argument that players have no 
information ex ante about which numbers will form the winning set for any given draw. With 
no information available about the winning numbers in any given draw, the decision by players 
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to purchase a ticket is then clearly uncorrelated with the winning numbers. Similar graphics 
can easily be drawn for small and medium numbers which highlight the same principle. 
However, it is possible to argue that price is dependent on the winning numbers because of the 
effect they have on the rollover probability arising from conscious selection. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Figure 3.3 shows that as more numbers greater than 
31 are drawn, the likelihood of there being no winner (i.e. a rollover) increases, thus by the 
mechanics of equation (3.9) price must also increase. Similarly, the most popular numbers, 1-
12, have the opposite effect on the rollover probability as can be seen in Figure 3.4.  
To model conscious selection in this way is, admittedly, rather arbitrary and a niche 
literature exists which presents a broader discussion of number choice by players in lotto 
games. Some of these would likely only add to the strength of the method used here, whilst 
others would not be detected in the present approach.  
It is well documented that individuals choose numbers which are, on average, smaller 
than one would expect from a random and not just because they form calendar dates. Boland 
and Pawitan (1999) is just one example in which 234 university students are explicitly asked 
to generate 6 random numbers from 1 to 42 (this is the design of the Irish Lotto). The average 
of all selections is found to be 2 less than the average expected from true random selection, and 
this bias would only improve the power of the instruments considered here. 
Boland and Pawitan (1999) also find the separation between numbers chosen by the 
participants is larger than what would be expected from random and there is a clear reluctance 
to choose consecutive numbers in particular. Conscious selection of this form is entirely 
separate to the approach used here and would not be captured by using ‘small’, ‘medium’ and 
‘large’ indicators as defined above.  Wang et al (2016) present evidence of both of the patterns 
identified in Boland and Pawitan (1999) using individual-level data for players of the Dutch 
Lotto and roulette data from Holland Casino. They also find that the layout of numbers 
presented to players influences their choices, with a preference for numbers located towards 
the centre of the choice form as well as special patterns. Again, neither of these behavioural 




Figure 3.2: Theoretical and actual proportion of draws with n numbers > 31 drawn 
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Figure 3.4: Proportion of rollover draws by number of balls 1-12 drawn 
 
Suetens et al (2016) expands the set of possible conscious selection heuristics in a 
recent study of individual-level Danish lotto data who benefit from being able to observe 
directly the precise proportion of players who select each number (1-36 in the Danish game) 
over 28 draws54. They find that players are susceptible both to the “gambler’s fallacy” (that 
players believe in frequent reversals) and the “hot hand fallacy” (the belief in the continuation 
of a sequence). They show that amongst those players who select their own numbers (it is 
possible to have the sales terminal choose the numbers randomly), but who vary the choices 
they make, are less likely to select a number which was drawn in the immediately preceding 
draw, but more likely to select a number which has appeared repeatedly in recent draws.  Only 
a third of their full sample (and less than half of the subset of frequent players) change their 
number selection, with the remainder choosing the same numbers each week.  
Experiments using indicators for consecutive numbers following the findings of Boland 
and Pawitan (1999) and Wang et al (2016), in conjunction with the small, medium and large 
indicators, made no qualitative difference to the estimates presented in Section 4.6. The method 
of modelling consecutive numbers using birthdays appears sufficient to capture the effects of 
                                               
54 Similar to Farrell et al (2000), Suetens et al (2016) also find that the most popular balls are numbered 
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conscious selection on the likelihood of a rollover occurring. Therefore, it is this strategy which 
forms the focus of the remainder of this chapter. First and second-stage regressions of the price 
and rollover model using consecutive numbers as an additional instrument can be found in the 
Appendix 3.10.5.  
Instrumenting rollover size, which is also endogenous since it is determined by 
autocorrelated ticket sales, is done by exploiting the mechanism through which fixed prizes 
deduct from the pari-mutuel prize fund. A variable which contains the exogenous variation in 
the number of players who match three numbers of the winning set is used. The rationale here 
hinges on the fact that these prizes are paid before money is allocated to the jackpot prize pool 
which would ultimately form the rollover size if there are no winners. An unexpectedly high 
number of winners of the £10 fixed prize would reduce the amount of money in a rollover, 
should one occur, so this variable is expected to be negatively correlated to rollover size. 
3.5 Data 
With the exception of Section 3.8, the analysis in this chapter uses data which contains 
information on ticket sales, prize pools, the number of winners of each pool, rollover sizes, the 
date, and the winning combinations drawn for 1,739 draws of the UK National Lottery between 
the 5th February 1997 and the 2nd October 201355. Prior to the 5th February 1997, the UK 
National Lottery was drawn only once per week – on Saturdays – with the introduction of 
Wednesday draws on this date. Consequently, this date was chosen as the start of the sample 
to avoid complications in the time series analysis caused by a change in the frequency of draws. 
On the 5th October 2013, the operator redesigned the UK game by changing the sticker price 
of a ticket to £2 and restructured the shares of sales allocated to the individual prize pools. 
Thus, the draw immediately prior to this date offers a natural termination point for our data. As 
such the first 117 draws from the dataset, and all of the draws since the 2013 game redesign 
are omitted from the sample in the main analysis.  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for this dataset. There are 870 Wednesday draws 
and 869 Saturday draws, of which 369 were rollovers – a proportion of 21.22%. As expected 
from Figure 3.1, price is lower for rollover draws than for non-rollover draws. This lower price 
for Saturday non-rollover draws than similar draws on Wednesday can be explained by sales 
                                               
55 Section 3.8 uses more data on draws made after the game re-design in 2013 to evaluate whether the 
changes in design had a positive effect on sales 
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on Saturday being significantly larger, resulting in the likelihood of a rollover occurring being 
much smaller. 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics - weekly averages 
Saturday Non-Rollover Rollover All 
No. Draws 617 252 869 
Sales (millions) 40.673 41.152 40.812 
Price (£) 0.5100 0.4272 0.4860 
Three-ball winners 716,748 716,383 716,643 
Three-ball winners (proportion) 0.0175 0.0173 0.0175 
Rollover size (£m) 0 3.622 1.051 
Wednesday    
No. Draws 752 117 870 
Sales (millions) 21.389 26.129 22.032 
Price (£) 0.5329 0.3124 0.5030 
Three-ball winners 380,648 463,059 391,864 
Three-ball winners (proportion) 0.0178 0.0176 0.0178 
Rollover size (£m) 0 6.713 0.912 
 
The effect of rollovers on average Saturday sales is noticeably small, just 1%, while the 
effective price falls by 16% which, taken at face value, would imply a price elasticity of just    
-0.06. In contrast, the effect of a rollover-enhanced jackpot on a Wednesday induces a 22% 
rise in sales from a 41% fall in the effective price implying an elasticity of -0.5. There are two 
explanations for this difference. Firstly, Saturday rollover draws are enhanced by a proportion 
of sales in the previous Wednesday which are, on average, around half of usual Saturday sales, 
so the rollover size in a Saturday draw is correspondingly smaller. Secondly, as can be seen in 
Figure 3.5, sales fall much faster over time in the Saturday draw game compared to the 
Wednesday draw game. Thus, the difference in average sales for rollover and non-rollover 
draws over the entire sample is masked by falling sales overall.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates the declining trend of sales in both Saturday and Wednesday draws 
over the 16-year period covered by the data from around 90 million tickets sold per week in 
1997 to just over 40 million in 2013. These declining sales figures no doubt contributed to the 
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decision to redesign the game in October 2013 and second design change occurred in 2015. 
Peaks in the graph highlight the impact that rollovers (and double, triple and even quadruple 
rollovers) have on ticket sales. It is the effect of rollovers on sales (either directly or via the 
influence on price) that are the focus of our attention in the model used in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, the time series nature of the data may raise concerns about stationarity. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) for both Wednesday and Saturday 
sales series strongly rejects the presence of a unit root56.   
Figure 3.5: Draw-by-draw lotto sales from February 1997 to September 2013 
 
3.6 Price model estimates 
This section presents estimates of the demand model outlined above which assumes 
that it is rollover induced variation in price that drives sales variation. The theory outlined in 
Section 3.4 suggests that the effective price is endogenous to sales such that least squares will 
produce biased estimates. The identification strategy used here relies on the effect conscious 
selection by players has on the likelihood of a rollover occurring and the effect of random 
variation in fixed-prize winners on the rollover size – both of which impact price (via rollovers) 
                                               
56 ADF unit root (with trend) test statistics for Saturday and Wednesday sales series are -16.259 and -
22.937, respectively, with 1% / 5% / 10% critical values of -3.960 / -3.410 / -3.120. ADF unit root 
(without trend) test statistics for Saturday and Wednesday sales series are -7.665 and -12.763, 
respectively, with 1% / 5% / 10% critical values of -3.430 / -2.860/ -2.570. 
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but are not correlated with sales. Fitted values of both rollover probability and size from a 
model including these effects are then used to obtain an instrumented price, rather than 
instrumenting price directly. This circumvents the issue of both rollover size and probability 
entering the definition of price in a clearly nonlinear way in equation (3.9). Moreover, this 
allows the separation of the effects of the instruments on the size and probability of rollovers.  
Heckman’s (1979) two-step selection procedure offers a neat solution to instrumenting 
the rollover size and probability simultaneously and is what is used here. Moreover, the 
Heckman selection model is preferred over a Tobit estimation since we expect different effects 
of our first-stage covariates on the frequency of rollovers and rollover size. In particular, lagged 
sales are expected to have a negative effect on the rollover probability but a positive effect on 
rollover size, should one occur, which would not evident in a Tobit model. The selection 
equation of Heckman’s procedure involves using the number indicator variables of equation 
(3.10) from the previous draw, along with all exogenous variables from the second stage, as 
determinants of a dummy variable for draw t being a rollover draw. Fitted values from this are 
used as the rollover probability in draw t-1. The second stage of this application of Heckman’s 
selection model is used to obtain an estimate of the effect of unexpected variation in 3-ball 
prize winners on rollover size in draw t. Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
𝑅i = Á𝑅i		𝑖𝑓	𝑅i∗ > 0,0				𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (3.12) 
where 𝑅i is the observed rollover, 𝑅i∗ is the latent rollover size and is determined by, 𝑅i∗ = 𝛾\ + 𝛾𝑆iU + 𝛾y𝑆iUy + 𝛾|𝑊,iU − 𝜋𝑆iU} + 𝜂i (3.13) 
where 𝛾j	(	𝐽 = 0,… ,3) are parameters to be estimated. The rollover probability is modelled as, Pr(𝑅𝑡 > 0) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑡−2 + 𝛼3𝛥𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝛥𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝛥𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡. (3.14) 
where 𝛼j (𝐽 = 0,… ,5) are again parameters to be estimated and 𝑅, 𝑆 and 𝛥’s are as defined 
previously. 
The transformed variable, 𝑊,iU − 𝜋𝑆iU , in the rollover size equation is the 
exogenous component of the variation in the number of 3-ball prize winners (the only fixed 
prize winners in the UK game during our sample period) from the previous draw. The number 
of 3-ball winners is itself dependent on the level of sales, which is autocorrelated, insofar as 
the expected number of winners is simply the probability of any given ticket winning the prize 
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(1 in 57) multiplied by the number of tickets sold. Thus, the number of 3-ball winners is itself 
invalid as instrument. However, random variation in the number of 3-ball winners in the 
previous draw, 𝑊,iU − 𝜋𝑆iU, is purged of the relationship with lagged sales and, appealing 
to the work of Conley et al (2012), here assume that this transformed variable is “plausibly 
exogenous” to facilitate the use of this random variation in prize winners as an instrument. This 
application of Heckman’s selection model is identified by the role that exogenous variation in 
3-ball winners has in determining the size of a rollover should one occur, but that it has no 
bearing on the probability of there being no winners which only depends on the level of sales 
and winning numbers in each draw due to conscious selection. 
The fitted values of Pr(𝑅i∗ > 0) are used as the rollover probability in draw t-1, and 𝑅i∗ 
from the second stage of Heckman’s selection model is used in place of 𝑅i in the price equation 
to obtain an instrumented price variable, 𝑃iÃ . This instrumented price is then used in the 
following sales model: 𝑆i = 𝛽\ + 𝛽𝑆iU + 𝛽y𝑆iUy + 𝛽𝑃iÃ + 𝜓𝑋i + 𝜀i. (3.15) 
Table 3.2 presents the resultant first-stage Heckman model estimates. The bottom panel 
of Table 3.2 refers to the selection equation of the Heckman model. The estimates indicate that 
drawing one extra medium ball in the winning combination, rather than a small number, 
increases the rollover probability. Drawing one more ‘large’ number instead of a number 
between 1-12 in the winning combination increases the likelihood of a rollover even further. 
These findings are consistent with the those of Farrell et al (2000) that numbers below 13 tend 
to be the most popular amongst players and that numbers greater than 31 are chosen least of 
all. These effects are highly significant for the often rollover-enhanced Saturday draws. 
Drawing an extra ‘medium’ or ‘large’ number, instead of an additional ‘small number’ on a 
Wednesday increases the likelihood that Saturday’s draw will have a rollover-enhanced 
jackpot. For Wednesday the effect is less pronounced, but still significant for ‘large’ numbers. 
This can be explained by Saturday ticket sales being sufficiently high that even unpopular 
combinations are chosen by at least one player, thus making conscious selection more difficult 
to detect. Nonetheless, the direction of the coefficients and their increase in magnitude from 
medium to large dummies is encouraging. Moreover, the significance of the Saturday 
estimates, and of the large numbers dummy in the Wednesday estimates, encourages the use 
of this idea as a powerful instrument. 
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The top panel of Table 3.2 reports estimates of rollover size conditional on a rollover 
occurring. For both Wednesday and Saturday draws, exogenous variation in the number of 
three-ball winners have negative and significant coefficients. An extra “unexpected” winner	of	 the	3-ball prize implies a reduction in rollover size of 10𝜌 (i.e. £6.66). The coefficient 
estimates for both Wednesday and Saturday are not statistically different from this theoretical 
value. Coefficients on lagged sales are also consistent with what one would expect. Extra ticket 
sales in the preceding draw (𝑆iU) increases the size of the rollover conditional on one 
occurring. Extra sales in the corresponding draw from the preceding week (𝑆iUy) would have 
reduced the likelihood of a rollover occurring in draw 𝑡 − 1, and thus sales (and any rollover 
from that draw) for that draw would have been somewhat lower than usual on average. 
Table 3.2: Heckman selection model estimates for rollover size and probability 
 Saturday Wednesday 
Dependent Variable 𝑹𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕|𝑹𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 > 𝟎 𝑹𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅|𝑹𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 > 𝟎 𝑊,iU − 𝜋𝑆iU -4.911*** 
(1.2904) 
-6.695*** 
(1.0356) 𝑆iU 1.029*** 
(0.0330) 
0.722*** 





(1.946x10) -41.083*** (5.7091) 
Selection Equation 𝐏𝐫	(𝑹𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 > 𝟎) 𝐏𝐫	(𝑹𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 > 𝟎) 𝛥«®¯(°«,iU 0.189*** 
(0.0553) 
0.026 
(0.0414) 𝛥­¬³´®,iU 0.338*** 
(0.0543) 
0.109** 
(0.0529) 𝑆iU -0.079*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0290 








Observations 868 868 
Censored observations 616 750 𝜆 -0.0561 2.4478*** 𝜒()y  test of 𝜆 = 0 0.06 17.01 
P-value 0.8131 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 1%,5%, 10% 
confidence. Trend and seasonality controls omitted from reporting. Sales variables in millions. 
 
Finally, the inverse Mill’s ratio, 𝜆, provides a test of the correlation between fitted 
values of 𝜈i and 𝜂i. If the coefficient on 𝜆 is 0 then rollover size would be uncorrelated with 
rollover probability. The estimate for Wednesday draws rejects the hypothesis that the two are 
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uncorrelated, thus also rejects OLS and Tobit specifications. Whilst the Saturday estimate of 𝜆 
fails to reject the null that the two equations are correlated, appealing to the theory laid out 
above and the encouraging rejection for Wednesday draws, this procedure still appears to be 
the best available. 
Table 3.3 reports estimates of the demand equation using OLS (columns 1 and 2) and 
using instrumented price (columns 3 and 4) per the fitted values from the estimates in Table 
3.2. OLS estimates show a significant, positive relationship between current sales and sales for 
the preceding two draws. This evidence verifies the hypothesis that sales are autocorrelated 
and that rollovers are indeed invalid instruments since their frequency and size are simply 
functions of past sales. OLS estimates suggest that a £0.10 decrease in price (which is not 
uncommon for rollovers of around £4m) would yield a £4.610m (£3.077m) increase in sales 
for Saturday (Wednesday) draws. These are consistent with estimates of long-run price 
elasticity of -0.556 for Saturday and -0.750 for Wednesday games. Both of these price elasticity 
estimates are significantly different from -1, indicating that the design of the game in the 
sample period could increase sales revenue by making the game more expensive to play57.  
Elasticity estimates derived from using instrumented price, however, suggest different 
conclusion. With direction and magnitude of coefficients on lagged sales broadly similar, 
estimates of the price coefficients suggest those obtained from OLS are attenuated towards 0. 
The price elasticity estimate for Saturday remains qualitatively the same at -0.636, suggesting 
that revenue could be increased by making the game more expensive. However, for the 
Wednesday game a price elasticity estimate of -1.472 suggests that the game is over-priced and 
revenues could be increased by making the game more attractive to play.58 Assuming a price 
elasticity of -1 would maximise revenues for the lotto monopolist, using the parameter 
estimates of Table 3.3 and rearranging the elasticity equation (3.7) suggests, ceteris paribus, 
that increasing the price of Saturday draws from £0.4860 to £0.7711 and reducing the price of 
Wednesday tickets from £0.5030 to £0.3625 would increase revenues from the games. The 
most obvious method of achieving this would be to increase the take-out rate of Saturday games 
and, using some of the extra net revenues, to subsidise Wednesday draws. A static set of 
equations indicate that removing £6.2m per draw from the Saturday prize pool and using £3.1m 
                                               
57 𝜒y tests of price elasticity OLS estimates’ statistical difference from -1 yields values of 85.48 
(p=0.000) for Saturday and 27.47 (p=0.000) for Wednesday.  
58 𝜒y tests of price elasticity IV estimates’ statistical difference from -1 yields values of 57.97 (p=0.000) 
for Saturday and 17.37 (p=0.000) for Wednesday.  
 93 
of this in Wednesday prize pools would increase the game’s weekly net revenues by the 
difference – £3.1m. 
Table 3.3: Second-stage estimates of lotto demand 
 OLS Control Function 
using Heckman First-Stage 
Dependent variable 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 













































Durbin-Watson d-stat 1.983 1.895 2.030 1.951 
ARCH LM test  
(𝐻\: no ARCH effects) 0.087 0.590 0.097 0.153 
ARCH LM test (p-
value) 
0.7682 0.4424 0.7557 0.6955 
AIC 4109.37 3468.07 4060.98 3699.79 
Observations 868 868 867 868 𝑅y 0.943 0.898 0.946 0.867 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 1%,5%, 10% 
confidence. Trend and seasonality controls omitted from reporting. Sales variables in millions.  
 
In addition to the stationarity of sales data for both Saturday and Wednesday discussed 
briefly in Section 3.5, extra time series diagnostics are displayed in the footer of Table 3.3. 
Durbin-Watson statistics (Durbin and Watson, 1950) for Saturday and Wednesday models 
estimated with OLS and instrumented price show no evidence of autocorrelation in the error 
terms. Furthermore, Engel’s (1982) Lagrange Multiplier safely fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that no ARCH effects are present in the residuals, even at the 10% level.  
3.7 Reduced form model of the effect of rollovers 
A frequent criticism of modelling lotto demand using effective price models is that their 
foundations lie in expected utility theory which is notoriously ineffective at explaining why 
individuals simultaneously take risks (via gambling) and hold insurance (Forrest et al, 2002). 
Moreover, these models assume that prize sizes – particularly jackpot prizes – only affect 
demand for lotto games through their effect on the expected value of winnings, which is simply 
an average of the prize distribution. However, there is a further thread to the literature that 
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suggests that gambling demand responds to higher moments of the prize distribution. In 
particular, the idea that gamblers are positively motivated by skewness in the prize distribution 
is commonplace (see, for example, Golec and Tamarkin, 1998). Cain et al (2002) show that 
the Golec and Tamarkin racetrack results fail to control for the collinearity between moments. 
Walker and Young (2001) is not subject to this criticism in their analysis of lotto sales which 
show that higher moments of the prize distribution have a significant effect on sales.  
A theoretical rationale of a preference for skewness is implicit in Prospect Theory 
where the values associated with risky prospects are multiplied by decision weights which “… 
measure the impact of events on the desirability of prospects, and not merely on the perceived 
likelihood of these events” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p.280). The theory suggests that 
individuals tend to overweight low probability events and underweight high probability events 
when making decisions in the face of uncertainty. This tendency of players to overestimate the 
chance of low probability events (longshots) occurring may be sufficient to make unfair 
gambles attractive. Quiggin (1991) uses a rank-dependent utility function to explain why risk-
averse people might play unfair gambles if such games comprise a large number of smaller 
prizes and a few large prizes, which is how most lottery games are structured. Under this 
argument, large prizes might be particularly relevant in determining sales. This motivates a 
specification where variation in the largest prize is the proximate determinant of sales variation. 
Such a specification has been used by Forrest et al (2002) so this section replicates their work 
but in the context of using conscious selection as the identification strategy. Moreover, their 
work is extended to include a fully flexible semi-parametric specification as well as higher 
order polynomial transformations of the rollover size to account for the fact that players may 
be motivated by prizes beyond the effect of the average size of the prize distribution. In 
particular, models which are cubic in rollover size are considered. 
Given the large size of jackpots relative to other prizes, variations in top-tier prize pools 
have a much larger effect on the higher moments than the average (expected) value of a lottery 
ticket. This may explain why Cook and Clotfelter (1993) observe that “bettor’s evaluation of a 
lotto bet tends to be more sensitive to the size of the jackpot than the objective probability of 
winning” (p. 638) and that ‘bigger is better’ when it comes to the demand for lotto prizes. 
Forrest et al (2002) evaluate the extent to which jackpot models are able to explain 
ticket sales relative to effective price models. Their jackpot model predicts that an additional 
£1 million in jackpot size would increase sales between £22,000 (Wednesday) and £53,000 
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(Saturday) conditional on the total prize pool remaining the same. Using rollover size in their 
identification strategy, they find that jackpot models yield significantly higher adjusted 𝑅y 
statistics for both draw days compared to the corresponding price models. Whilst this would 
tentatively suggest that their jackpot model may be superior to existing effective price models, 
non-nested tests were inconclusive in determining which model should be preferred.  
This section is concerned with estimating the following: 
𝑆i = 𝛽\ + 𝛽𝑆iU + 𝛽y𝑆iUy + 𝛽𝑅iÕ + 𝛽V𝑅iyÕ + 𝛽𝑅iÕ + 𝛾𝑋i + 𝜀i. (3.16) 
Since rollover size is endogenous to sales, causal estimation of equation (3.16) is again 
reliant on IV techniques. Fortunately, it is possible to recycle the identification strategy 
outlined in Section 3.4 and the Heckman selection model estimates presented in Section 3.6. 
Rather than imposing the strict functional form of expected price, estimation of this rollover 
model simply includes the predicted values (and their square and cube transformations) of 
rollover size, 𝑅iÕ, from the Heckman selection model in place of 𝑅i. 
Table 3.4 presents OLS and instrumented rollover estimates of this model for both 
Wednesday and Saturday games59. Similar to the price model estimates, OLS shows a 
significant, positive relationship between current and lagged sales in both the Saturday and 
Wednesday games. For Wednesday draws the higher order expansions of rollover size are 
statistically significant, with sales responding positively to 𝑅iy and negatively to 𝑅i. An F-test 
for joint significance suggest that coefficient estimates for Saturday games suggest that 𝑅iy and 𝑅i are, however, insignificant. These OLS estimates suggest that an £1m increase in rollover 
size would induce an increase in sales by £1.1m (£0.5m) for a given Saturday (Wednesday) 
draw. Since the operator returns approximately half of these extra sales in prizes, it would 
appear that augmenting the jackpot prize would be an ineffective way of increasing revenue 
for good causes.  
When controlling for endogeneity in the size of the rollover, the relationship between 
current sales and sales for the immediately preceding draw is negative and significant for both 
Wednesday and Saturday games. This suggests that the positive relationship between current 
                                               
59 Testing revealed that semiparametric estimation can be approximated by a parametric estimation of 
a regression including cubic expansion of rollover size. Hence, only regression estimates of this 
specification are reported here. Statistics from these tests are reported in Table 3.6. Estimates of models 
which are linear and quadratic in rollover size are reported in Appendix Section 3.10. 
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and past sales in the price model is erroneous and was not being detected because of the strict 
functional form. Similarly, the positive coefficients from OLS estimates of the rollover model 
may be due to not controlling for the correlation between rollover size and lagged sales. F-tests 
of the joint significance of 𝑅iyÕ  and  𝑅iÕ  suggest that the price model was not detecting the effects 
of higher moments of prizes, which were instead being captured by higher sales in the previous 
draw. The instrumented estimates suggest an increase in rollover size of £1m would increase 
Saturday sales by approximately £1.8m and Wednesday sales by £0.5m. In both cases, OLS 
again appears to be downward biased, though the magnitude of this bias seems greater for 
Saturday draws than it is for Wednesday draws. 
Table 3.4: OLS and Heckman-instrumented estimates of rollover induced ticket demand 
 OLS Heckman First-Stage 
Dependent variable 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 


























































Joint F-test 𝑅iy, 𝑅i = 0 0.43 38.04*** 5.96*** 4.22** 
Prob>F 0.6503 0.0000 0.0027 0.0151 
Durbin-Watson d-stat 1.914 1.605 1.959 1.988 
ARCH LM test (H0: no 
ARCH effects) 
0.032 2.120 0.040 0.024 
ARCH LM test  
(p-value) 
0.858 0.1454 0.8406 0.8777 
AIC 3941.94 2858.93 4455.42 4373.87 
Observations 868 868 868 868 𝑅y 0.953 0.9496 0.916 0.711 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 
1%,5%, 10% confidence. Trend and seasonality controls omitted from reporting. Sales and 
rollover size variables in millions. 
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Similar to the price model estimates in the preceding section, Durbin-Watson statistics 
(Durbin and Watson, 1950) for Saturday and Wednesday models estimated with both OLS and 
instrumented rollovers show no evidence of autocorrelation in the error terms. Engel’s (1982) 
Lagrange Multiplier test again safely fails to reject the null hypothesis, even at the 10% level, 
that ARCH effects are present in the residuals, though OLS estimates for Wednesday sales do 
come noticeably close to 10% significance (p-value = 0.1454). 
In order to evaluate whether this reduced form model is preferred to the price model of 
Section 3.6, non-nested hypothesis testing developed by Cox (1961), Cox (1962), and later by 
Pesaran (1974) is used. This test compares two models, 𝑀 and 𝑀y, tests two hypotheses of 
the form: 𝐻\:𝑀 superior to 𝑀y 𝐻\:𝑀 not superior to 𝑀y. 
The test is then repeated where the null hypothesis is re-defined as 𝑀 superior to 𝑀y. 
Determining a superior model using non-nested hypothesis testing requires both rejecting the 
null of the inferior model and not rejecting the null hypothesis of the superior model. As such, 
there are four possible outcomes: a rejection of 𝑀, a rejection of 𝑀y, failure to reject both, and 
a rejection of both. The latter two outcomes would be inconclusive whilst the former would 
suffice for determining model superiority. 
Table 3.5 presents the results from the Cox-Pesaran test. This test is repeated for both 
Saturday and Wednesday draws and for both OLS and instrumented estimation regimes. 
Table 3.5: Cox-Pesaran non-nested hypothesis testing of model preference 
 OLS Heckman First-Stage 
Saturday z-statistic 𝒑 > |𝒕| z-statistic 𝒑 > |𝒕| 𝐻\: Rollover model preferred 1.88 0.030 -108.75 0.000 𝐻\: Price model preferred -13.95 0.000 -2.46 0.007 
 OLS Heckman First-Stage 
Wednesday z-statistic 𝒑 > |𝒕| z-statistic 𝒑 > |𝒕| 𝐻\: Rollover model preferred -6.51 0.000 -482.09 0.000 𝐻\: Price model preferred -55.48 0.000 -2.53 0.006 
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For Saturday games, OLS estimates suggest, albeit only at the 1% level, that the rollover model 
is superior to the price model. When controlling for endogeneity, the test is inconclusive in 
testing the competing models of Saturday ticket sales.  For Wednesday sales, non-nested testing 
of both OLS and instrumented estimates are inconclusive. The rejection of both of the 
competing models mirrors the results found in Forrest et al (2002) who suggest that an 
improvement to both models would to allow for a more flexible specification of the role of 
jackpot prizes, which encourages proceeding with a semi-parametric estimation routine. 
This section has so far assumed that 𝑔, from equation (3.17) below, is somewhat 
arbitrarily cubic in 𝑅i, whilst the price model estimated in Section 3.6 assumed that 𝑔 mediates 
the effect of rollover size solely through price. Allowing 𝑅i to enter non-parametrically 
overcomes the limitations inherent to imposing such arbitrary constraints, regardless of 
whether those constraints are guided by theory. Specifically, the semi-parametric technique 
used here estimates directly the following specification: 𝑆i = 𝛽+𝑿i + 𝑔(𝑅i) + 𝜀i. (3.17) 
This model of sales is estimated using methods developed by Robinson (1988). 
Following contributions made by Blundell et al (1998) and Blundell and Powell (2003) to 
Robinson’s estimation method in the presence of endogenous regressors, rollover size is 
instrumented per the Heckman first-stage in Section 3.660, and the residual of this first stage is 
included in the parametric component, 𝑿i. Other controls which form the parametric 
component of this specification and include own and cross lagged sales and variables to control 
for trend.  
Table 3.6 reports the coefficient estimates of the parametric component. As with the 
majority of estimates above, coefficients on both own and cross lagged sales are positive and 
highly significant for both Wednesday and Saturday draws. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
residual from the first stage, 𝜌, is also significant indicating the assumption that rollover size 
is endogenous is justified. Using a test developed by Hardle and Mammen (1993) reveals that 
both Wednesday and Saturday models are statistically different from a parametric fit which is 
linear in rollover size, and Saturday modelling is statistically different from parametric fits 
which are quadratic and cubic in rollover size at the 5% level. Estimates for Wednesday, 
however, are not statistically different from either the quadratic and cubic parametric rollover 
                                               
60 Details of this estimation procedure can be found in Appendix Section 3.10. 
 99 
models. The difference in these tests between Wednesday and Saturday models are not 
surprising upon examination of Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 which are plots of the nonparametric 
estimates of the function 𝑔 for Saturday and Wednesday draws, respectively. For Saturday, the 
relationship is highly non-linear, with modest increases in sales for single and double rollovers 
in the £0-10m range, but large increases in sales for treble rollovers, almost all of which are 
over £10m. For the Wednesday draw it can be seen that the non-parametric fit indeed looks 
close to quadratic, with an increasing gradient for larger rollover sizes. 
Differing estimates suggest that players in Wednesday and Saturday draws respond 
differently to increases in rollover sizes. Moreover, the non-linear relationship between 
rollover size and sales for both Wednesday and Saturday draws indicates that previous 
literature reliant solely on price variation is not capturing the true response of players’ demand 
to changes in the prize distribution. 
Table 3.6: Parametric coefficient estimates for semi-parametric models of sales 
Dependent Variable 𝑆iz¬i 𝑆i;®¯  
 (1) (2) 𝑆iU 0.186*** 
(0.0616) 
0.243*** 
(0.0567) 𝑆iUy 0.153*** 
(0.0248) 
0.220*** 




t-test vs parametric fit: 


















0.96 𝑅y 0.9472 0.9477 
Observations 845 852 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance 
at 1%,5%, 10% confidence. Trend and seasonality controls omitted from reporting. 






Figure 3.6: Non-parametric estimate of rollover size and sales for Saturday draws 
 
Notes: 95% confidence interval. Red line is the linear fit. Green dots / yellow triangles / blue squares 
denote single / double / treble rollovers.  
Figure 3.7: Non-parametric estimate of rollover size and sales for Wednesday draws 
 
Notes: 95% confidence interval. Red line is the linear fit. Green dots / yellow triangles / blue squares 
denote single / double / treble rollovers.  
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3.8 Evaluating lotto re-designs 
Changes made to the UK lotto game in October 2013 and October 2015 were likely in 
response to the dwindling sales which can be seen in Figure 3.5. The 2013 changes saw the 
sticker price increase from £1 to £2, a change in the share of prize money allocated to each 
prize tier which saw a larger share of the pari-mutuel prize fund being allocated to the jackpot, 
an increase in the fixed-prize awarded for matching 3 of the 6 winning numbers from £10 to 
£25, and 50 fixed raffle prizes of £20,000 for each draw. In 2015, the set of numbers from 
which winning combinations were drawn (and from which players could choose) was increased 
to 59, a prize of one free ticket to the following draw for matching two numbers was introduced, 
the number of £20,000 raffle prizes available each draw was reduced to 20 and a £1m raffle 
prize was added. Also in 2015, the cap on the number of consecutive draws for which the 
jackpot prize could have no winners was removed, with the operator instead allowing the prize 
to “roll-over” until it reached £50m; after which, if it had not been won again, would be shared 
between winners of the next-highest prize tier. This cap was lowered in August 2016 to £22m. 
The natural question to ask is whether the changes effective in rejuvenating sales and, if so, 
how effective were they? 
The price model estimates from Section 3.6 suggested lotto sales could be increased if 
the Saturday draw, where demand is price inelastic, were made more expensive to play relative 
to the Wednesday draw, where demand is price elastic. Introducing raffle prizes from 2013 
onwards could, at least in theory, have achieved precisely this. The 50 raffle prizes of £20,000 
for each draw, which any given ticket is equally likely to win, are paid before prize money is 
shared amongst the pari-mutuel prize funds. Effectively, this change reduces the value of 
money made available to pari-mutuel prizes by £1m. This then influences the effective price 
by reducing the size of a rollover, should one occur. 
The implication of this change for effective price is two-fold. Firstly, should there be 
no winners of the jackpot prize in the current draw, the increase in the effective price (caused 
by money lost to the rollover) is smaller than it would otherwise have been if there were no 
raffle prizes awarded. Having no winners of the jackpot prize occurs more frequently on 
Wednesday draws than Saturday due to lower sales. Therefore, this smaller increase in 
effective price will be experienced more frequently in Wednesday draws and should decrease 
the average price of Wednesday draws relative to that of Saturday, compared to the old design. 
Secondly, the decrease in price for the subsequent draw is smaller than it would have otherwise 
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been because the size of the rollover has been reduced. Again, this decreases the average price 
of Wednesday draws relative to Saturday because Wednesday have fewer jackpots enhanced 
by rollovers from Saturday than vice versa. Thus, this smaller decrease in price is experienced 
less frequently on Wednesdays than on Saturdays and will decrease the relative price of 
Wednesday draws on average. These two effects are amplified by the fact that the £1m taken 
from the pari-mutuel prize pool is a larger share of the pool for Wednesday draws than it is for 
Saturday draws. Moreover, the changes in 2015 saw even more money (£1.4m) being awarded 
in raffle prizes.  
However, other changes implemented simultaneously in 2013 have an opposing effect 
on Wednesday prices relative to Saturdays. In particular, the share of the pari-mutuel prize pool 
allocated to the jackpot prize increased from around 50% to over 80% at the expense of prize 
money allocated to the lower pari-mutuel prize tiers. This increase in the share of prize money 
allocated to the jackpot means that the raffle prize money deducted from the pari-mutuel prize 
fund was unlikely to affect the average size of the jackpot and, by extension, the size of 
rollovers and their effect on effective price when they occur. Moreover, an increased frequency 
of rollovers arising from doubling the sticker price in 2013 (also doubling the effective price 
for both Wednesday and Saturday draws and fewer tickets being bought overall), and 
increasing the difficulty of the game in 2015, will likely lead to an increased effective price for 
both games.  
Whilst theory can predict the direction of the effect of each of the design changes 
discussed above, little is known about the magnitude of the effect changing game-specific 
parameters has on the demand for tickets, which is not surprising given the unique way in 
which the price of lotto, rollovers, and sales are all endogenous to one another. Thus, given 
the conflicting effects that the simultaneous design changes are predicted by theory to have on 
the price of lotto tickets, whether or not they are effective in reviving lotto sales revenue is 
unclear. A naïve answer can be found by simply comparing sales figures for each draw before 
and after the changes.  
 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the sales figures for Wednesday and Saturday draws of the UK 
lotto from November 2011 to July 2017 – allowing some comparison to be made between ticket 
sales for the pre-2013, post-2013 and post-2015 designs. The red vertical lines correspond to 




Figure 3.8: Draw sales for the UK lotto (Nov 2011-Jul 2017) 
 
The 2013 reform appears to have had an immediate impact on sales figures, particularly 
for Saturday draws, causing an apparent parallel shift upwards in both Wednesday and 
Saturday revenues. The 2015 re-design does not display such an obvious increase in sales, 
relative to the 2013 design, but does produce a small subset of draws in early 2016 where sales 
reached in excess of £90m for a Saturday draw and over £40m for a Wednesday draw. These 
spikes correspond to an unusually large rollover which occurred due to the operator removing 
the cap on the number of consecutive draws a rollover was allowed to happen – instead opting 
to terminate consecutive rollovers when the jackpot prize reached £50m in value61. After the 
immediate shift in sales following the 2013 design changes, sales – particularly on Saturday – 
appear to continue to follow the downward trend visible in Figure 3.4. Moreover, the sales 
depicted towards the end of the sample in  
 
                                               
61 In 2016, the cap on the value which the rollover prize could reach was lowered to £22m. If the rollover 
reaches this amount, and there are no winners in the following draw, it is shared between winners of 
the next highest prize tier.  
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Figure 3.8 seem to return to the ballpark figures seen before October 2013 – suggesting 
that the changes made to the game offered only a temporary boost in sales. 
Table 3.7 presents supporting evidence by comparing average sales revenue per draw 
for the two-year period before the first game changes, the post-2013 design and the post-2015 
design. Following the 2013 change, average weekly revenues rose by around £5m, an increase 
of just under £2m in revenues from Wednesday draws and around £3m for Saturday draws. 
The higher standard deviation in revenues compared to the pre-2013 design reflects the fact 
that rollovers – which induce increases in sales – occur much more frequently because of the 
fall in the quantity of tickets sold. 
Table 3.7: Comparison of sales revenues between game designs (£m) 



















Notes: Pre-2013 sales only considered for the two years (104 weeks) 
before the original 2013 game re-design. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
 
Whilst informative, the story told by  
 
Figure 3.8 and Table 3.7, that sales increased by roughly £5m per week following the 
2013 reform before falling back to pre-2013 levels, are only indicative of the success of the 
changes. To properly evaluate the effectiveness of the changes, one would need to estimate the 
level of sales under the original game design over the same time period – for which, clearly, 
there is no data. The most obvious approach to this is produce out of sample forecasts using, 
say, estimates of the models presented above in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 and the 
mathematical identities which determine price in Section 3.3 as an approximation to this 
missing counterfactual.  
Given the autocorrelation of sales, and the endogeneity of both price and rollovers, this 
would then require a dynamic forecasting approach, in which fitted values of past sales are 
used in all the equations of the model, where appropriate to fit subsequent values. However, 
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this too is fraught with difficulty since, without observed data, the variation in price driven by 
both the size and, particularly, the frequency of rollovers is not known. The endogeneity of 
rollovers to sales makes deriving these from the equations of the model intractable, thus such 
an approach would either require using observed frequencies from the new designs as an 
approximation or simulating rollover occurrence for each draw using probabilities derived 
from equation (3.2).  
Figure 3.9: Dynamic forecast fit of Saturday lotto sales 1997-2017 
 
Attempts at this procedure62, such as what is depicted in Figure 3.9, generally continue 
along the underlying time trend variables in the out of sample period. Whilst it is likely that 
without design changes to the game in 2013 and 2015 sales would have continued to fall, the 
outputs like that of Figure 3.9 are highly sensitive to the specification of the time trend – with 
experiments using varying degrees of polynomial expansion in the time trends yielding 
substantially different forecasts – and estimates based on these outputs should be treated with 
caution without further supporting evidence on the marginal effect of each of the changes 
implemented on lotto demand and price. Moreover, the relatively flat sales in the two years 
before the 2013 design changes suggest that rollover frequency and size had, at least locally, 
                                               
62 This was done using the dynamic forecasting suite of commands in Stata 14, which forecasts out of 
sample using the structural model of supply and demand for lotto tickets outlined in Sections 3.3 and 
3.4 and parameterised in Section 3.6. Identities are used to enforce the mechanical nature in which sales 
determine price, both directly and via rollover size and probability in the supply equation.  
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been unchanged over that period. In the absence of a more complete model of lotto demand, 
the declining trend evident in Figure 3.5 and, though unlikely to be useful, in Figure 3.9 suggest 
a comparison of the average sales figures in Table 3.7 is likely to be sufficient in determining 
the (lack of) success of the design changes.  
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has modelled the sales of lotto in the UK under the assumption that sales 
are driven by the effect of rollovers assuming that the transmission mechanism is only through 
the mean of the prize distribution. By exploiting two of the institutional aspects of the game, a 
novel strategy to identify the causal effect of effective price of a ticket has been employed. The 
resultant estimates suggest that the Wednesday draw should be made more attractive relative 
to the Saturday draw – a novel finding for this literature. 
Models of lotto demand in which the mean of the prize distribution is the key dependent 
variable are often criticised on the grounds that they are based on expected utility theory which 
is notoriously ineffective at explaining why gambling occurs amongst otherwise risk-averse 
individuals. This chapter further extends the existing literature by adopting a more pragmatic 
reduced form model that is cubic in the rollover size, rather than assuming that the effect on 
sales is only via the expected price. The same instrumental variables strategy used to identify 
the price model is employed to overcome the endogeneity of rollover size, and estimates 
suggest £1 million increases in the jackpot prize from rollovers increases Saturday sales by 
around £1.8 million and Wednesday sales by £0.5 million. A semi-parametric model that 
allows the effect of rollover size on sales to be fully flexible is also estimated. Whilst testing 
formally rejects the parametric reduced form of modelling, the semi-parametric model is 
effectively economically equivalent to the parametric model in its effects.  
Finally, major re-designs to the UK’s main lotto game in 2013 and 2015 which were 
likely implemented in response to declining sales figures are assessed. Simple comparison of 
pre- and post-redesign revenues shows that the 2013 changes were a relative success, 
increasing sales from an average of £44.5 million per week to £49.8 million – equivalent to 
over £275 million per year in extra revenues. The 2015 renovation of the game proved less 
successful, seeing sales return to their pre-2013 levels. Thorough analysis of the effectiveness 
would require knowledge of the level of sales had the game re-designs never occurred. 
Attempts to forecast sales out of sample from the model developed in Section 3.6 mirror the 
declining trend in sales pre-2013, indicating that changes to the game’s design were more 
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successful than simply comparing sales figures implies. However, these forecasts could be 
improved with a more complete simulation of lotto design and the effects of changing the game 




3.10.1 Estimates with rollovers as instruments 
Table A3.8: Comparison of second stage estimates of lotto demand using rollover size 
and conscious selection as instruments 
Instrument: Rollover Size Conscious Selection 
Dependent Variable 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 






































Observations 868 868 867 868 𝑅y 0.9526 0.9403 0.946 0.867 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 
1%,5%, 10% confidence. Trend and seasonality controls omitted from reporting. Sales 
variables in millions.  
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3.10.2 Consumer Surplus, Tax, and Deadweight Loss 
Assuming a linear demand function for lotto tickets, it is possible to provide estimates 
of long-run tax revenues, consumer surplus and, due to the existence of tax and good causes 
receipts, deadweight loss using estimates from Table 3.3.  
Figure A3.10: Linear demand for Saturday lotto tickets 
 
Figure A3.10 shows such a demand curve, for Saturday tickets, parameterised using 
column 5 of Table 3.3, as well as indicating average price (dashed line, 𝑃 = £0.51) and 
marginal cost (dot-dashed line, £0.10) which is the amount per £1 spent on National Lottery 
tickets shared between the operator and the vendor.  
This suggests consumer surplus is in the region of £20m per draw (£1b per annum) for 
Saturday games and £3m per draw (£150m per annum) for Wednesday draws. Tax and good 
causes revenues are approximately £16m per draw for Saturday and £8.8m per draw for 
Wednesday (approximately £1.3b per annum combined) and deadweight losses are estimated 




3.10.3 Semi-parametric Estimation Routine 
The semi-parametric approach used here is the partially linear model and is estimated 
using the double residual method developed by Robinson (1988). Partially linear models 
contain an assumed linear parametric component of variables, 𝑿i, with unknown parameters, 𝛽, and an unknown function, 𝑔, of a variable, say 𝑅i, for which we cannot make assumptions 
of the functional relationship between itself and the dependent variable, say 𝑆i. Specifically, 
the model can be written as, 𝑆i = 𝛽+𝑿i + 𝑔(𝑅i) + 𝜀i (3.18) 
Consistent estimation of (3.18) requires that 𝐸(𝜀i|𝑿i, 𝑅i) = 0. Robinson’s estimator 
for the unknown parameter vector, 𝛽, and unknown function, 𝑔, can then be obtained by 
transforming the model, 𝑆i − 𝐸(𝑆i|𝑅i) = 	𝛽+|𝑿i − 𝐸(𝑿i|𝑅i)} +	𝜀i (3.19) 
and replacing 𝐸(𝑆i|𝑅i) and 𝐸(𝑿i|𝑅i) by their respective non-parametric estimators, 𝑚ÙÚz(𝑅i) 
and 𝑚ÙÚ𝑿(𝑅i), which are found using kernel density estimates with bandwidths ℎ. Robinson 
showed that using OLS to estimate this transformed model yields  𝛽Û  coefficients which 
converge at a rate of √𝑛. After obtaining estimates for 𝛽, it is then possible to estimate the 
unknown function 𝑔 using the following, 𝑔ÝÚ(𝑅i) = 𝑚ÙÚz(𝑅i) − 𝛽+«ÙÞ𝑿(𝑅i). (3.20) 
If 𝑅i is endogenous, such that 𝐸(𝜀i|𝑅i) ≠ 0 or 𝐸(𝑆i|𝑅i) ≠ 0, this approach will yield 
inconsistent estimators since 𝐸(𝜀i|𝑅i) would be non-zero. Blundell et al (1998) develops a 
method for estimating such partially linear models when the non-parametric variables are 
endogenous. Their approach relies on the existence of some instrumental variable, 𝑍i, such that  𝑅i = 𝛾𝑍i + 𝜈i (3.21) 
with 𝐸(𝜈i|𝑍i) = 0 and 𝐸(𝜀i|𝑅i, 𝜈i) = 𝜌𝜈i. Then 𝜀i = 𝜌𝜈i + 𝜂i and an analogue of Robinson’s 
partially linear model holds as follows, 𝑆i = 𝛽+𝑿i + 𝑔(𝑅i) + 𝜌𝜈i + 𝜂i (3.22) 
which we can then re-write and estimate as per Robinson’s methodology using: 𝑆i − 𝐸(𝑆i|𝑅i) = 	𝛽+|𝑿i − 𝐸(𝑿i|𝑅i)} + 	𝜌|𝜈i − 𝐸(𝜈i|𝑅i)} + 𝜂i. (3.33) 
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3.10.4 Auxiliary Rollover Model Estimates 
Estimates in Table A3.9 are auxiliary to those found in Table 3.4 in which demand for 
lotto tickets dependent on a function that is cubic in rollover size. 
Table A3.9: Heckman-instrumented estimates of liner and quadratic rollover induced 
ticket demand  
 Heckman First-Stage 
Dependent Variable 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 





































Durbin-Watson d-stat 1.9685 1.9905 1.9625 1.9868 
ARCH LM test (H0: no ARCH effects) 0.051 0.034 0.062 0.027 
ARCH LM test (p-value) 0.8219 0.8529 0.8038 0.8706 
AIC 4464.907 4374.156 4455.880 4375.155 
Observations 868 868 868 868 𝑅y 0.9146 0.7099 0.9156 0.7103 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 1%,5%, 10% confidence. 




3.10.5 Estimates Using Consecutive Numbers in the Identification Strategy 
Appendix Table 3.10: Heckman selection model estimates for rollover size and 
probability using consecutive numbers in the selection equation 
 Saturday Wednesday 
Dependent Variable 𝑹𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕|𝑹𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 > 𝟎 𝑹𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅|𝑹𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 > 𝟎 𝑊,iU − 𝜋𝑆iU -4.825*** 
(1.2555) 
-7.021*** 
(1.0962) 𝑆iU 1.031*** 
(0.0326) 
0.722*** 








Selection Equation 𝐏𝐫	(𝑹𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 > 𝟎) 𝐏𝐫	(𝑹𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 > 𝟎) 𝛥«®¯(°«,iU 0.183*** 
(0.0552) 
0.021 
(0.0427) 𝛥­¬³´®,iU 0.336*** 
(0.0543) 
0.119** 
(0.0552) 𝛿áâuª®á°i(ã®,iU 0.310*** 
(0.0940) 
0.068 
(0.0636) 𝑆iU -0.081 *** 
(0.0218) 
-0.029 








Observations 868 868 
Censored observations 616 750 𝜆 -0.0845 2.4165*** 𝜒()y  test of 𝜆 = 0 0.15 15.94 
P-value 0.6944 0.0001 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 1%,5%, 10% 




Appendix Table 3.11: Second-stage price model estimates with consecutive numbers in 
the identification strategy 
 Control Function 
using Heckman First-Stage 
Dependent variable 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 
 (1) (2) 𝑆iU 0.133** 
(0.0546) 
0.071** 
(0.0347) 𝑆iUy 0.101*** 
(0.0283) 
0.073** 












Durbin-Watson d-stat 2.0331 1.9418 
ARCH LM test  
(𝐻\: no ARCH effects) 0.088 0.060 
ARCH LM test (p-value) 0.7673 0.8058 
AIC 4061.838 3777.626 
Observations 868 868 𝑅y 0.9460 0.8541 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at 
1%,5%, 10% confidence. Trend and seasonality controls omitted from reporting. Sales 





Appendix Table 3.12: Second-stage rollover model estimates with consecutive numbers 
in the identification strategy 
 Heckman First-Stage 
Dependent variable 𝑺𝒕𝑺𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝑾𝒆𝒅 
 (3) (4) 𝑆iU -1.254*** 
(0.3721) 
-0.340*** 
(0.1070) 𝑆iUy 0.249*** 
(0.0502) 
0.116** 
(0.0459) 𝑅iÕ 1.884*** 
(0.4070) 
0.483** 








Joint F-test 𝑅iy, 𝑅i = 0 5.97*** 4.20** 
Prob>F 0.0027 0.0155 
Durbin-Watson d-stat 1.959 1.988 
ARCH LM test (H0: no 
ARCH effects) 
0.040 0.024 
ARCH LM test  
(p-value) 
0.8407 0.8776 
AIC 4455.41 4373.82 
Observations 868 868 𝑅y 0.9159 0.711 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes 
statistical significance at 1%,5%, 10% confidence. Trend and 
seasonality controls omitted from reporting. Sales and rollover size 





4 The regressivity of lotto taxation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with estimating the extent to which high rates of tax on UK 
lotto games are disproportionately borne by low-income individuals – i.e. the regressivity of 
such taxes. The main analysis focuses on parameterising Engel curves from a Working-Leser 
specification in which a proxy for log income, log total expenditure, is the key independent 
variable in determining the budget share of lottery tickets. Since lotteries are taxed at a constant 
rate, this enables us to infer on whether lottery taxes are regressive, progressive, or proportional 
directly from estimates of income elasticity when its value is less than, more than, or equal to 
one, respectively. The household-level nature of the data used necessitates non-standard 
statistical techniques to deal with the potential for bias associated with households that do not, 
at least in the survey period, participate in lotto63 – namely Heckman’s (1979) selection model 
and Cragg’s (1971) double hurdle routine. A novel strategy is used to identify these two-step 
models by exploiting exogenous differences in consumer preference arising from religious 
practices; namely, abstaining from alcohol, pork, and gambling products by practicing 
Muslims. 
The results classify the UK lotto as an inferior good and headline estimates of the 
game’s income elasticity are between -1.4 and -0.7, indicating that taxes imposed on lotto 
tickets are significantly more regressive than the previous literature suggests. Advances on 
previous literature are also made by employing non- and semi-parametric techniques to 
examine directly the relationship between lottery expenditure and income over the entire 
distribution. To complement the income elasticity estimates from the Working-Leser 
parametric specification, a second non-parametric approach is used in which an index of 
regressivity, known as the Suits’ index, is calculated in an attempt to quantify how regressive 
lotto taxes are. 
Lotteries are typically state-owned or state-licensed enterprises, the proceeds of which 
are earmarked for financing public projects or services; in particular, on those that are not 
typically financed by government. Lotteries, in countries where they are available, are 
frequently the most popular gambling product both in terms of revenue and prevalence. In the 
                                               
63 Only games which feature draws that occur at regular intervals are considered here and not 
scratchcards. 
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UK, government-licensed lottery games achieve annual sales around £4.5b (2.6% of household 
expenditure) and the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 reveals that 80% of those who 
had gambled in the previous 12 months had participated in the UK National Lottery in the same 
period. Moreover, state-run lotteries are common across the globe. In the US, for instance, 
lotteries are available in 43 states with each contributing to state-level finances some of which 
are earmarked for particular forms of expenditure – although none impose the additionality 
constraint that the UK game operates under. US lotteries achieved sales of $70.1b in 2014 and 
have raised over $300b towards state revenues since the first modern lottery in New Jersey, 
1971.  
Goods which are subject to high rates of taxation naturally raise concerns about 
regressivity but the popularity, state provision, and earmarking of funds for public goods make 
lotteries particularly interesting candidates for examination. In the UK only around 50% of 
ticket sales are returned in prizes – making lotteries one of, if not the, worst-return gambling 
products available. The remainder of ticket revenues are divided between ‘good causes’64 
(28%), tax (12%), retailer commission (5%), and operating costs and profit (5%). Accounting 
for only the consumers’ and supplier’s interests, such an allocation of revenues would then 
appear as an effective tax rate of 40% – substantially higher than tax rates paid on other 
gambling products65. The lotto tax rate is analogous to ‘sin taxes’ such as tobacco, alcohol, and 
sugar duties which are popular fiscal policies designed to discourage the consumption of goods 
which are potentially damaging to the consumer. Implementing such punitive taxes rarely faces 
opposition when the state can appeal to a paternalistic ‘moral high ground’ and claim to be 
either internalising the social cost of consumption or acting to deter consumption of otherwise 
harmful goods. However, whilst problem gambling is costly both to the individual and to the 
state (see Thorley, Stirling, and Huynh, 2016; and Pryce, Walker and Wheeler, 2017), there is 
no evidence that playing lotto games are connected to problem gambling or is linked to any 
other harms66. 
                                               
64 ‘Good causes’ funds are distributed by government-appointed organizations and in the year ending 
March 2016 were invested as follows: Health, education, environment and charitable causes – 40%, 
sport – 20%, arts – 20%, heritage – 20%.  
65 At the time of writing, tax rates on other gambling products range from 3% (spread betting) to 25% 
(high-stakes fixed odds betting terminals). A full list of UK gambling duty rates can be found on the 
UK Government webpages via www.gov.uk.  
66 Although Pryce et al (2017) finds that there is a statistically significant effect of scratchcards on the 
loss in well-being associated with being a problem gambler. 
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Though beyond the scope of this research, it is important to consider the overall 
regressivity of lotteries by additionally addressing the question who benefits, and by how 
much, from the proceeds of taxes collected from players. Clearly, this would require an analysis 
of the income distribution of both the players, which is the subject of this chapter, and that of 
the beneficiaries of good causes funding and the sales tax proceeds. If the proceeds from a 
lottery whose taxation is regressive are spent entirely on projects which exclusively benefit the 
lowest income individuals then, arguably, one would be less concerned about the regressive 
tax than about the state’s role in how low-income individuals allocate their limited budgets. At 
the opposite extreme, a lottery which finances projects primarily for the benefit of individuals 
in the right tail of the income distribution, would place even more emphasis on the question of 
the extent to which lotto taxation is regressive. Though this concern is not dealt with in the 
analysis here, Borg and Mason (1988), Rubenstein and Scafidi (2002), and more recently 
Feehan and Forrest (2007) all present evidence that suggests that the latter is likely to be the 
case. 
4.2 Related literature 
Since the introduction of the New Jersey lottery in 1971 many aspects of lotteries have 
received attention in economics literature. An early contribution was Clotfelter and Cook 
(1991), and Perez and Humphreys (2013) provide a thorough overview of the literature. There 
are several studies on the incidence of lottery taxes in the literature and a select few are 
reviewed here. 
Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) provide early evidence on the incidence of lottery taxation 
using individual-level survey data made up from separate random-sample surveys in 
Connecticut and Massachusetts, and from a sample of lottery winners from Pennsylvania. Their 
evidence suggests that average nominal expenditure on lotteries peaks in the middle of the 
income distribution before quickly falling away at higher income levels. Moreover, since taxes 
are a constant proportion of sales revenue they are able to conclude the tax is regressive. Their 
paper also shows that mean lottery expenditure, as a percentage of total income, falls 
continuously from low to high income brackets. Whilst informative, these findings are merely 
descriptive so Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) also provide basic regression evidence from 
county-level income and demographic data, together with the geographic distribution of small 
prize winners as a noisy measure of ticket sales. Their regression analysis corroborates the 
conclusions from the extensive descriptive statistics and shows that expenditure as a percentage 
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of income declines as incomes rise. Other early evidence on the regressivity of US lottery 
taxation follows the methods of Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) by using aggregate data at both 
the zip code (e.g. Clotfelter, 1979, and Clotfelter and Cook, 1987) and county (e.g. Mikesell, 
1989) levels. Only Mikesell (1989) is inconclusive on whether lottery taxes are regressive or 
not by estimating the income elasticity of lotteries in Illinois between 1985-1987 to be 
statistically indistinguishable from 1. These findings are the exception, however, with all other 
studies of the time finding evidence of regressivity. 
Studies of the income distribution of lottery players using aggregate level data are often 
criticised for assumptions made about regional homogeneity and the inherent measurement 
error arising from individuals purchasing tickets outside of their home district. When modern 
state lotteries were in their infancy, the popularity of approaching the question in this way was 
due to limited individual-level data. Moreover, early research using individual or household 
level data were susceptible to either small samples, sample selection issues, or both. One such 
example is that of Spiro (1974), who analyses a mailed survey of 1,250 winners of the 
Pennsylvania state lottery. With only 271 usable responses, the external validity of the study is 
severely limited by both a small sample size and selection bias resulting from only surveying 
winners and a low response rate. As a result, Sprio (1974) argues that an income elasticity 
estimate of 0.22 is an upper bound, since any correlation between the probability of response 
and income is likely to be negatively correlated. However, this ignores the sample selection 
issues inherent to only surveying winners. Even if the income distribution and number of 
tickets purchased by each of the 271 respondents is representative of all players, one would 
then be also required to rely on aggregate level assumptions about the income distribution to 
formulate conclusions about the regressivity of lottery taxation for all players. Finally, only 
surveying winners who have participated for sure in the lottery prohibits any insight into the 
behaviour and characteristics of non-lottery players. Of specific interest here would be whether 
changes in income, or indeed any other factor, affects propensity of individuals to purchase a 
ticket, or if changes in these variables merely encourages existing players to alter the number 
of tickets they purchase.  
As the global lottery market has continued to grow over the past four decades, there is 
an increasing number of large population surveys being made available to researchers which 
also circumvent many of the issues which arise with early individual-level and aggregate-level 
studies. Kitchen and Powells (1991) use the Canadian 1986 Survey of Family Expenditure – a 
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household-level study – to obtain income elasticities for lotteries played in all six major 
Canadian regions. Their data benefits from over 10,000 observations – considerably more than 
early studies such as Spiro (1974) – and by randomly sampling from the entire population. 
Their estimation approach involves a regression of the amount spent on lottery tickets on 
household income and wealth, as well as controls for demographic characteristics. A common 
issue with such data is the presence of a zero lower bound in expenditure data which would 
bias coefficient estimates from OLS regression. Kitchen and Powells (1991) use Tobin’s 
(1958) estimation routine – the Tobit model – which corrects for this bias. The Tobit model is 
often preferred to OLS in this instance since it effectively accounts for the effect of regressors 
on both the decision to purchase and on the amount to spend. Kitchen and Powells (1991) find 
income elasticities in all regions to be less than 1, ranging from 0.70 (Quebec) to 0.92 (Alberta). 
They also conclude that taxes on Canadian lotteries are regressive, but less regressive than 
previous estimates both in the US and Canada would suggest. 
Farrell and Walker (1999) compare coefficient and income elasticity estimates from 
OLS and Tobit models with a third estimation procedure developed by Heckman (1979). They 
echo the arguments of Scott and Garen (1994) that a Tobit model may be invalid in estimating 
lottery expenditures for two reasons. First, Tobit estimates are sensitive to an assumption of 
normality in unobserved heterogeneity, which is particularly concerning when using micro-
level data where heteroscedasticity is often expected. Second, the Tobit model imposes the 
strong restriction that the influence of regressors on the decision to participate are proportional 
to the influence they have on the amount purchased, conditional on participating. The Heckman 
selection model generalises the Tobit routine to allow for the dependent variables to have 
differing effects on the decision to purchase and the amount to spend but, as Farrell and Walker 
(1999) point out, it requires an exclusion restriction for identification. The routine requires at 
least one variable to influence participation, but not the quantity purchased conditional on 
participation, in order for the model to be identified. Farrell and Walker (1999) use car 
ownership – a factor which plausibly reduces the transaction cost of participation but does not 
influence the number of tickets to buy – to overcome this problem, though admit this is not 
ideal since “there may well be grounds for thinking that car ownership is correlated with 
unobservables that affect lotto demand” (p. 112). Nonetheless, they find that OLS and Tobit 
understate the regressivity of lotto taxation relative to Heckman’s selection model with income 
elasticities of 0.27, 0.45, and 0.13, respectively. 
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More recently, the use of the Heckman selection model in estimating lottery ticket 
purchases has been criticised. In a study using data from Alberta in Canada, Humphreys, Lee 
and Soebbing (2010) argue that the Heckman model would only be appropriate if individuals 
who gamble will always be observed to gamble and that nonparticipants will never gamble. 
Such an assumption ignores the draw-by-draw variation in lottery ticket sales driven by 
rollovers which is well documented in the literature. Instead, Humphreys, Lee and Soebbing 
(2010) propose using a double hurdle routine which further relaxes the assumptions of the 
Tobit model and compare differences in coefficient estimates of explanatory variables on 
lottery spending between the two models. They note the double hurdle routine is particularly 
appealing since it allows for abstention as well as non-participation driven by low prizes in any 
draw. Their results reveal a further deficiency of the Tobit estimation routine. The Tobit model 
for their data simply shows that spending on lotto increases with income, whereas double 
hurdle estimates reveal that income has no bearing on whether an individual participates, only 
their expenditure conditional on participation. This result might imply that the lotto taxation in 
Alberta may not be regressive, although Humphreys, Lee and Soebbing (2010) stop short of 
formally analysing the this issue. Moreover, they do not present Heckman model estimates for 
comparison, so there remains a question about which model would be preferential in practice 
for micro-level data. 
A final strand of the literature exists in relation to evaluating the regressivity of taxation. 
Suits (1977a) proposes a method of investigating the issue using an index of tax progressivity 
which is analogous to the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The index, S, ranges from +1, 
extreme progressivity, to -1, extreme regressivity, where 0 would indicate a perfectly 
proportional tax. The index is constructed by plotting the accumulated percent of the total tax 
burden against the accumulated percent of total income (with individuals sorted by income). 
The value of the index for a given tax is then computed by subtracting the ratio of the area 
under the curve and the area under the diagonal from 1. Suits’ index has become a popular tool 
in evaluating tax policy since it provides a normalised measure of regressivity which can be 
compared to other taxes. Suits (1977b) estimates this index for a variety of gambling products 
in the US and shows that only casino games (outside of Nevada) and sports betting are taxed 
progressively with index values of 0.26 and 0.29, respectively. Taxes on state lotteries were 
found to be the third most regressive of all gambling products with an index of -0.31. Many of 
the studies reviewed in this section also provide estimates of this index for lotteries, 
unanimously finding lottery taxation to be regressive, ranging from -0.13 in Quebec (Kitchen 
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and Powells, 1991) to -0.46 in Massachusetts (Brinner and Clotfelter, 1975). Table 3 of Perez 
and Humphreys (2013) provides a more complete list of the reported Suits’ index values from 
the literature. 
4.3 The data 
The data used here are taken from the UK Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) – later 
re-named the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF) – which is a large, individual-level survey 
of individual and household expenditure. Collection of expenditure data is done via a two-week 
expenditure diary that is self-completed by all survey participants within each household. An 
interview is also conducted to obtain some demographic and socio-economic information and 
details of both infrequent expenditure on goods and services – for instance, cars or vacations – 
and regular expenditures such as water, energy, and rent/mortgage which may fall outside the 
diary period. The survey is conducted year-round and the dataset used here contains responses 
from 2001-2013. Over this time period, the design of the UK National Lottery was unchanged, 
though it was revised in October 2013 when our dataset ends, and the design of the survey was 
constant. Over the whole sample period, the sticker price of tickets also remained constant at 
£1 and average returns were around 50%. This means that this product can be largely 
considered homogenous for the whole sample period, conveniently providing little concern for 
structural breaks in the demand analysis here.67 
Since labour and expenditure decisions are often made at the household level, 
expenditure and income is aggregated to the household level for the analysis in this chapter.68 
In total, there are 79,065 households sampled evenly across each year of the available dataset. 
The survey is conducted year-round and across the whole of the UK with samples for each year 
drawn from postcode data and designed to be representative of the UK population.  
The EFS/LCF data contains information on expenditure on individual items, total 
expenditure, and gross incomes and all values which relate to currency amounts are converted 
to weekly averages. Total expenditure is a derived variable in this dataset and differs from 
                                               
67 The design of lotto games means that the expected value of tickets – and therefore the expected cost 
– varies with the number of players because of the possibility of prizes not being won (for further 
explanation see Walker and Young (2001), for example). With declining participation over the sample 
period, the expected cost of playing increases. In this analysis, month fixed-effects capture this trend.  
68 It seems likely that many households will collectively own tickets bought by separate household 
members so analysing behaviour at the individual level is probably unwise, as well as impossible 
because of restrictions on access to the individual diary data. 
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aggregating expenditure on individual items because it excludes council tax, water, and 
sewerage charges in order to better maintain the anonymity of the respondents since these taxes 
vary across Local Authorities. This is therefore the preferred measure of total expenditure 
rather than manually aggregating expenditures for each household. Income is recorded as gross, 
rather than net, and two options are available in the data – ‘current’ and ‘normal’ gross incomes. 
Differences between the two measures are that the former includes any recent social security 
benefit payments, actual current pay (based on the last pay slip), and sick pay, whilst the latter 
only consists of current pre-tax pay provided the respondent has not been out of work due to 
illness for more than 13 weeks. Where appropriate, this chapter exclusively uses the ‘normal 
income’ measure in order to better capture demand which arises as a result of regular income. 
The preferred analysis here involves regressing the budget share of lottery expenditure 
on log income and other relevant controls. To calculate the budget share of lotteries, the 
recorded expenditure on lotto tickets over the two-week period is simply divided by the total 
expenditure derived variable for each household. In addition to income, estimates presented in 
Section 4.6 also include controls for government region and the age, sex, employment status 
and years of education of the household representative person (HRP). As noted in Kitchen and 
Powells (1991), there is no obvious prior for the direction or significance of many of these 
variables, but their inclusion and the resultant estimates may be of use to the relevant 
stakeholders who have an interest in the household characteristics of lotto players beyond just 
their income. Given the likely correlation between some of these controls and income, these 
estimates will, however, provide an estimate of income elasticity which is conditional on the 
control variables. For completeness, all the analysis in Section 4.6 was repeated without the 
extra control variables to obtain an unconditional estimate of income elasticity, which may 
arguably be of more interest to the regulator, and these estimates can be found in the Appendix 
Section 4.8.3. For all models, this income elasticity was even smaller than those that form the 
body of this chapter, suggesting lotto taxation is even more regressive than the main analysis 
implies.  
Means and standard deviations of the relevant variables to our analysis are presented in 
Table 4.1. There appears be little difference between purchasing and non-purchasing 
households in income and the age of the HRP. However, differences are noticeable in means 
of sex, employment status, and education level of the HRP. Purchasing households are more 
likely – relative to their non-purchasing counterparts – to have a male HRP, to have an 
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employed HRP, and have a HRP who left education at or below the age of 16. Such a profile 
of purchasing households is consistent with previous studies on the demographics of gamblers 
conducted on individual-level surveys such as in Wardle et al (2010).  
Table 4.1: Mean and standard deviation of variables used in the analysis by observed 






Weekly Gross Normal Income 609.063 604.605 607.144 
 (616.3904) (437.5022) (546.6059) 
Weekly Total Expenditure 438.733 454.394 445.475 
 (386.6743) (334.3482) (365.2696) 
Weekly Lottery Expenditure - 4.289 1.846 
 - (4.6843) (3.7357) 
Age HRP 51.239 53.040 52.014 
 (17.5049) (15.1596) (16.5600) 
Male HRP = 1 0.585 0.664 0.619 
 (0.4928) (0.4722) (0.4856) 
Employment Status of HRP:    
Employed = 1 0.568 0.621 0.591 
 (0.4954) (0.4851) (0.4917) 
Unemployed = 1 0.028 0.019 0.024 
 (0.1641) (0.1352) (0.1524) 
Retired = 1 0.285 0.270 0.279 
 (0.4516) (0.4437) (0.4483) 
Sick/Unoccupied = 1 0.119 0.091 0.107 
 (0.3239) (0.2871) (0.3089) 
Age HRP left education:    
At or before 16 = 1 0.552 0.706 0.618 
 (0.4973) (0.4557) (0.4858) 
17-18 = 1 0.177 0.159 0.169 
 (0.3815) (0.3654) (0.3748) 
18+ = 1 0.269 0.134 0.211 
 (0.4432) (0.3412) (0.4079) 
n 45,028 34,037 79,065 
 
One might be concerned, as with studies into alcohol expenditure for example, about 
the possibility of under-reported lotto expenditures in the EFS/LCF. To investigate this 
potential problem, Figure 4.1 presents a comparison of per-person monthly expenditure on 
lotto as recorded in the EFS/LCF with per-person monthly expenditure with the aggregate-
level dataset used in the previous chapter69. Clearly, from 2001-2011, the EFS/LCF under-
reports lotto expenditure relative to the aggregate level data, but the magnitude of under-
reporting appears fairly constant over time. From 2011 to the end of the data, there is a 
                                               
69 Computation of a per-person monthly expenditure from the Merseyworld dataset assumes a constant 
46m adult population. 
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reduction in the level of under-reporting of lotto expenditures, though reasons for this are 
unclear with no evident change to the categorisation of lotto expenditures in the data 
documentation.   
Figure 4.1: Comparison of EFS/LCF lotto spend with Merseyworld data 
 
The under-reporting of lotto expenditures in the EFS/LCF data would be particularly 
concerning in the analysis later in this chapter if the level of under-reporting varies with 
income. This is, of course, something which is impossible to know since this data is collected 
on the population of lotto players. Moreover, if the level of under-reporting does not vary with 
income, then this is simply a measurement error issue, and one that is in the dependent variable 
which presents no problem for the statistical analysis in this chapter.  
A comparison of means in Table 4.1 only provides an insight into the characteristics of 
players versus non-players, and not the correlations between those characteristics and the level 
of spending on tickets. Figure 4.2 illustrates that whilst there is little difference in mean age of 
the HRP between purchasing and non-purchasing households, there is relatively substantial 
variation in expenditure over the age distribution. Panel (a) gives average weekly lottery 
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expenditure by age of HRP for the whole sample and there is a clear correlation between age 
of HRP and spending, rising through the age ranges before peaking at 60-69 year olds. Panel 
(b) also shows a similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern with the sample restricted to ticket 
purchasers only. Differences in expenditure across other demographic variables, which are also 
more moderate when restricting the sample to ticket purchasers, are also evident and similar 
graphs to Figure 4.2 for the additional control variables can be found in the appendix. 
Figure 4.2: Mean weekly spend on lotto by age of HRP 
 
Crucial to the analysis in this paper is the variation in lotto participation and expenditure 
across the income distribution. Figure 4.3 provides a local polynomial fit of lottery expenditure 
against income, with the data trimmed to exclude the upper and lower 1% of observations by 
weekly income.  Naturally, the polynomial fit is higher for purchasing households versus the 
whole sample, however a similar shape can be observed from both panels of the figure. Mean 
lotto expenditure increases with household income at the left of the distribution before peaking 
at around an income of £900 per week (a gross household income of £46,800 p.a.) and then 
declining. Across the whole sample, the downward trend broadly applies over the rest of the 
income distribution, but amongst players there is a slight increase starting at very high levels 
of income around £1,500 per week. The percentage increase in lottery expenditure appears to 
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(b) Purchasing households only
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around £250 per week in both panels – tentatively indicating a small, or even negative, income 
elasticity. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates how the expenditure share on lotto declines with total expenditure. 
The natural logarithm of total expenditure is used on the x-axis for clarity. Since the sticker 
price of each ticket is fixed and equal to £1 in our sample period, the apparent “lines” declining 
from left to right coincide with those households who purchase a fixed number of tickets per 
week. This scatter plot gives a clearer indication that one should expect low, or perhaps 
negative, income elasticity estimates with the average expenditure share on lottery tickets 
declining, on average, everywhere across the total expenditure range. 
As with any research using data from population sampling, a final concern with the data 
is that of the response rate and possible non-response bias. Over the entire sample the response 
rate is 55% at the household level, though this declines over the sample period as is common 
with repeated socioeconomic surveys. Table 4.2 tabulates the number of households in the data 
and the household-level response rate for each year of data available. Figure 4.5 illustrates the 
sample size in each quarter of data available and that responses are distributed fairly uniformly 
throughout each year. The decreasing response rate evidenced in Table 4.2 is also apparent 
from the declining frequency of usable observations. Concerns about non-response bias are, 
however, allayed by there being no statistically significant difference in estimates when using 










Figure 4.3: Local polynomial fit (95% CI) of weekly lotto expenditure versus weekly 
gross normal income for the whole sample and purchasing households 
 
Note: data trimmed to exclude the upper and lower 1% of households by gross normal income 
Figure 4.4: Lottery expenditure versus log total expenditure (purchasing households 
only) 
 









































Table 4.2: Number of household-level observations and response rate for each year of 
EFS/LCF data available 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
n 5,606 7,041 7,018 6,855 6,696 6,645 6,136 
Response rate (%) 62 58 58 57 57 55 53 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 - 
n 5,843 5,822 5,263 5,551 5,473 5,116 - 
Response Rate (%) 51 50 50 54 52 48 - 
Figure 4.5: Number of household observations by quarter of data sample 
 
4.4 Estimation approach 
Due to the flat rate of tax imposed on lottery tickets in the UK, analysis of the tax 
incidence over the income distribution is equivalent to estimating the income elasticity of 
demand. This follows simply from the fact that the tax contributed by any given consumer is 
directly proportional to their expenditure. By far the most common approach in previous 
studies of the regressivity of lottery products using micro-level data is to estimate Engel curves 
in which the number of tickets purchased by an individual or household is linear in the level 
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when using micro-data – for example, Farrell and Walker (1999) include a squared income 
term – and aggregate-level studies only deviate by taking logs of the regressand. For 
comparative purposes, Section 4.6.1 briefly replicates this approach by estimating the 
functional form: 𝐸( = 𝑋(+𝛽 + 𝛾𝑌( + 𝜀( (4.1) 
where 𝐸( is expenditure by individual 𝑖 on lottery tickets, 𝑌( is some measure of income, and 𝑋( are controls for various demographic characteristics. Though clearly convenient, this naïve 
specification is deficient in both theoretical and empirical aspects.  
Although linear Engel curves as described in equation (4.1) will satisfy the additivity 
criterion – that income elasticities sum to 1 – when estimated as a set of all commodity groups, 
such functional forms are unnecessarily restrictive and only result from specific, and unlikely, 
utility functions (Pollak, 1971). Moreover, Leser (1963) notes that such a specification often 
produces negative expenditure values within the observed range of incomes and that changes 
in elasticity across the distribution are not consistent with economic theory (e.g. that the 
implied income elasticity of inferior goods increases with income). As a result, these models 
are typically ‘rejected’ by the data since they produce poor fit statistics and large estimated 
standard errors. 
The preferred model of this chapter is one in which the budget share of lottery tickets 
for a given individual, 𝑤( = 𝐸(/𝑌(	, is linear in log total expenditure, ln𝑌(, and estimates are 
presented in Section 4.6.2. This model was proposed by Working (1943) and later discussed 
by Leser (1963). The Working-Leser model is formally described as, 𝑤( = 𝑋(+𝛽 + 𝛾 ln𝑌( + 𝜀( (4.2) 
where 𝑋(+ are again controls for various demographic characteristics70, 𝛽 is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated, and 𝛾 is a parameter to be estimated describing the effect of log 
income, ln 𝑌(. Since 𝑤( is simply lottery expenditure divided by income, eliciting income 
elasticity of lottery tickets is trivial and given by 𝜂 = 1 + åæ. This model underpins the Almost 
                                               
70Experiments with the specification to include controls for the number of people in the household made 
very little difference to the resultant estimates of income elasticity. Estimates obtained using Heckman 
selection and double hurdle routines with household size controls are therefore relegated to Appendix 
Table A4.19. Accounting for household size with equivalised income resulted in smaller income 
elasticities than those already reported, some unbelievably so. 
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Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) which is often used 
with macro-level data to determine the income elasticities of broad commodity groups. The 
AIDS model is popular in the wider economics literature due, in part, to its derivation from 
consumer theory and the simple functional form.  
The model used here deviates from the AIDS specification only by omitting price 
information for three reasons. First, the inclusion of price is only indirectly relevant for 
investigating the relationship between expenditure on lottery tickets and income. Second, due 
the repeated cross-sectional nature of the data any draw-by-draw price variation, such as that 
arising from rollovers, for all observations in each 2-week diary window is the same. Thus, 
variation in observed expenditure resulting from a change in price can be easily captured using 
year-month fixed effects, which are employed throughout the analysis in Section 4.6. Third, 
this strategy also circumvents issues posed by the anonymization processes of the data which 
results in only the month of the diary being included. That is, even if there were some advantage 
to be gained from including draw-by-draw price as an explanatory variable in the model, doing 
so is impossible since the data are censored to protect the identity of respondents in such a way 
that it is not clear which are the relevant draws in the diary window. Using fixed effects for 
each month within the sample should sufficiently capture variation in expenditure caused by 
prices, and is unlikely to be improved upon by, say, including average price of lotto within 
each month which would hardly vary at all. By adopting the Working-Leser specification here, 
the literature on the income elasticity of lotto and the regressivity of its taxation is brought up 
to date with the broader economic studies of other goods such as carbon taxes (Brannlund and 
Nordstrom, 2004), alcohol (Gil and Molina, 2009), and comprehensive studies over several 
commodity groups (e.g. Banks et al 1997). 
The use of total expenditure, rather than income, on the right-hand side of equation 
(4.2) is common throughout the literature and respects a plausible two-stage budgeting process 
in which utility-maximising households first allocate disposable income between consumption 
and saving, then decide on the quantities of specific goods – in this case lottery tickets – to be 
consumed. Total expenditure then reflects the disposable income available to households in the 
current period. Moreover, reported gross or net incomes – particularly for those who are self-
employed – can vary significantly over the short and medium term. Total expenditure, 
meanwhile, can be seen as a measure of average (or expected) levels of income, thus providing 
a better measure of income in the long-run. 
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In Section 4.6.4 the assumption that budget share of lottery tickets is linear in log 
income is relaxed by estimating the following equation using semi-parametric estimation as 
described in Robinson (1988), 𝑤( = 𝑋(+𝛽 + 𝑓(ln 𝑌() + 𝜀( (4.3) 
in which 𝑓 is some unknown function. This agnostic methodology allows full flexibility in the 
possible shape of 𝑓. Moreover, following Hardle and Mammen (1993) it is possible to test 
whether the function 𝑓 can be sufficiently approximated using polynomial expansions of ln	 𝑌(. 
This essentially becomes a test of whether the functional form imposed by the Working-Leser 
specification in equation (4.2) is rejected by the data. 
4.5 Econometric issues 
Two principal empirical issues arise in the application of a Working-Leser model as 
defined in equation (4.2) to household-level data. The first is the presence of zeroes in 
expenditure data which would bias estimates obtained using OLS. The second is the 
endogeneity of total expenditure with budget shares of lottery tickets. 
4.5.1 The presence of zeroes in expenditure data 
As is common with demand studies which use micro-level data, the analysis here is 
complicated by non-purchasers of lottery tickets having their observed expenditure – and, by 
extension, their budget share – truncated at zero. For the present sample only 43% of 
households purchased a ticket for the UK National Lottery in the two-week diary window. 
Though significantly smaller than headline figures for annual participation (e.g. BGPS, 2010, 
estimates 59% of adults purchased tickets in the previous 12 months), the observed proportion 
of ticket buyers is broadly in-line with short-term estimates (e.g. in the past month) which 
ranges from 36% to 48% for participation in the previous four weeks (Gambling Commission, 
2017).  
Several empirical models exist to deal with such censored data. A simple solution is 
presented in Tobin (1958) – commonly known as the Tobit model – which estimates, 𝑤(∗ = 𝑋(+𝛽 + 𝛾 ln𝑌( + 𝜀( (4.4) 
where 𝑤(∗ is some latent variable (related to expenditure share of lottery tickets), 𝑋(, 𝑌(, 𝛽, and 𝛾 are defined as before and, 
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𝑤( = µ𝑤(∗	𝑖𝑓	𝑤(∗ > 00, otherwise . 	(4.5) 
Such a model can then be estimated using maximum likelihood and is easily implemented in 
most statistical software packages. However, when taken to expenditure data a potentially 
unpalatable implication of the Tobit model is that the regressors have the same effect on both 
the decision to purchase and the quantity purchased conditional on the former being true. For 
instance, the Tobit model implies that a change for a given level of income would have the 
same effect on both the probability of purchasing a lottery ticket and the number of lottery 
tickets to buy – which may not necessarily be the case. 
Section 4.6.2 presents estimates from two alternatives to the Tobit model to allow for 
the possibility that the regressors may have differing effects on the binary decision to purchase 
lotto tickets and, conditional on purchase, the quantity of tickets to buy. Heckman (1979) 
generalises the Tobit model by modelling selection in participation separately to the amount 
spent on lotto tickets. Specifically, the two-step model in the context of purchasing lottery 
tickets can be written as, 𝑤( = 𝑋(+ 𝛽 + 𝛾 ln𝑌( + 𝜀( (4.6) 
where 𝑤(, 𝑋(, 𝑌(, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are as previously defined and, Pr	(𝑤( > 0) = 𝑋y(+ 𝜓 + 𝜈( (4.7) 
where 𝜓 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝑋y( are variables which determine whether 
household 𝑖 purchased a lotto ticket. Heckman’s selection model further assumes the errors of 
the two equations in the model are jointly normally distributed such that, 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎) 𝜈~𝑁(0,1) 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀, 𝜈) = 𝜌. 
Equation (4.6) is again the budget share equation for lotto tickets and equation (4.7), estimated 
via probit, is the selection equation which determines whether 𝑤( is observed (i.e. whether 𝑤( > 0). Heckman’s selection model corrects for the bias, which arises because of unobserved 
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𝑤( being recorded as 0, by including the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio71, 𝜆, of the selection 
equation in 𝑋(. Heckman (1979) shows that the coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio is 𝜌𝜎 
and testing whether 𝜌𝜎 = 0 amounts to a test of whether the model could have been estimated 
using either the Tobit specification in equation (4.4) or via OLS as in equation (4.2). Implicit 
in Heckman’s methodology for correcting zero-induced bias is that when the dependent 
variable, 𝑤(, is recorded as zero, it is because of an inability to measure its true value and not 
because individual 𝑖 chose not to purchase any lotto tickets. The resulting estimates of 𝛽 and 𝛾 
can therefore be interpreted as the coefficients which would have been obtained had we been 
able to observe the true budget share of lottery tickets for all households.  
Identification of the Heckman selection model can be achieved in one of two ways. If 𝑋y is comprised of the set of all variables from the right-hand side of equation (4.6), 
identification relies on the functional form imposed by the Heckman model being correctly 
specified. Whilst convenient, relying on the functional form being correct for identification 
requires an appeal to theory for support and must, in essence, remain an unverifiable 
assumption. The second approach to identification – and the standard in the literature – calls 
for an exclusion restriction (Heckman, 1990). The model can be identified when 𝑋y also 
contains a variable which affects the probability of purchasing a lottery ticket, but not the 
budget share conditional on an affirmative response to the former. Importantly, the issue of 
identification here is purely a statistical one and, in some ways, the theoretical justifications 
for choosing one instrument, or set of instruments, over another are arguably less important 
than, say, for causal identification. Rather, it is the statistical properties – that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with the level of spend conditional on play but correlated with participation – that 
are most important.  
Nonetheless, the hypothesis underpinning the identification strategy employed here is 
that it exploits exogenous differences in individuals’ consumption which arise from religious 
practice. The obvious approach would be to include indicator variables for religion directly, 
however this is not recorded in the data. Instead, this chapter exploits the effects of religious 
practices on consumption – which is observable in expenditure data – to identify the Heckman 
selection model similar to Pryce (2016).  
                                               
71 The inverse Mill’s ratio for some random variable 𝑋 is defined as 𝜆(𝑋) = 𝜙(𝑋)/𝛷(𝑋) where 𝜙 and 𝛷 are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively.  
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To implement this idea, dummy variables are included which indicate whether 
household 𝑖 does not purchase any alcohol and/or pork in the two-week diary window in the 
selection equation. Islam – the second largest religion in England and Wales according to the 
2011 Census – prohibits gambling and the consumption of both alcohol and pork products. A 
non-purchasing household of lottery tickets who does so because the occupants practice Islam, 
for instance, would also not purchase alcohol or pork. Thus, if the identification strategy is 
correct, the coefficient on both these dummies should be negative when estimating equation 
(4.7). The need to use dummies for non-purchasers of both alcohol and pork, rather than just 
one, arises because of the effect on consumption preferences for followers of other religions. 
Judaism, for instance, which also prohibits the consumption of pork does not prohibit either 
gambling or alcohol consumption. This would then clearly increase one’s prior on the value of 
the coefficient on non-pork consumption in the selection equation, but it is unclear whether the 
increase would be large enough to cause the estimate to become positive. The confounding 
effect of multiple faiths being practiced in the population reduces the effectiveness of pork 
consumption alone as a variable with which to identify the Heckman selection model. It is 
possible, however, to capture the predicted differences in consumption from observing 
religious practice by including an interaction between alcohol and pork consumption. 
Therefore, if the proposed exclusion restriction is justified, the expectation is for a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term. If this is true, then it seems likely that this effect is driven 
primarily by households who do not purchase lottery tickets because of their religious belief.  
Table 4.3 compares the proportion of households who purchase lotto tickets between 
the purchasing and non-purchasing households of alcohol and pork. The proportions provide 
encouraging evidence that both alcohol and pork are correlated with the decision to purchase 
lotto tickets. Only 27.5% of households who did not purchase pork and alcohol purchased lotto 
tickets, compared with 51.6% of households that bought both pork and alcohol. Examination 
of the totals columns reveals that individually purchasing of pork or alcohol are themselves 
correlated with the purchase of lotto tickets as the identification strategy outlined above 
requires – albeit to a smaller extent. Only 35.6% of non-purchasers of pork bought a lotto ticket 
compared to 48.7% for those who did purchase pork, and 33.5% of non-alcohol households 
participated in lotto compared to 47.5% for alcohol purchasing households. 
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Table 4.3: Proportion of households who purchased lotto by whether they also 
purchased alcohol and pork 
 No Alcohol Bought Alcohol Total 



















Analogous to the assumptions required for an instrumental variables approach, the 
usefulness of religious belief, which is (imprecisely) observed here through the non-purchase 
of alcohol and pork, as an exclusion restriction to identify the Heckman selection model also 
relies on the assumption that it is uncorrelated with the level of play. That is, being Muslim 
should have no effect on the observed budget share of lottery tickets beyond the effect it has 
on the selection equation. If being Muslim meant a decreased (or increased) level of play, 
relative to non-Muslims, if they participated in lotto would preclude its usefulness as an 
exclusion restriction. Whilst there is no way to examine this directly – non-purchasers of lotto 
who also do not purchase pork or alcohol because of their religious belief necessarily do not 
reveal their expenditure if they were to play – Table 4.4 provides some evidence that the non-
purchase of pork and alcohol has no significant impact on lotto expenditure amongst those who 
do participate. Whilst expenditures on lotto are lowest for those households who purchase no 
pork or alcohol, the mean difference is small – only around £0.50 per week less than the sample 
average – and not statistically different from alcohol and/or pork purchasing households. 
Table 4.4: Mean expenditure on lotto by alcohol and pork consumption conditional on 
participation (s.d. in parentheses) 
 No Alcohol Bought Alcohol Total 





























There are, of course, other reasons why participation and expenditure on lotto may vary 
with alcohol and pork consumption. The most obvious is income, which is controlled for in the 
selection equation anyway, but others may well exist. Again, whilst the issue here is purely a 
statistical one, there may remain doubts over whether alcohol and pork consumption are 
sufficiently exogenous to consumption conditional on lotto participation to be used as an 
exclusion restriction. To help address this concern, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 present average 
lottery participation and expenditure conditional on play, respectively, by the purchase of two 
innocuous goods: poultry and potatoes72. The choice to use these two goods is entirely 
arbitrary; there are plenty of candidates which could have been used instead, and which produce 
the similar conclusions, since most items purchased are unlikely to correlate with lottery 
consumption on religious grounds.  
Table 4.5: Proportion of households who purchased lotto by whether they also 
purchased potato and poultry 
 No Potato Bought Potato Total 
No Poultry 0.379 0.408 0.394 
 n=19, 435 n=18,895 n=38,330 
Bought Poultry 0.478 0.460 0.465 
 n=12,334 n=28,401 n=40,735 
Total 0.417 0.439 0.430 
 n=31,769 n=47,296 n=79065 
Table 4.6: Mean expenditure on lotto by potato and poultry consumption conditional 
on participation (s.d. in parentheses) 
 No Potato Bought Potato Total 
No Poultry 4.158 4.214 4.187 
 (4.4666) (4.6647) (4.5689) 
 n=7,371 n=7,718 n=15,089 
Bought Poultry 4.393 4.358 4.369 
 (5.0427) (4.6459) (4.7727) 
 n=5,890 n=13,058 n=18,948 
Total 4.262 4.305 4.288 
 (4.7324) (4.6533) (4.6842) 
 n=13,261 n=20,776 n=34,037 
 
                                               
72 The need to use two innocuous goods here is due to the fact that comparing with alcohol or pork 
would still have effects on participation and expenditure induced by religious belief.  
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The relationship seen between lottery participation and pork and alcohol purchases is 
not repeated here. Whilst there is a slight reduction in the participation rate (8 percentage 
points) for households who purchase neither poultry nor potatoes versus those who buy both, 
this is far from the difference seen with pork and alcohol non-purchasers (24 percentage 
points). Similarly, there appears to be no correlation between poultry and pork purchasing and 
lottery expenditure, conditional on play. As such, the choice to use pork and alcohol purchase 
as the exclusion restriction in estimating the Heckman selection model seems reasonably robust 
based on the religious arguments above and these descriptive statistics.  
Alternative candidates to the proposed identification strategy may consider exploiting 
the, perhaps more obvious, correlations between lotto play and other risky behaviours such as 
other gambling expenditure, smoking, alcohol consumption. Such a simple argument would 
almost certainly be correlated with lottery participation and such relationships are well 
documented in the economics literature. Griffiths et al (2010) is one such example using BGPS 
2007 data that finds positive correlations between gambling behaviour and smoking and 
alcohol consumption. Griffiths and Sutherland (1998) highlights the correlation between 
(underage) gambling on the UK National Lottery or scratchcards and smoking, drug use, 
alcohol consumption, and other ‘undesirable’ behaviour73 in adolescents. Indeed, correlations 
in such consumption data fit with the notion of ‘risky’ or ‘addictive’ personality traits. An 
alternative to using consumption altogether, if such data existed alongside lotto expenditure 
and income, might well be to include any manner of risk-seeking indicators.  
However, whilst the correlation between all of these candidate identification strategies 
and lotto participation is well founded, this rationale would undoubtedly not satisfy the second 
criteria for statistical identification: that consumption of these goods (by any measure) on the 
grounds that lotto players’ exhibit an increased propensity for risk seeking behaviour more 
generally would be uncorrelated with the level of lotto play conditional on participation.  
Whilst the use of alcohol alone is ill-advised for the reasons set out above, the approach 
employed here relies on its interaction with pork consumption, and that this effect is induced 
by exogenous differences in preferences arising from religions practice. Therefore, in the 
absence of a more obvious and robust identification candidate (or set of candidates), and 
encouraged by the evidence in Tables 4.3 to 4.6, this chapter pursues the use of (non-
                                               
73 Contact with the police, suspension from school and failing at school.  
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)consumption of pork and alcohol for identification of the Heckman and double-hurdle models 
outlined above.  
The final econometric model considered in this paper to handle zeroes in the 
expenditure data is the double-hurdle model proposed by Cragg (1971). Comparing estimates 
from the Heckman selection model with Cragg’s double-hurdle model addresses directly the 
concerns raised in Humphreys, Lee and Soebbing (2010) who argue that the Heckman selection 
model is inappropriate with micro-level data if zeroes are observed, not because of an inability 
to observe the true value of 𝑤(, but because the purchase of lottery tickets is infrequent. Cragg’s 
double-hurdle model used in the present context can be written as, 𝑤( = 𝛿(𝑤(∗ (4.8) 
where 𝑤( is the observed expenditure share of lottery tickets for household 𝑖, 𝑤(∗ is the latent 
variable related to the budget share of lottery tickets which behaves as a conventional Tobit, 𝑤(∗ = 𝑋(+ 𝛽 + 𝛾 ln𝑌( + 𝜀( (4.9) 
and the participation variable, 𝛿(, is defined as, 
𝛿( = µ1,	if	𝑋y(𝜓 + 𝜈 > 00,	otherwise								 . (4.10) 
Again, the double-hurdle model presents a generalisation of the Tobit model but differs 
in its approach in dealing with the presence of zeroes in the data compared to the Heckman 
selection model. Whereas Heckman’s selection model first estimates the selection equation and 
uses the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio to correct for bias in the second-stage participation 
equation, Cragg’s double hurdle estimation routine estimates equations (4.9) and (4.10) 
simultaneously. Moreover, whilst the Heckman selection model implies that zeroes are present 
because of an unobservable response, the double-hurdle model instead assumes that 𝑤( is only 
observed if both 𝑤(∗ > 0 and 𝛿( = 0. This means another way to express equation (4.8) would 
be to say,  
𝑤( = µ𝑤(∗, 𝑖𝑓		𝑤(∗ > 0		and	𝛿( > 0,0, otherwise.																										 	 (4.11) 
Therefore, for some positive value of the budget share of lotto tickets to be observed requires 
a positive outcome of both the participation decision (equation 4.10) and the consumption 
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decision (equation 4.9), giving rise to the name “double-hurdle”. This implies that observing 
zeroes occurs a result of household 𝑖 choosing not to consume lotto tickets, rather than their 
choice of budget share being unobservable (Perez and Humphreys, 2013).  
Finally, as a two-stage estimation routine, the use of a double hurdle model experiences 
the same identification issues as the Heckman selection model. Humphreys, Lee and Soebbing 
(2010) note that whilst not explicitly required, an exclusion restriction is common practice in 
the existing literature in the application of double hurdle models. This identification issue can 
be overcome in the same way as for the Heckman selection model – by including dummy 
variables for the non-purchase of alcohol and pork to the vector of variables 𝑋y in the selection 
equation defined in equation (4.10). 
4.5.2 Endogeneity of total expenditure 
The final econometric issue to be dealt with is the endogeneity between (log) total 
expenditure, 𝑌(, and the budget share of lottery tickets which is necessarily defined as 𝑤( =𝐸(/𝑌(. This specification clearly induces a simultaneity bias since the expenditure share of lotto 
tickets is itself a function of total expenditure and precludes a causal interpretation on the effect 
of income on lottery expenditure from estimates obtained via basic methodologies. A common 
solution to this endogeneity problem is to employ an instrumental variables approach and this 
paper follows the standard set in previous literature (e.g. De Agostini, 2014, Farrell and 
Shields, 2007, Banks et al, 1997) by using gross total income as an instrument for log total 
expenditure.  
The validity of total income as an instrument relies on two conditions. First, the 
instrument must be correlated with the endogenous regressor, a condition which is easily 
verified using the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb that an F-test statistic of the 
significance of the instrument coefficients in the first-stage exceeds 10. Second, the instrument 
must also only affect the dependent variable of interest – the budget share of lottery tickets – 
via its effect on the endogenous regressor. However, in the just identified case – where the 
number of instrumental variables equals the number of endogenous regressors as there are here 
– it is not a testable condition and must remain be an article of faith. The validity of gross 
income as an instrument, in particular satiating this second condition, requires an appeal to 
theory and the two-stage budgeting process described in Gorman (1959) in which households 
first divide their gross income between broad categories of goods (including savings), before 
deciding on shares of those budgets to be allocated on individual products in a second stage. 
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As explained in De Agostini (2014) total income will therefore be highly correlated with total 
expenditure as part of the first-stage of this budgeting process but exogenous to the specific 
good (in this case, lottery tickets) in the second stage. 
4.6 Results 
The estimation results are presented as follows. Section 4.6.1 covers estimates of the 
naïve linear model presented in equation (4.1). Though this model is largely inappropriate 
when taken to the data for reasons outlined above, it is included here to allow for comparisons 
to be made with results from previous studies. Section 4.6.2 presents estimates of the Working-
Leser specification as presented in equation (4.2) onwards. Section 4.6.3 presents Suits’ 
(1977a) index for the regressivity of lotto taxation and compares this index for each year of 
data available to asses any possible changes in the regressivity of these taxes over time. Finally, 
Section 4.6.4 presents non- and semi-parametric explorations of the appropriateness of the 
Working-Leser functional form. 
4.6.1 Linear expenditure model estimates 
In order to directly compare income elasticity estimates – and therefore whether lottery 
duty is regressive – with the existing literature, Table 4.7 presents estimates from a linear 
expenditure model as described in equation (4.1). Here, weekly expenditure on lotto tickets is 
the dependent variable and is assumed to be linear in weekly total expenditure as the measure 
of income, controls for the sex, age, employment status and education level of the HRP, region, 
and month-year fixed effects. 
Estimates from OLS and Tobit estimation of the linear expenditure model in Table 4.7 
are strikingly similar to those in Farrell and Walker (1999) whose study of the UK game was 
taken before there was sufficient data available from the Family Expenditure Survey – the 
predecessor to the Expenditure and Food Survey used here. Their estimates using survey data 
gathered on behalf of the Office of the National Lottery (OFLOT) produced income elasticity 
estimates of 0.27 and 0.45 using OLS and Tobit estimation, respectively, suggesting that lottery 
tickets are a normal good, and that the flat-rate tax is indeed regressive. The estimates here 
present an income elasticity of 0.22 when using OLS. When using Tobit estimation to correct 
for bias induced by zeroes in the data, the income elasticity estimate doubles to 0.46, still 
indicative of a regressive tax. In both cases, a positive coefficient on total expenditure suggest 
that expenditure on lotto tickets increases with income – though it is unclear whether this is  
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Table 4.7: OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (4.1) 
  (1) (2) 
 OLS Tobit 
Dependent Variable 𝐸( 𝐸( 
    
Total Expenditure (/1000) 0.921*** 1.924 *** 
 (0.0633) (0.1269) 
Female HRP -0.457*** -1.043*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0594) 
Age HRP 0.030*** 0.067*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0028) 
Self-employed -0.332*** -1.144*** 
 (0.0557) (0.1126) 
Unemp. seeking work -0.588*** -1.831*** 
 (0.0646) (0.1845) 
Unemp about to work -0.184 -1.269 
 (0.4507) (1.0668) 
Sick -0.533*** -1.540*** 
 (0.0610) (0.1283) 
Retired -1.122*** -2.803*** 
 (0.0530) (0.1074) 
Unoccupied -0.544*** -2.027*** 
 (0.0513) (0.1398) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.676*** -1.579*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0791) 
Left Education 18+ -1.364*** -3.902*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0905) 
Constant 1.829*** -0.722** 
 (0.1580) (0.3238) 
Income Elasticity 0.222*** 0.464*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0306) 
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 78,867 78,867 
R-squared 0.053 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Omitted categories: Male 
HRP, employee, left education before 17, North East. Regional controls 
omitted for brevity. Income elasticity calculated as 𝜂 = 𝛾 ∗ ïXðX where 𝛾 is the 
coefficient on log total expenditure,  𝑌X is mean total expenditure in 
thousands, and  𝐸X is mean expenditure on lottery tickets. Full estimates are 
presented in Appendix Table A4.12. 
 
due to increased participation or higher expenditures amongst those who would participate at 
lower incomes. The OLS estimate of income elasticity also matches the upper bound of Spiro 
(1974) from a study of the Pennsylvania state lottery in the 1970s. The Tobit estimate from 
Table 4.7 is in-line with the implied estimate from Humphreys, Lee and Soebbing (2010) of 
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0.40, but is significantly smaller than the elasticities obtained by Kitchen and Powells (1991), 
0.70-0.92, in their respective studies of Canadian lotteries. 
There is little difference in the coefficients of demographic controls when comparing 
between OLS and Tobit estimates of the linear expenditure model. Households with a Female 
HRP spend significantly less than their Male HRP counterparts, as do those whose HRP’s 
employment status is anything other than an employee or about to start work. Increasing levels 
of education for the HRP – as determined by years of schooling – also correlates with lower 
spending on lotto tickets. These estimates are consistent with the existing literature on the 
demographic profile of gamblers, even though the demographics used here are only those of 
the HRP.  
As discussed in Section 4.4, however, these results should be treated with caution due 
to the deficiencies associated with the assumed functional form. Notably, the estimated R-
squared resulting from this model is characteristically low and concurrent with previous studies 
using such a specification – making the estimates unreliable and effectively rejected by the 
data. Moreover, naively estimating Equation (4.1) via OLS and Tobit ignores the endogeneity 
which necessarily arises from lottery expenditure being a component of total expenditure, and 
the questionable assumption of Tobit estimation that the regressors have the same effect on 
expenditure and participation. The use of instrumental variables and alternative statistical 
models such as Heckman selection and double-hurdle routines have been employed by 
previous literature in this setting, as discussed in Section 4.2. Results from these methodologies 
typically estimate income elasticity to be smaller than those obtained from OLS or Tobit, 
indicating that the latter are understating the regressivity of taxation on lotto. 
4.6.2 Working-Leser model estimates 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.8 present OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (4.2) and act as 
baseline results for which direct comparisons can be made with the income elasticity estimates 
of the linear expenditure model in Table 4.7. Using the naïve OLS and Tobit methods, we find 
income elasticities significantly larger than those under the linear expenditure model at 0.68 
and 1.03, respectively. Similar to the estimates presented in the previous section, the Tobit 
coefficient on log total expenditure (0.158) is significantly larger than OLS (-1.859), and is not 
statistically different from 0. The OLS estimates imply that as income increases, the 
expenditure share on lotto decreases and would unambiguously render a flat-rate tax on lotto 
as regressive – as is supported by an income elasticity of 0.675. The coefficient estimate 
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obtained by Tobit (0.158) is not statistically different from 0, however, and implies that the 
budget share of lotto tickets is constant across the income distribution suggesting a flat rate of 
tax on lotto is proportional. This is again supported by the estimated income elasticity of 1.03 
and not being statistically different to 1. Under the Working-Leser model, the control 
coefficients yield similar conclusions about the profile of lottery players. Having a female, non-
employee and better educated HRP are all correlated with a lower expenditure share of lottery 
tickets in all specifications presented in Table 4.8. 
However, the estimates in columns 1 and 2 are still unreliable for making inference 
about the income elasticity – and therefore the regressivity of taxation – of lottery tickets. 
Column 3 re-estimates equation (2) using two-stage least-squares (2SLS) in order to correct 
for the simultaneity bias that arises from the functional form of the Working-Leser model. Log 
total expenditure is instrumented using gross income and the results of the first stage of this 
procedure are contained in Appendix Table A4.1474. The resulting coefficient on log income 
is significantly larger in magnitude at -2.35 and the resultant income elasticity of 0.589 suggests 
a higher level of regressivity from taxation than the estimates obtained via OLS. The IV Tobit 
estimates in column 4 highlight even further the need to account for simultaneity bias than do 
the regular 2SLS estimates. Similar to the 2SLS comparison with OLS, the IV Tobit estimate 
of the coefficient on log total expenditure (-3.358) is significantly smaller than the un-
instrumented version in column 2, and much more so than with 2SLS. Moreover, the 
corresponding estimate of income elasticity is smaller still at 0.412. 
The final deficiency of the above estimates is addressed with the results in Table 4.9 
which presents estimates of the Working-Leser specification using both Heckman’s selection 
routine and Cragg’s double-hurdle estimator. Both have advantages over the Tobit estimates 
in Table 4.8 since, in both models, the regressors are free to have differing effects on both the 
decision to purchase decision and the expenditure decision when a consumer considers the 
purchase of a lottery ticket. Throughout the remaining analysis log total expenditure is 
                                               
74 As discussed in Section 4.5.2, in order for the instrumental variables technique to be valid two 
conditions must be satisfied: gross income must be correlated with the endogenous regressor, log total 
expenditure, and uncorrelated with the budget share of lotto. Whilst the latter condition must remain an 
article of faith in this just-identified case, the former is clearly satisfied following the Staiger and Stock 
(1997) rule that the first-stage F-statistic be greater than 10 is easily satisfied with the reported F-statistic 
of 68.67. The coefficient on total income in the first stage is both positive and significant at the 1% 
level and the R-squared is predictably large at 0.47 thus there is no concern about a possible weak 
instrument problem. 
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instrumented using gross normal income with the estimates from Table A4.14 as is done in the 
IV columns of Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (4.2) using un-instrumented and 
instrumented log total expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit IV (2SLS) IV Tobit 
Dependent Variable 𝑤( 𝑤( 𝑤( 𝑤( 
      
Ln(Total Expenditure) (/1000) -1.859*** 0.158 -2.350*** -3.358*** 
 (0.0848) (0.1558) (0.0955) (0.6485) 
Female HRP -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Age HRP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Self-employed -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Unemp. seeking work -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.005*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Unemp. about to work -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0035) 
Sick 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.004*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
Retired -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.008*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Unoccupied -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.006*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Left Education 18+ -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.011*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Constant 0.018*** -0.002 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0040) 
Income Elasticity 0.675*** 1.028*** 0.589*** 0.412*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0273) (0.0167) (0.1135) 
     
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st Stage F-Statistic - - 65.264*** 65.264*** 
Observations 78,867 78,867 78,867 78,867 
R-squared 0.073 - 0.072 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level, respectively. Demographic controls omitted from reporting for brevity. For full estimates see 
Appendix Table A4.13. In all columns ln(total expenditure) is divided by 1000 to allow coefficients 
to be legible. Income elasticity is calculated as 𝜂 = 1 + [𝛾/(1000 ∗ 0.00571)	]	where 𝛾 is the 
coefficient on log total expenditure and 0.00571 is the mean expenditure share of lottery tickets. 
Columns 3 and 4 have ln(total expenditure)/1000 instrumented by gross income. The first stage is 
available in Appendix Table A4.14. Columns 2 and 4 are estimated by maximum likelihood. Omitted 
categories: Male HRP, employee, left education before 17, North East. 
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Since they are identical, column 1 of Table 4.9 presents points estimates from the 
selection equation for both the Heckman selection and double hurdle routines. The dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if household 𝑖 purchased a lottery ticket and 0 otherwise and is 
estimated for both the Heckman selection and double hurdle models using probit. Column 2 
presents the marginal effects of the second stage equation for the Heckman selection estimation 
– the parameters of interest from equation (4.6). Column 3 concludes with the marginal effects 
of from the second stage of the double hurdle model – equation (4.9).  
In the selection equation, the inclusion of dummies for no alcohol and no pork 
consumption and an interaction term form the identification strategy appears justified since, as 
expected, the coefficients are all negative and highly significant. This is consistent with the 
identification strategy set out in Section 4.5.1 and can be explained using the hypothesis of 
exogenous differences in consumption behaviour arising from religious practice. These 
dummies and the interaction term are omitted from the second-stages in columns 2 and 3 as 
the identifying exclusion restriction. Though negative, the point estimate of the income 
coefficient in the selection equation is insignificant suggesting that income plays no role in the 
purchase decision of households. This finding is consistent with that of Humphreys, Lee, and 
Soebbing (2010). Interestingly, point estimates of the coefficients on the demographic controls 
in the selection equation mirror those presented in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. The significance 
and direction of coefficients indicate households with female, educated, and non-employee 
HRPs are less likely to even participate in the UK lotto than their counterparts in the omitted 
categories. 
Column 2 reports the marginal effects of the variables of interest from equation (4.6) 
of the Heckman selection model. There is a negative and highly significant relationship 
between income and the budget share of lottery tickets – suggesting that separating the 
estimation of purchase decision and expenditure decision is justified. The implied income 
elasticity of -0.629, is considerably lower than existing estimates. These Heckman estimates 
imply that lottery tickets are inferior goods, a novel finding for the literature, and would suggest 
that the regressivity of lotto taxation is more severe than previously thought. Demographic 
effects are all of the same direction as in the selection equation suggesting that individuals in 
the demographics identified above are not only less likely to purchase lottery tickets but also 
to spend less conditional on participation. The significant and positive coefficient on the 
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Table 4.9: Heckman selection and double hurdle selection equation estimates and 
consumption equation marginal effects of the Working-Leser model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Selection Equation Heckman Double Hurdle 
        
No Alcohol -0.298*** - - 
 (0.0143)   
No Pork -0.198*** - - 
 (0.0115)   
No Alcohol * No Pork -0.077*** - - 
 (0.0204)   
Ln(Total Expenditure) /1000 -24.832 -9.640*** -32.165*** 
 (18.1572) (0.4238) (8.6294) 
Female HRP -0.123*** -0.003*** -0.062*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0002) (0.0052) 
Age HRP 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
Self Employed -0.236*** -0.002*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0004) (0.0085) 
Unemp. (Seeking work) -0.313*** -0.004*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0008) (0.0166) 
Unemp. (About to work) -0.287* 0.000 -0.137* 
 (0.1607) (0.0035) (0.0750) 
Sick -0.274*** -0.003*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0005) (0.0120) 
Retired -0.451*** -0.005*** -0.217*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0004) (0.0087) 
Unoccupied -0.375*** -0.004*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0006) (0.0113) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.241*** -0.003*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0003) (0.0064) 
Left Education 18+ -0.601*** -0.006*** -0.275*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0004) (0.0060) 
Constant 0.625*** - - 
 (0.1258)   
Income Elasticity - -0.687*** -1.424** 
  (0.0742) (0.6503) 𝜆 - 0.011*** - 
  (0.0007)  
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Month-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78,867 78,867 78,867 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level, respectively. Regional controls omitted from reporting for brevity. For full estimates see 
Appendix Table A4.15. In all columns ln(total expenditure) is divided by 1000 to allow coefficients 
to be legible. Income elasticity is calculated as 𝜂 = 1 + [𝛾/(1000 ∗ 0.00571)], where 𝛾 is the 
coefficient on log total expenditure and 0.00571 is the mean expenditure share of lottery tickets. The 
first stage is available in Appendix Table A4.14. Columns 2 and 4 are estimated by maximum 
likelihood. Omitted categories: Male HRP, employee, left education before 17, North East. 
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inverse Mill’s ratio, 𝜆, is further evidence that these estimates should be preferred over those 
obtained via Tobit and that the purchase equation and expenditure equation are positively 
correlated, as one would expect. 
To allow examination of the arguments of Humphreys, Lee, and Soebbing (2010), that 
the Heckman selection model is inappropriate in the context of lotteries because of infrequent 
participation, column 3 presents the marginal effects of the second stage from Cragg’s (1971) 
double hurdle procedure. When compared with estimates on column 2, there is little qualitative 
difference between the two methods for all covariates. Income is again negatively related to 
expenditure on lottery tickets, demographic controls broadly have the same effects, and the 
resultant income elasticity estimate again suggests lotteries are in fact inferior goods and that 
flat-rate taxes are highly regressive. Quantitatively, however, the marginal effect of income on 
the expenditure share of lottery tickets is over three times larger at -32.165 and the estimated 
income elasticity is over twice as large at -1.424 and, though not as well determined as in 
column 2, is still significant at the 5% level. The theoretical superiority of the double hurdle 
model to handle infrequent purchases – as is likely the case with lottery tickets – makes -1.424 
the preferred income elasticity estimate and suggests that the estimate of -0.629 from Heckman 
estimation is an upper bound. 
4.6.3 Suits’ index 
With all estimates presented indicating that the flat-rate of taxation of lottery tickets is 
regressive, the natural question is to ask how regressive are such taxes? As described in Section 
4.2, Suits (1977a) proposes a simple, nonparametric index, 𝑆, ranging from -1 for extreme 
regressivity to +1 for extreme progressivity of taxes, with 0 denoting a perfectly proportional 
tax. Graphically, Suits’ index for lotteries using the present data can be derived from Figure 
4.6. This plots the accumulated percent of income, sorted by the income of each household, on 
the x-axis against accumulated percent of lotto tax paid on the y-axis. Then, defining the area 
beneath the solid line which plots this relationship from the data as 𝐿, and the area beneath the 
45-degree dashed line as 𝐾 – which represents a perfectly proportional tax – Suits’ index is 
simply 𝑆 = 1 − ó. When 𝐿 > 𝐾, as is the case here, this index is clearly less than 0 and the 
lottery tax is defined as regressive. The area 𝐾 is trivially 0.5, and the estimate of L using 
numerical integration with the present data is 0.679, giving a Suits’ of -0.357 which lies towards 
the lower end of the range of previous estimates. Only Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) and 
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Clotfelter and Cook (1987) estimated a lower Suits’ index than the one reported here at -0.46 
and -0.48 in their respective studies of US lotteries. 
Figure 4.6: Graphical representation of Suits' index of tax incidence for the UK lotto 
 
The long time span which is covered by the data gives the unique opportunity to 
examine whether lotteries have become more regressive over time. Table 4.10 presents Suits’ 
index estimates for each year of the available data. There appears to be little difference between 
the estimates for each year with the least regressive year occurring in 2002 (𝑆 = −0.3319) and 
the most regressive year in 2005 (𝑆 = −0.3739). 
 
Table 4.10: Suits' index estimates for each year of available data 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Suits’ -0.3599 -0.3319 -0.3594 -0.3369 -0.3739 -0.3610 -0.3456 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
All years 
Suits’ -0.3681 -0.3299 -0.3561 -0.3424 -0.3076 -0.3367 -0.3574 
 
4.6.4 Semi-parametric estimation of the Working-Leser model 
Finally, this section returns to the Working-Leser model considered above but relaxes 
the assumption that the budget share of lotto tickets is log linear in total expenditure. Instead, 
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a completely agnostic approach is taken towards the functional form by allowing the data to 
dictate the shape of the Engel curve using semi-parametric estimation. This is accomplished 
by using Robinson’s (1988) semi-parametric routine75 to estimate equation (4.3), 𝑤( = 𝑋(+𝛽 + 𝑓(ln 𝑌() + 𝜀(. 
Robinson’s estimator ensures consistent estimation of 𝛽 and estimates the unknown function, 𝑓, using kernel density estimation. Blundell et al (1998) and Blundell and Powell (2003) show 
that when the non-parametric component is endogenous, instrumental variables techniques can 
be employed and the residuals of this first-stage are to be included in the parametric component 
of equation (4.3). Therefore, the endogeneity of log total expenditure is controlled for by 
instrumenting with gross normal income and using the residuals from the estimates presented 
in Appendix Table A4.14. Following the standard notation for this procedure, these residuals, 𝜈( from the first stage are included in the semi-parametric regression as, 𝑤( = 𝑋(+𝛽 + 𝑓(ln 𝑌() + 𝜌𝜈( + 𝜀( (4.12) 
and 𝜌, the coefficient on these residuals, is estimated as part of the parametric component. 
Table 4.11 presents estimates of the parametric component of equation (4.12), 𝛽 and 𝜌. The 
effects of the control variables on the budget share of lotto using the Robinson’s semi-
parametric estimator are considerably smaller than all parametric models estimated above.  
Though the sex, education level, and some employment statuses of the HRP affect the 
budget share allocated to lotto in the same direction as previous models, these estimates suggest 
that having an unemployed or sick HRP increases the budget share for lotto, albeit by a small 
amount. The significant, though also small, coefficient on the residuals from the first-stage 
regression indicates that estimating equation (4.3) without instrumenting log total expenditure 
would yield biased estimates, thus the instrumental variables process and the inclusion of these 
residuals here is justified. The solid line in Figure 4.7 is the estimate of the non-parametric 
component, 𝑓, of equation (4.12) and the shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval. Due 
to the large dataset used here, this confidence interval is unsurprisingly small for much of the 
total expenditure range. The figure is trimmed to exclude the top and bottom 1% of households 
by total expenditure to allow the graph to be legible – though these observations were included 
                                               
75 This routine is identical to that used in Chapter 0 and a more detailed description of the procedure is 
available in Section 3.10.3. 
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in the estimation process. The estimated budget share of lotto over the distribution is indicated 
on the left-hand y-axis. Superimposed in Figure 4.7 is a histogram of household weekly total 
expenditure which corresponds to the right-hand y-axis. 
Table 4.11: Parametric component of semi-parametric estimation of the Working-Leser 
model for lotto demand 
 (1) 
Dependent Variable 𝑤( 
  
Female HRP -0.001*** 
 (0.0001) 
Age HRP 0.000*** 
 (0.0000) 
Self Employed -0.001*** 
 (0.0001) 
Unemp. (seeking work) 0.001*** 
 (0.0003) 








Left Education 17-18 -0.003*** 
 (0.0001) 




  𝜌 -0.041*** 
 (0.0027) 
Month-Year Effects Yes 
Observations 78,867 
R-squared 0.044 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
Omitted categories: Male HRP, employee, left education 
before 17, North East. 𝜌 is the coefficient on residuals from 
instrumenting log total expenditure with gross income as in 
Appendix Table A4.14. 
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Figure 4.7: Semi-parametric estimate of lotto budget share against log total 
expenditure with distribution of households by log total expenditure 
 
Moving from left to right across the total expenditure distribution, the estimated non-
parametric component, f, rises until a log weekly expenditure of around 5 (which translates to 
£148 per week). The peak in lotto budget share occurs at a level of total expenditure which is 
considerably lower than the average as shown by the superimposed distribution of total 
expenditure. The fitted relationship between lotto budget share and log total expenditure falls 
rapidly after this peak over the remainder of the distribution – furthering the conclusions drawn 
from the parametric estimates that the budget share of lotto declines with higher levels of 
income and the lotto taxes are regressive. 
Hardle and Mammen (1993) provide a test of the fitted relationship between the budget 
share of lotto tickets and log total expenditure against a parametric fit of any degree polynomial 
of the latter. This test evaluates whether the fitted budget share of lotto tickets from the semi-
parametric routine is statistically different from that of a given polynomial expansion, i.e. 
whether the parametric fit is a sufficiently close approximation of the underlying relationship. 
It is not surprising upon examination of the fitted function in Figure 4.7 that this test rejects the 
linear specification of the Working-Leser model, and even  specifications which are quadratic 
and cubic in log total expenditure. Nonetheless, the Working-Leser model which forms the 
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basis of the parametric estimates presented in Section 4.6.2 has a more substantial theoretical 
underpinning than the linear expenditure model favoured by the existing lotto literature, 
indicating that the estimates contained in this chapter are still both an improvement and 
important. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Despite their notoriously low return rates, lotteries are one of the most popular forms 
of gambling enjoyed not just in the UK but around the world. Their usefulness as a means of 
raising public finance when it is otherwise difficult to do so has meant that many games are 
either operated directly, or have their operation licensed, by the state. However, unlike many 
other goods subjected to so-called “sin taxes”, there is little-to-no supporting evidence that 
playing lotto games generates any externality or is in some way otherwise harmful to the 
individual. Without a supporting paternalistic ‘moral high ground’ argument – and assuming 
one of the objectives of government is maintain a progressive tax structure – the question of 
whether, and to what extent, a high rate of tax imposed on such games is regressive becomes 
an important one.  
This chapter has sought to answer this question by estimating a Working-Leser demand 
function for lottery tickets using household-level data.  Since taxes on the UK lotto are constant, 
the question of whether taxes are regressive, proportional, or progressive can be answered by 
determining whether the income elasticity of demand for lotto tickets is less than, equal to, or 
greater than one, respectively. The preferred estimates of this chapter yield headline estimates 
of the income elasticity for lotto between -1.4 and -0.7. These estimates are significantly lower 
than those in the existing literature, and well below the critical value of +1 for proportionality 
in taxes. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the only estimate in the literature that 
indicates lotteries are actually inferior goods. Such low income elasticity estimates therefore 
suggest that lotto taxes are significantly more regressive than previously thought. This 
conclusion is supported by a Suits’ index estimate of -0.36, lower than any other study that also 
calculates an income elasticity and only exceeded by early estimates for lotteries in the US.  
Using a Working-Leser demand specification provides an improvement upon the 
existing literature surrounding the income elasticity of lotto and the regressivity of lotto 
taxation. Previous studies exclusively use naïve models of demand in which the level of 
expenditure is some function – typically linear – of income. In the wider economics literature, 
this model has been criticised for its lack of foundation in microeconomic theory and is, at best, 
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merely an approximation of the true relationship between income and expenditure. Section 
4.6.2 briefly replicates this approach and the resultant estimates are, unsurprisingly, very 
similar to those of the existing literature, estimating income elasticity to be between 0.22 and 
0.46. Whilst they would still imply that lotto taxes are regressive, these naïve estimates 
understate the regressivity of such taxes and contrary to the Working-Leser estimates, class 
lotto as normal goods, rather than inferior.  
Household-level expenditure data presents a number of econometric issues, primarily 
the presence of zeroes in lotto expenditure which would bias coefficient estimates from OLS. 
Moreover, the simplest approach to correcting for this bias, using a Tobit model, is undesirable 
because the independent variables are likely to have different effects on whether a given 
household participates in lotto and the level of play conditional on participation. The use of 
Heckman’s selection model and Cragg’s double-hurdle model overcomes this issue with Tobit 
by allowing the independent variables to affect the participation and consumption decisions 
separately, but their two-stage nature present identification issues of their own. This chapter 
deals with the identification of these models by exploiting differences in consumption 
behaviour which arises because of religious belief – namely, the identification strategy uses 
alcohol and pork consumption as an exclusion restriction. It is from these models which the 
headline estimates of income elasticity are obtained. 
Such a large difference between the income elasticity estimates presented here and 
those in the existing literature highlights the importance of correctly specifying the model used 
when investigating the relationship between lottery expenditure and income. Moreover, despite 
its popularity in economics literature and theoretical foundations, the Working-Leser model 
favoured here still imposes a strict (log-linear) functional form on the relationship between 
income and the budget share of lotto tickets. Thus, as the final contribution of this chapter, 
Robinson’s semi-parametric estimator has been employed in which the budget share of lotto is 
fully flexible in its relationship to income – allowing the data to dictate the shape of this 
function. Thanks to the large dataset used here, this estimator is well determined and shows 
clearly that the effect of income on lotto consumption varies substantially over the income 
distribution. Testing against this fully flexible specification reveals that parametric fits of 
polynomial expansions up to cubic in log income are statistically different. Nonetheless, the 
Working-Leser model estimates presented here offer a novel finding for the literature and 
indicate that lotto taxes are even more regressive than previously thought. This is supported 
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with an estimate of Suits’ regressivity index of -0.36, far lower than any previous estimate for 




4.8.1 Lottery expenditure by demographic characteristics 
Figure A4.8: Mean weekly household lotto expenditure by HRP employment status for 
the full sample and purchasing households 
 
Figure A4.9: Mean weekly household lotto expenditure by region for the whole sample 























































































































































































Figure A4.10: Mean weekly household lotto expenditure by age HRP left education for 










































Age HRP Left Education
(b) Purchasing households
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4.8.2 Full coefficient estimates 
Table A4.12: Full OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (4.1) 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: E 𝐸( 
   
Total Expenditure 0.921*** 1.924*** 
 (0.0633) (0.1269) 
Female HRP -0.457*** -1.043*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0594) 
Age HRP 0.030*** 0.067*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0028) 
Self-employed -0.332*** -1.144*** 
 (0.0557) (0.1126) 
Unemp. seeking work -0.588*** -1.831*** 
 (0.0646) (0.1845) 
Unemp about to work -0.184 -1.269 
 (0.4507) (1.0668) 
Sick -0.533*** -1.540*** 
 (0.0610) (0.1283) 
Retired -1.122*** -2.803*** 
 (0.0530) (0.1074) 
Unoccupied -0.544*** -2.027*** 
 (0.0513) (0.1398) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.676*** -1.579*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0791) 
Left Education 18+ -1.364*** -3.902*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0905) 
North West -0.567*** -1.258*** 
 (0.0809) (0.1497) 
Merseyside -0.361*** -0.746*** 
 (0.1058) (0.1953) 
Yorks. and Humber -0.549*** -1.230*** 
 (0.0813) (0.1502) 
East Midlands -0.689*** -1.651*** 
 (0.0829) (0.1557) 
West Midlands -0.525*** -1.316*** 
 (0.0855) (0.1539) 
East of England -0.727*** -1.899*** 
 (0.0833) (0.1553) 
London -0.794*** -2.296*** 
 (0.0819) (0.1589) 
South East -0.926*** -2.365*** 
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 (0.0778) (0.1472) 
South West -0.915*** -2.237*** 
 (0.0820) (0.1565) 
Wales -0.378*** -0.893*** 
 (0.0913) (0.1682) 
Scotland -0.446*** -0.957*** 
 (0.0819) (0.1511) 
Northern Ireland -0.763*** -1.767*** 
 (0.0827) (0.1610) 
Constant 1.829*** -0.722** 
 (0.1580) (0.3238) 
Income Elasticity 0.222*** 0.464*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0306) 
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 78,867 78,867 
R-squared 0.053 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
Omitted categories: Male HRP, employee, left education before 




Table A4.13: Full OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (4.2) with ln(total expenditure) 
uninstrumented and instrumented by gross normal income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit IV (2SLS) IV Tobit 
Dependent Variable 𝑤( 𝑤( 𝑤( 𝑤( 
      
Ln(Total Expenditure) (/1000) -1.859*** 0.158 -2.350*** -3.358*** 
 (0.0848) (0.1558) (0.0955) (0.6485) 
Female HRP -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Age HRP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Self-employed -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.004***  
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Unemp. seeking work -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.005***  
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Unemp. about to work -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004  
(0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0035) 
Sick 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.004***  
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
Retired -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.008***  
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Unoccupied -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.006***  
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.005***  
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Left Education 18+ -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.011***  
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
North West -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005***  
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Merseyside -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***  
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Yorks. and Humber -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
East Midlands -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.006***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
West Midlands -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.005***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
East of England -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.007***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
London -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.008***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
South East -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.008*** 
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(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
South West -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.008***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Wales -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Scotland -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Northern Ireland -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.018*** -0.002 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0040) 
     
Income Elasticity 0.675*** 1.028*** 0.589*** 0.412*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0273) (0.0167) (0.1135) 
     
Month-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st Stage F-Statistic - - 65.264*** 65.264*** 
Observations 78,867 78,867 78,867 78,867 
R-squared 0.073 - 0.072 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Log total expenditure is divided by 1000 to allow coefficients 




Table A4.14: First-stage IV estimates 
 (1) 
Dependent Variable ln(Y)/1000 
  
Gross Normal Income 0.609*** 
 (0.0734) 
Self Employed 0.090*** 
 (0.0087) 
Unemp. (seeking work) -0.586*** 
 (0.0436) 








Left Education 17-18 0.123*** 
 (0.0086) 
Left Education 18+ 0.152*** 
 (0.0209) 




Yorks. and Humber 0.037*** 
 (0.0113) 
East Midlands 0.058*** 
 (0.0118) 
West Midlands 0.048*** 
 (0.0117) 




South East 0.125*** 
 (0.0139) 












Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes 
F-Statistic (1, 78693) 68.67*** 
Observations 78,867 
R-squared 0.470 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
Omitted categories: Male HRP, employee, left education 




Table A4.15: Full Heckman and double hurdle estimates of the Working-Leser model 






        
No Alcohol -0.298***   
 (0.0143)   
No Pork -0.198***   
 (0.0115)   
No Alcohol * No Pork -0.077***   
 (0.0204)   
Ln(Total Expenditure) /1000 -24.832 -9.640*** -32.165*** 
 (18.1572) (0.4238) (8.6294) 
Female HRP -0.123*** -0.003*** -0.062*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0002) (0.0052) 
Age HRP 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
Self Employed -0.236*** -0.002*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0004) (0.0085) 
Unemp. (Seeking work) -0.313*** -0.004*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0008) (0.0166) 
Unemp. (About to work) -0.287* 0.000 -0.137* 
 (0.1607) (0.0035) (0.0750) 
Sick -0.274*** -0.003*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0005) (0.0120) 
Retired -0.451*** -0.005*** -0.217*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0004) (0.0087) 
Unoccupied -0.375*** -0.004*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0006) (0.0113) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.241*** -0.003*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0003) (0.0064) 
Left Education 18+ -0.601*** -0.006*** -0.275*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0004) (0.0060) 
North West -0.210*** -0.004*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0005) (0.0130) 
Merseyside -0.114*** -0.002*** -0.056*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0006) (0.0169) 
Yorks. And Humber -0.202*** -0.003*** -0.099*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0005) (0.0132) 
East Midlands -0.281*** -0.004*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0005) (0.0134) 
West Midlands -0.243*** -0.003*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0005) (0.0131) 
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East of England -0.321*** -0.004*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0005) (0.0130) 
London -0.376*** -0.004*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0006) (0.0130) 
South East -0.388*** -0.005*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0005) (0.0125) 
South West -0.381*** -0.006*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0005) (0.0131) 
Wales -0.177*** -0.003*** -0.087*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0005) (0.0144) 
Scotland -0.147*** -0.003*** -0.072*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0005) (0.0134) 
Northern Ireland -0.299*** -0.005*** -0.146*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0005) (0.0137) 
Constant 0.625*** - - 
 (0.1258)   
Income Elasticity - -0.687*** -1.424** 
  (0.0742) (0.6503) 
lambda - 0.011*** - 
  (0.0007)  
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78,867 78,867 78,867 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Demographic controls omitted from reporting for 
brevity. In all columns ln(total expenditure) is divided by 1000 to allow coefficients 
to be legible. Income elasticity is calculated as 𝜂 = 1 + 𝛾/(1000 ∗ 0.00571) where 𝛾 is the coefficient on log total expenditure and 0.00571 is the mean expenditure share 
of lottery tickets. All columns have log total expenditure instrumented by gross 
normal income. The first stage is available in Appendix Table A4.14. Omitted 




4.8.3 Working-Leser model estimates with no demographic controls 
Table A4.16: First-stage with no demographic controls 
  (1) 
Dependent Variable ln(Y) 
   





Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes 
F-Statistic (1,78693) 112.96*** 
Observations 79,057 
R-squared 0.376 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** 
denotes statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level, respectively.  
 
Table A4.17: OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (4.2) with ln(total expenditure) 
uninstrumented and instrumented by gross normal income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit IV IV Tobit 
Dependent Variable 𝑤( 𝑤( 𝑤( 𝑤( 
      
Ln(Total expenditure)/1000 -2.751*** -2.075*** -3.264*** -5.285*** 
 (0.0764) (0.1365) (0.0705) (0.5158) 
Constant 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0031) 
Income Elasticity 0.519*** 0.637*** 0.429*** 0.075*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0239) (0.0123) (0.0903) 
     
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-Stage F-Statistic - - 112.96*** 112.96*** 
     
Observations 79,057 79,057 79,057 79,057 
R-squared 0.036 - 0.035 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Income elasticity is calculated as 𝜂 = 1 + 𝛾/(1000 ∗0.00571) where 𝛾 is the coefficient on log total expenditure and 0.00571 is the mean 
expenditure share of lottery tickets. Log total expenditure is divided by 1000 to allow 
coefficients to be legible. Columns 3 and 4 have log total expenditure instrumented by 




Table A4.18: Heckman selection and double hurdle estimates of the Working-Leser 
model without demographic controls 






     
No Alcohol -0.306***   
 (0.0140)   
No Pork -0.269***   
 (0.0112)   
No Alcohol * No Pork -0.080***   
 (0.0200)   
Ln(Total Expenditure)/1000 -100.826*** -12.049*** -73.280*** 
 (11.5683) (0.2468) (5.6302) 
Constant 0.848*** - - 
 (0.0851) - - 𝜆 - 0.009*** - 
 - (0.0006) - 
Income Elasticity - -1.109*** -4.522*** 
 - (0.0432) (0.4242) 
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 79,057 79,057 78,988 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Demographic controls omitted from 
reporting for brevity. In all columns ln(total expenditure) is divided by 1000 to 
allow coefficients to be legible. Income elasticity is calculated as 𝜂 = 1 +𝛾/(1000 ∗ 0.00571) where 𝛾 is the coefficient on log total expenditure and 
0.00571 is the mean expenditure share of lottery tickets. All columns have log 
total expenditure instrumented by gross normal income. The first stage is 




Table A4.19: Heckman and double-hurdle estimates of the Working-Leser model with 
controls for household size  








     
No Alcohol -0.261*** - - 
 (0.0145)   
No Pork -0.148*** - - 
 (0.0117)   
No Alcohol * No Pork -0.101*** - - 





 (28.9541) (0.6217) (0.2252) 
Household Size 0.345*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Female HRP -0.073*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Age HRP 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Self Employed -0.228*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Unemp. (Seeking work) -0.469*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0008) (0.0002) 
Unemp (About to Work) -0.342** -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.1612) (0.0035) (0.0013) 
Sick -0.428*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Retired -0.487*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
Unoccupied -0.493*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Left Education 17-18 -0.178*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Left Education 18+ -0.508*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
North West -0.185*** -0.004*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Merseyside -0.107*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Yorks. and Humber -0.181*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
East Midlands -0.259*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
West Midlands -0.228*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
East of England -0.276*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
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London -0.345*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
South East -0.325*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
South West -0.342*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Wales -0.168*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Scotland -0.119*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Northern Ireland -0.296*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Income Elasticity - -1.202*** -0.350*** 
  (0.1088) (0.0394) 
Lambda - 0.011*** - 
  (0.0008)  
Constant 1.771*** - - 
 (0.1646)   
    
    
Observations 78,867 78,867 78,867 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Demographic controls omitted from reporting for 
brevity. In all columns ln(total expenditure) is divided by 1000 to allow coefficients to 
be legible. Income elasticity is calculated as 𝜂 = 1 + 𝛾/(1000 ∗ 0.00571) where 𝛾 is 
the coefficient on log total expenditure and 0.00571 is the mean expenditure share of 
lottery tickets. All columns have log total expenditure instrumented by gross normal 





The purpose of this thesis was to address three topics surrounding the economics of 
gambling. Beyond the unifying theme of gambling, the three main chapters are also linked by 
in their application of modern statistical techniques to the best available data in order to 
approach their respective research questions. In doing so, all three chapters present results 
which are both novel and important to the literature and which are not only of interest to 
academics, but to policy makers and the industry as a whole. Chapter 2 addresses the extent to 
which individuals who are defined as problem gamblers are harmed by their affliction. 
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate issues surrounding the UK’s most popular gambling product – 
lotto. In Chapter 3 the game is found to be poorly designed when considering its primary 
objective of maximising revenues for good causes and tax – and even more so since changes 
to its design in 2015. Chapter 4 uses modern econometric techniques to evaluate the extent to 
which the incidence of high rates of tax levied on lotto are borne disproportionately by the 
poor. The results suggest that lotto is even more regressive than previously thought and that 
lotto is not a normal good as evidence in the previous literature suggests; instead, lottery tickets 
should be classified as inferior.  
5.1 Summary of Chapter 2 
 Chapter 2 attempts to quantify the extent to which problem gambling causes harm to 
afflicted individuals. To answer this question, an increasingly popular well-being methodology 
is employed in which well-being is estimated as a function of problem gambling and income, 
plus other controls. This methodology enables, by dividing the resultant coefficient on the 
former by the coefficient on the latter, a money metric of the loss in well-being associated with 
being a problem gambler. Baseline estimates place this value – also known as the compensating 
variation – at £90,000 per annum for the average problem gambler. Whilst the prevalence of 
problem gambling is small, less than 1% of the population, there are an estimated 300,000 
problem gamblers in the UK, implying the aggregate well-being loss is in excess of £31 billion 
per year.  
Evaluating the effect of problem gambling on well-being is a useful methodology since 
it can, in essence, be viewed as a catch-all measure of the welfare effects of the condition. This 
gives the methodology, at least in principle, superiority over studies which evaluate the cost of 
problem gambling by aggregating the associated externalities such as crime and labour market 
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effects. Analysis of externalities necessarily avoids the cost of problem gambling to the 
afflicted individual, which the analysis here finds to be significant, and is susceptible to missing 
some costs if all externalities are not known or accounted for. However, the well-being 
methodology is still in its relative infancy and criticisms of the approach are addressed directly 
in Chapter  2. Treating self-reported well-being (on a 1-10 scale) as cardinal, as is the case with 
OLS, is unlikely to be a valid assumption. Bond and Lang (2010) argue that these well-being 
scores are categorical in nature and the reported values correspond to some interval along a 
continuous distribution. They argue that monotonic transformations of the underlying utility 
function can reverse the ranking of these intervals and instead the measure can only be safely 
treated as ordinal. Several transformations in well-being are considered but have no significant 
effect on the headline estimate of compensating variation. Using an ordered probit model, 
which treats the reported well-being scores as ordinal rather than cardinal per the 
recommendation in Bond and Lang (2010), yields higher estimates of the cost of problem 
gambling (£50 billion per annum) than OLS, suggesting that the effect measured using OLS 
may be a lower bound on the cost of well-being.  
The money metric derived using the well-being methodology is susceptible to 
measurement error in both income and problem gambling. The presence of measurement error 
in either of these covariates will bias their respective coefficients towards zero, increasing 
(decreasing) the estimated compensating variation when it is present in the former (latter). 
Income in the dataset used is recorded in intervals, which are undesirable for the methodology, 
so correction for measurement error and to obtain a continuous income variable is done using 
interval regression, the results of which are very conventional. Fortunately, the data contains 
two measures of problem gambling and measurement error in one screen is corrected by using 
the score in the other as an instrumental variable. Again, this yields even higher estimates of 
the cost of problem gambling than the baseline OLS, precisely because of measurement error 
attenuating the coefficient on problem gambling towards zero.  
OLS estimates of the compensating variation, whilst novel to the literature and 
important in their own right, do not provide a causal interpretation on the cost of problem 
gambling. Attempting to find a causal estimate of this effect is done using parental gambling 
behaviour as an instrumental variable. Finding an instrument is particularly difficult for 
problem gambling since the proportion of problem gamblers is so small it will almost certainly 
lead to a weak instrument problem and is evident in the estimates in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, 
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the importance of finding a causal estimate warrants its inclusion and indicates again much 
higher costs than the baseline estimates. 
Chapter 2 concludes by investigating the mediating role of gambling expenditure on 
reduction in well-being associated with being a problem gambler. Uncovering such effects is 
important since it would provide some evidence to policy makers on the effectiveness of 
taxation in mitigating the harm of problem gambling. Mediation analysis here is, however, 
severely hampered by the presence of measurement error in these expenditures which is self-
reported and again recorded in intervals in the data. Moreover, there is no obvious candidate 
variable in the data with which these expenditures could be instrumented to correct for this 
measurement error. Thus, for most gambling types, the expenditure has no effect on well-being 
and it is unclear whether this is due to measurement error or because there is simply no effect. 
Nonetheless, expenditures on two of the most popular gambling products – lotto and 
scratchcards – are measured fairly well when compared to aggregate-level data and are 
considered as potential mediators. Spending on scratchcards are found to have a statistically 
significant mediating role on the impact of being a problem gambler, whereas lotto expenditure 
is not. 
 It would, however, be unwise to conclude from these estimates that tax policy targeted 
at scratchcards in the hope it would generate substitution effects towards the benign lotto game 
would be effective in mitigating the harm associated with problem gambling. Future work 
would need to incorporate own- and cross-price elasticities of all gambling products to evaluate 
whether taxation of the different goods would generate substitution effects towards benign 
products. Moreover, future work could improve upon the estimates here with better expenditure 
data being recorded alongside well-being, problem gambling and income to investigate more 
accurately and across all gambling products whether expenditure has any mediating effects. 
Moreover, policies which target behavioural origins of problem gambling may be more 
effective in reducing the associated costs and future research on this would also be beneficial. 
5.2 Summary of Chapter 3  
Chapter 3 addresses the role which the design of the UK’s most popular gambling 
product – lotto – influences demand for the game. Lotto is a particularly important product to 
analyse not only because of its popularity amongst players but also because of its popularity 
with governments and charitable organisations as a means of raising tax dollars and financing 
public good provision. In this chapter, the demand for lotto is first modelled under the 
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assumption that sales are driven by the effect of rollovers on the mean of the prize distribution 
– i.e. via the expected value of a lotto ticket. This approach is popular in the literature as it 
facilitates the estimation of a price elasticity of demand and tests of this against -1 are often 
used to determine whether the current design of the game is maximising the revenues used 
towards public good provision. 
Much of the existing literature identifies such models of lotto demand by instrumenting 
price with either the occurrence or size of rollovers or both. However, the pari-mutuel design 
of lotto means that rollover size is simply a pre-determined proportion of sales in the previous 
draw, and if sales are autocorrelated then rollover size is not exogenous to sales and is an 
invalid instrument. Rollover occurrence is also an invalid instrument since the likelihood of a 
rollover occurring is dependent on the number of unique tickets sold in the previous draw. A 
primary contribution of Chapter 3 is then to provide a novel identification strategy for the price 
model of lotto demand. Rollover occurrence is instrumented using the numbers which form 
part of the winning configuration and the rationale is based on exploiting systematic non-
random number selection by lotto players – termed “conscious selection” by the industry. A 
peculiar feature of the UK lotto is the award of a fixed prize for matching 3 of the 6 numbers 
which make the winning configuration and the fact that these prizes are paid before the 
remaining prize money is allocated to the pari-mutuel prize pools. As such, unexpected 
variation in the number of winners of the 3-ball prize exogenously affects the size of the pari-
mutuel prizes available, including the jackpot prize which becomes the rollover size if there 
are no winners. To instrument rollover size, then, this random variation in fixed prize winners 
is used.  
The resultant estimates of price elasticity of demand for lotto are -0.6 for the more 
popular Saturday draws and -1.5 for Wednesday draws, indicating inelastic demand for the 
former and elastic demand for the latter. These estimates suggest that the game is not revenue 
maximising and could improve its tax and good causes funding by increasing the price of 
Saturday draws relative to Wednesday draws – a new finding for the literature.  
A common criticism of models of lotto demand in which price is the key dependent 
variable is that it is based on expected utility theory which is notoriously ineffective at 
explaining why gambling occurs amongst otherwise risk-averse individuals. Moreover, the 
definition of the price of lotto tickets is little more than an arbitrary functional form of rollovers. 
Thus, Chapter 3 further extends the research base by estimating models in which rollovers 
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directly affect demand. The same instrumental variables strategy is employed to overcome the 
endogeneity of rollover size, and estimates suggest £1 million increases in the jackpot prize 
from rollovers increases Saturday sales by around £1.8 million and Wednesday sales by £0.5 
million. Non-nested testing of this reduced form model of rollover size against the price model 
proved inconclusive suggesting future research could improve upon the estimates presented 
here by assuming some other functional form of the prize distribution. Semi-parametric 
estimation, in which rollover size is fully flexible in its role in determining lotto ticket sales is 
not statistically different from quadratic or cubic parameterisations for Wednesday draws, but 
is statistically different for Saturdays for the same specifications.  
Finally, Chapter 3 examines major re-designs to the UK’s main lotto game in 2013 and 
2015, which were likely implemented in response to declining sales figures. Simple 
comparison of pre- and post-redesign revenues shows that the 2013 changes were a relative 
success, increasing sales from an average of £44.5 million per week to £49.8 million – 
equivalent to over £275 million per year in extra revenues. The 2015 renovation of the game 
proved less successful, seeing sales return to their pre-2013 levels. Thorough analysis of the 
effectiveness would require knowledge of the level of sales had the game re-designs never 
occurred. Attempts to forecast sales out of sample from the models developed in Chapter 3 
mirror the declining trend in sales pre-2013, indicating the game changes were more successful 
than simply comparing sales figures suggests. However, these forecasts could be improved 
with a more complete simulation of lotto design and the effects of changing the game 
parameters in future research. 
5.3 Summary of Chapter 4 
Lotteries’ usefulness as a means of raising public finance means many of the games 
around the world are either operated directly by, or under strict license from, the state and often 
with large take-out rates. In addition to deadweight losses generated by such high taxes there 
is an additional strand to the literature surrounding the extent to which the incidence of these 
taxes is disproportionately borne by the poor. Since taxes imposed on lotteries are constant, 
analysis of whether they are regressive, progressive or proportional can be achieved by 
determining whether the income elasticity for the game is less than, greater than or equal to 1, 
respectively. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature surrounding the regressivity of lotto 
taxation by estimating a Working-Leser model of household demand for lottery tickets using a 
large household-level survey – the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). 
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Much of the existing literature approaches the question of regressivity of lotto taxation 
by estimating a linear expenditure model in which income is linear in the level of tickets 
purchased. Replicating this approach using the aforementioned data yields very similar 
estimates to those in the existing literature of between 0.22 and 0.46. These estimates would 
indicate that lotteries are classed as a necessity good and, since they are below the critical value 
of 1 for proportionality, indicate that taxes on lotto are regressive. The linear expenditure model 
is, however, often criticised in the wider economics literature for its lack of microeconomic 
foundation and poor fit statistics when taken to such micro-level data.  
Instead, Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature by estimating a Working-Leser 
model of household demand for lottery tickets to obtain income elasticity estimates. Rather 
than modelling the level of tickets demanded as a function of income, the budget share of 
lottery tickets is instead estimated as a function of log income. The preferred estimates of this 
model suggest that the income elasticity for lotto tickets is between -1.4 and -0.7, which is 
significantly lower than previous estimates and well below the critical value of 1 for 
proportional taxation. Furthermore, these estimates suggest taxes imposed on lotteries are even 
more regressive than previously thought and that lotteries are not a necessity good as is the 
conventional wisdom, rather they should be classed as inferior.  
The large difference in the income elasticity estimates from the two models considered 
in Chapter 4 highlights the importance of correctly specifying the model used when model the 
relationship between lottery expenditure and income. The preferred Working-Leser model still 
imposes a strict (log-linear) functional form on the relationship between income and the budget 
share of lotto tickets. Thus, as an additional contribution of the chapter, a semi-parametric 
model is pursued to allow the data to dictate the shape of this function. Due to the large dataset 
used here, this estimator is well determined and shows that the budget share of lotto tickets is 
positively related to income at the very lower end of the distribution, before peaking well below 
median income and then falling rapidly over the rest of the distribution. Tests of fully flexible 
specification against the parametric estimates reveals that polynomial expansions up to cubic 
in log income are statistically different. Nonetheless, the Working-Leser model estimates 
presented here offer a novel finding for the literature and indicate that lotto taxes are even more 
regressive than previously thought.  
Using household-level expenditure data presents a number of econometric issues. 
Primarily, the presence of zeroes in lotto expenditure leads to biased coefficients when 
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estimating via OLS. The simplest approach to correcting for this bias, using a Tobit model, is 
undesirable because it imposes the strict assumption that the independent variables have the 
same effect on the household’s participation and consumption decisions. The analysis in 
Chapter 4 uses Heckman’s selection model and Cragg’s double-hurdle routine to overcome 
this issue, both of which allow the independent variables to affect the participation and 
consumption decisions separately. However, the two-stage nature of these routines present 
identification issues of their own. In order to overcome this identification issue, Chapter 4 
exploits exogenous differences in consumption behaviour which arises because of religious 
belief as an exclusion restriction. 
The final contribution of Chapter 4 is to estimate Suits’ index of tax regressivity – a 
Gini-style metric which allows comparison of the regressivity of different taxes. The key 
determinant for this index is whether the computed index is less than, greater than, or equal to 
0 which indicates regressive, progressive and proportional taxes, respectively. This index is 
calculated at -0.36 using the present data – considerably smaller than much of the existing 
literature – and supports the findings from income elasticity estimates that lotto taxes are much 
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